


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5 MARCH 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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5 MARCH 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SDI IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PRESENTED TO REAGAN

LD181357 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 18 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 18 TASS--TASS correspondent Igor Ignatiyev reports:

The Reagan administration's "hawks" hasten to embark on the deployment of a large-scale ABM system with space-basing elements. WASHINGTON POST reports that at a White House meeting on December 17, 1986, President Reagan was treated to an unusually specific version of a plan for the implementation of the "Star Wars" program.

Reagan was told the United States could begin deployment an "initial" network of ABM defense with space-basing elements by 1994. This message was brought to him by Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, the SDI director, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle.

WASHINGTON POST writes the presentation of this version at the White House has been widely interpreted within the government as an effort by SDI proponents to move Star Wars from research to deployment. The newspaper writes such a recommendation to Reagan is under consideration at the Pentagon.

The reason behind the stormy activity launched by "hawks" in the administration and by the Pentagon that seek a sharp stepping up of the rates of SDI implementation is, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, a recognition that they can count on only two more years of unequivocal support from the Oval Office. The right-wing circles fear that after the 1988 presidential elections the fate of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" might be uncertain.

The efforts toward an early militarisation of outer space evoke the growing concern of sober-minded Americans. A report of the authoritative public organization, Center for Defense Information, issued here says that the implementation of the "Star Wars" program combined with the deployment of inter-continental ballistic missiles by the USA enhances the risk of a chance outbreak of nuclear war. Director of the Center for Defense Information retired Rear Admiral Gene Larocque said that there might be a malfunction in the fully-automated

"Star Wars" system that might lead to an outbreak of nuclear conflict. Former head of the U.S. delegation to the talks with the USSR on Strategic Arms Limitation, Paul Warnke, said in an interview to the ABC television network that SDI is blocking any progress in the sphere of arms control.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GERASIMOV WRITES ON EARLY SDI DEPLOYMENT

PM031155 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Jan 87 p 7

[Gennadiy Gerasimov "Saturday Commentary": "SDI Sophistry"]

[Text] They kept telling us: What are you worried about, the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) is purely a research program, a journey into the unknown with an uncertain outcome. Maybe something will come of it, maybe not. Paul Nitze, the leading U.S. Government expert even proposed rigid criteria for giving SDI the go-ahead. Specifically, the planned ABM defense was to be truly impenetrable and the creation of additional means to penetrate it was to be more expensive than its reinforcement.

Only having travelled this long and thorny path, equivalent to at least seven Manhattan projects (for the creation of the atom bomb) would it be possible to decide where to go from there -- whether the ABM defense would be deployed [razvertivat] or whether it was not worth the cost.

Consequently, the U.S. agreement to abide by the 1972 treaty on the limitation of ABM defense systems for another 8-10 years was interpreted by some people as presenting necessity as a virtue. There was no reason to abandon the treaty earlier since SDI would take at least 10 years to materialize.

Then suddenly U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger gets up and opens his mouth; he is saying what the Pentagon has been thinking about. The Defense Secretary is saying that it is necessary to deploy [razvertivat] "the first phase of ABM defense" "as soon as possible," preferably "within the next few years." Naturally, the defense secretary blabs out, the first phase must serve as a basis for nationwide defense.

All kind of questions are cropping up. What has happened to Nitze's criteria? What has happened to the statements about SDI being purely a research program at the present stage? What has happened to respect for the ABM Treaty? Is it still a treaty which the United States will observe in the course of the next 10 years, or is it no more than a crumpled piece of paper?

A revision of the timetable for deployment [razvertyvaniye] calls into question the U.S. position at the Geneva talks. Secretary of State George Shultz explains: "According to the proposal as it stands and given the right circumstances, a pledge to observe the existing treaty -- that is, not to withdraw from it or in other words, to refrain from deployment [razvertyvaniye] for a period of 10 years -- is envisaged. Of course, with time, this could be amended."

By "amended" he means of course shortening the period in question. But this is, after all, a fundamental issue -- the reinforcement of the ABM Treaty provisions. Shultz is warning that an "amendment" aimed at annulling the ABM Treaty provisions is possible.

The questions are multiplying. "Is the Reagan administration adhering to the stance adopted in Reykjavik?" -- THE WASHINGTON POST asks. "Is it sticking to Reagan's promise not to deploy SDI in the next 10 years or is it moving toward reviewing this position?"

The cacaphony coming out of Washington is even baffling people with the sharpest political hearing. Weinberger is pressing on with "the first phase," Shultz is threatening an "amendment," Reagan is keeping mum. Weinberger is talking about a territorial ABM defense, about a "shield above the continent" rather than above specific targets.

Whatever the case may be, it is possible to note a departure from the thesis that SDI is a "research" program. It is possible to note that this departure places those U.S. allies who have agreed to take part in SDI research in an awkward position. This is the case with Japan, for instance, which has stipulated that its participation should be confined to research only.

Senators W. Proxmire and B. Johnston and representatives of the public organization Union of Concerned Scientists held a press conference in Washington 20 January in the course of which they opposed an early or a phased deployment [razvertyvaniye] of ABM defense componenets.

Experts estimate the cost of the "first phase" at approximately \$100 billion.

All this, it was pointed out at the press conference, will not be of substantial significance either for the protection of the country's population or the defense of military installations. It will however undermine the process of arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Most probably this is where the explanation has to be sought for the U.S. Defense Secretary's sudden bout of importance: The aim is to physically remove every possibility of reviewing the U.S. decision on the creation of ABM defense.

At the same time Max Kampelman, the U.S. representative at the Geneva talks, says that the United States is sticking to the promise not to deploy [razvertyvat] ABM within the next 10 years which it gave in Reykjavik.

THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote 21 January:

"It is becoming increasingly difficult for Americans to believe that President Reagan really wants to establish control over nuclear arms together with the Soviet Union at a time when he has lost control over his own administration as regards this problem."

So what are other people to believe?

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GERASIMOV BRIEFING: REAGAN, FRG ON SDI

Cites Reagan's Address

LD291504 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1358 GMT 29 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)--In his State of the Union address to Congress President Reagan verbally proclaimed U.S. readiness for dialogue but in fact spoke in a spirit of confrontation, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Department, said at a briefing here today. In particular, the President tried to blame the USSR for tension in the world and for the failure of the Reykjavik meeting and cited false data about Soviet military expenditure. The USSR Foreign Ministry representative recalled the U.S. side came empty-handed to the Icelandic capital and was unable to present anything apart from its old proposals.

The United States' insistent striving to push through its Star Wars program undermined the possibility of an understanding in Reykjavik. This program and the task of limiting the arms race are incompatible.

Is it possible to combine a willingness to arrange dialogue with the USSR with the stereotyped assertions about the "Soviet threat," "Soviet expansionism" and so forth, which have already been repeated ad nauseam, and which were strewn throughout the U.S. President's address?

The President asserts that "as a result of the efforts to restructure U.S. might, the world has become a safer place." It is scarcely possible to find an assertion further from reality than that thesis. Yes, the U.S. military might has increased during the time that the present administration has been in office thanks to accelerated militaristic measures. This is a fact. It is also a fact that the \$1.5 trillion which Washington has thrown into military preparations has resulted in an unprecedented intensification of the arms race throughout the world, which is now on the threshold of transferring this arms race to space. International security, including U.S. security, has not increased but on the contrary has decreased, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stressed.

FRG SDI Participation

LD291644 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT 29 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS -- According to reports in the Western press, a firm named "Institute of Solid-State Lasers" was set up in West Berlin in December 1986 which, as is pointed out, will take part in work under "Eureka" programme and will be geared to research on the U.S. SDI programme, Gennadiy Gerasimov, spokesman for the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry, said at a briefing here.

"As far as we know," he said, "this 'institute' is being set up on the basis of a laboratory at West Berlin's technical university. It should be noted in this connection that in real fact a West Berlin institution might find itself involved in research on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative which has military applications," Gerasimov pointed out.

The spokesman of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry emphasized that that contradicted the demilitarized status of West Berlin and ran counter to the principle of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin according to which the situation there can not be changed unilaterally.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA CITES U.S. OPPONENTS OF SDI

PM151407 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own Correspondent A. Blinov article: "United States: Gambling on 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Washington--U.S. President Ronald Reagan has once more demonstrated the U.S. side's lack of readiness for serious dialogue on disarmament questions.

In the official statement which he issued shortly after meeting with leaders of the U.S. delegation to the seventh round of talks on nuclear and space arms due to begin in Geneva on 15 January, the White House head claimed that the United States is striving to "lower the level of nuclear armaments for the sake of more secure U.S.-Soviet strategic relations." But, he stated, the United States has no intention of abandoning SDI. Furthermore, in the U.S. President's words, "it is vitally important for Western security to implement the SDI program as quickly as possible."

Despite the clear language of the 1972 ABM Treaty, Reagan claimed that this document allows the research, development, and testing of the space arms systems envisaged under the "Star Wars" program.

The statement by the U.S. President, who is campaigning for the rapid implementation of SDI, was quickly clarified by Defense Secretary C. Weinberger. Addressing the Senate Armed Services Committee, he reported that the Pentagon has no intention of waiting until the development of the SDI program is fully complete. Weinberger said that as individual SDI systems leave the development stage it will be possible to begin their gradual deployment.

The administration's course of accelerating work on SDI was criticized by prominent specialists and public figures at a press conference held at the U.S. Congress. According to R. Garvin, scientific staffer of the T. Watson Research Center, the administration's intention to carry out the gradual commissioning of the SDI system is a "stupid move" which essentially torpedoes

the ABM Treaty. The USSR will be able to effectively oppose that with its own countermeasures, R. Garvin stated. According to former CIA Director W. Colby the "Star Wars" program will lead not to the strengthening of Western and U.S. security, as the White House claims, but to the opposite--to a higher level of danger.

The press conference heard an analysis entitled "Security Without 'Star Wars'" presented by Betty Lall, former employee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and commissioned by the authoritative Council on Economic Priorities. The analysis convincingly shows that the work on SDI will lead to the intensification of the arms race, which will ultimately harm the security of the United States itself.

Instead of undermining the ABM Treaty by its own actions the United States should recognize the need to strictly observe this important arms control agreement and work toward enshrining it in the form of an additional accord with the Soviet Union, B. Lall stressed.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR SCIENTISTS CONFIDENT OF COUNTERING SDI

PM141101 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 11 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by B. Komzin and A. Podberezkin, scientific assistants at the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute: "The Response Will Be Effective; Scientists Discuss Possible Countermeasures to 'Star Wars'"--first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "Last year showed that the U.S. Administration is stubbornly dodging a solution to the questions of limiting the race in both nuclear and space arms. In an attempt to achieve military-strategic superiority, Washington is gambling on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.' What might our response to SDI be?" asks A. Dadashev, chief power engineer at the Montin Oil Drilling Machine Building Plant in Baku.

It must be borne in mind that U.S. President R. Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative"--or SDI for short--is not just a program for creating [sozdaniye] an antimissile defense system with space-based elements. SDI is a range of programs for the creation [sozdaniye] of offensive arms and military hardware which could be used for aggressive purposes. And we realize that we must be prepared to rebuff aggression. That is why measures to counter SDI must inevitably be developed (razrabatyvatsya). Soviet and U.S. specialists are spotlighting active and passive measures.

Active measures include various land-, sea-, and space-based means. Their use derives from the features of the SDI system. First, the elements of this system, as R. Bowman, director of the U.S. Institute for Space and Security Studies, has noted, are extremely vulnerable. Their sensors [datchiki], energy sources, and electronics are undefended. "Star weapons" elements such as reconnaissance, identification, target indication, and combat control satellites have outer shells no thicker than saucepans or car bodies. And all these objects have been in full view of active countermeasures for quite a long time.

One possible means is to exploit the high orbiting speed of the space objects themselves. Even a simple encounter with an obstacle--"artificial meteorites," for instance--would be a devastating "blow."

Elementary calculations show that given a closing speed of 15 km per second a particle weighing the equivalent of six 5-kopek pieces could literally "pierce" a modern tank's 150 mm armor, not to mention the outer shell of a satellite. This is confirmed by direct observations, during which a U.S. electronic "cannon" easily pierced a massive aluminum casting by using a "shell" weighing seven grams accelerated to a speed of 7 km per second. The dispersion of small clouds of even microscopic particles in orbit could create defects on the mirror surfaces which would hamper the focusing of the laser beam, while larger shrapnel-like objects would be equivalent to a catastrophic meteorite strike in terms of their consequences.

Nor should we fail to mention the possible use of antisatellite systems which are already an effective weapon at the present time. Thus, one Pentagon expert has claimed that several squadrons of aircraft equipped with interceptor missiles could "clear the sky" of enemy space hardware in 24 hours. If that is so, the same missiles could also destroy space-based elements in the SDI system.

Second, irrespective of what kinds of "star weapons" are deployed where, they will be totally dependent on various types of auxiliary space systems--combat control and communications satellites. The operations of nuclear-pumped lasers--which are planned to be sited on SLBM's--is also dependent on them. This means that any arm of the SDI system is potentially vulnerable to both traditional and new antisatellite means. And in order to neutralize this system it is by no means vital to hit all the system's space-based components. It is sufficient, for instance, to put the early warning satellites or some other component out of action.

Thus, by detonating a nuclear device at high altitude the "working life" of most of the satellites could be sharply reduced. On passing through the radioactive belts they would pick up radiation dangerous to their electronics, sensors, and optics. According to foreign specialists, the detonation of a single nuclear device in the atmosphere would be guaranteed to "blind" all sensors within a 100 km radius and put them out of action for minutes.

It is quite possible to even avoid detonating nuclear devices. "It is not ruled out," Soviet specialists R. Sagdeyev and S. Rodionov believe, "that existing millimetric wave generators can produce something equivalent to an electromagnetic pulse over distances of up to 1,000 km." The only way of defending the highly complex range of SDI systems is to reliably shield all important components and elements. And that is currently an unresolved task.

Third, the vulnerability of space strike arms is further complicated by the fact that the space platforms on which they would be based would be comparatively large in size, heavy, and placed in relatively low orbits. Whereas countermeasure devices installed on the ground, say, would be considerably smaller, many more of them could be made, they could be made more powerful, would be cheaper, and could be defended better and aimed more accurately. Finally, ground-based counterlasers, for instance, would not be limited in terms of power or size. Space-based weapons, A. Carter, the well-known U.S. specialist, believes, are "first-class targets" for countermeasures rather than positions for launching an attack.

Specialists in the USSR and abroad are also examining a number of passive but effective measures for countering SDI systems. In particular they believe that if the United States deploys space strike arms the response could be a quantitative buildup in the Soviet Union's offensive strategic means. Under these circumstances the USSR would be relieved of its voluntary commitment under the SALT II Treaty to limit the number of its nuclear delivery means and the construction of launch facilities for them. Understandably, this would substantially impact the effectiveness of the proposed SDI system.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union could also embark on a quantitative buildup in nuclear munitions deployed on delivery means. Or it could equip these means with a greater number of dummy warheads. This would also make it much harder to intercept them. In principle these measures could lead to a 10-fold increase in the real targets and a 100-fold increase in the dummy targets which the SDI means would have to destroy. Washington understands the situation. As R. De Lauer, U.S. under secretary of defense, has stated, "without limits on numbers (of offensive strategic arms--Authors' note) no defense system will work."

A straightforward quantitative buildup in developed missile and combat charge designs and in dummy delivery means and warheads not only devalues SDI. The workload placed upon certain space-based stations will exceed their combat potential.

Needless to say, this does not exhaust the possible retaliatory measures for countering SDI. Were a large-scale system of space strike arms to be created [sozdaniye] and deployed by the United States the latest achievements in the fundamental sciences and modern technology would make it possible to resolutely rebuff it, as a result of which the aggressor's actions would be neutralized.

But the USSR advocates a political solution to the problem of security, not a transfer of conflict to the sphere of military-technical rivalry. We have everything we need--the material and intellectual resources and the political will--to oppose the whipping up of the arms race.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS DERIDES 'MORALITY' OF REAGAN'S SDI

LD032024 Moscow TASS in English 2010 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

In his message to the national religious broadcasters annual convention, President of the United States Ronald Reagan declared that "a system of protection like SDI is morally superior to a system of devastating nuclear retaliation", that, furthermore, SDI would open new opportunities for maintaining peace.

One might agree with the President that there is, certainly, no high morality in a threat of nuclear retaliation. People the world over see the need for opening the dangerous situation. But how can this be done? How can a change for the better be achieved? What will really be in keeping with high moral criteria? There can be only one conclusion: To get rid of the Sword of Damocles, or speaking the language of our age, the nuclear sword looming over human civilisation.

The declaration of the head of the White House about "moral superiority" of SDI can only cause surprise. It can be recalled that even such a zealous proponent of the "Star Wars" programme as the Pentagon's chief Caspar Weinberger once admitted that there is a muddle in the discussion of moral aspect of SDI. And this muddle stems from the fact that its morality cannot be proved no matter what invented argumentation is used.

First, SDI is a programme to create weapons, and weapons directed not only against missiles, but also against targets in the atmosphere and on earth. Furthermore, this programme is aimed not at elimination of nuclear arms but at the creation of still more intricate and more lethal nuclear weapons.

Second, what the star warriors have in view is not the elimination of a system of nuclear retaliation but supplementing such an American system which space arms. They in Washington want to make "obsolete and impotent" Soviet weapons of retaliation, while upgrading and building such American weapons. This aim was openly proclaimed by U.S. official representatives more than once. Caspar Weinberger, for instance, said outright that creating SDI, the United States will also have a powerful "strategic triad" for dealing a devastating nuclear strike. And assistant of the Pentagon's chief explained that even after the deployment of a large-scale ABM system with space-basing elements, security will still be based on "nuclear deterrence forces."

Third, contrary to Ronald Reagan's assertions that SDI makes reaching agreements for a reduction of nuclear arsenals more likely, SDI is a barrier to such an agreement. This was confirmed at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, at the Geneva talks. And elementary logic, too, shows that reducing offensive arms when there is a threat of the deployment of SDI means assisting "star warriors" in their striving for strategic superiority.

All this shows that the White House has its own notion of morality, different from that of the whole world. A threat to humanity with nuclear strikes from space, preserving and even enhancing the effectivity of the U.S. "system of nuclear retaliation" while neutralising such a system in the opposite side, ensuring exclusive security for the United States and enhancing the threat for all others -- this is what the current U.S. Administration regards as highly moral.

Very indicative in this respect are recent pronouncements by Richard Perle in Munich. Foolishness bordering on absurdity, this is how he described suppositions that one fine day the world can be rid of nuclear armaments. Thus, Perle shattered the main propaganda thesis of the President, his declarations that a world free from nuclear arms is his aim, and said out loud what the White House is really thinking of.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA HITS U.S. BUILDING OF THULE RADAR STATION

PM301618 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 7 First Edition p 5

[Mikhail Kostikov "Commentator's Column": "In the Role of Underlings"]

[Text] Copenhagen -- The Pentagon is speeding up the creation of a sophisticated radar installation at the base at Thule in the extreme northwest of Greenland. [paragraph continues]

This base has long been used by the American military not only as a bridgehead for electronic espionage against the USSR and for the collection of intelligence information from satellites, but also as a center for planned nuclear missile operations in the north. Now they want to adapt it for the control of combat operations in outer space.

The siting of the new radar installation at the Thule base, the capital's POLITIKEN newspaper notes, citing information from a whole series of American and British arms control exports, undermines the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and is closely connected to the "Star Wars" plans. As the Western press reports, a similar radar station is also being created in the Fylingdales region (Britain).

As for Denmark (Greenland forms part of Denmark on the basis of international autonomy), such plans on Washington's part go against Copenhagen's official position. After all, according to a decision of the Folketing (parliament), in all international forums, including NATO, the government is obliged to come out against the "Star Wars" plans and space militarization in general, and for the need for strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. It is this contradiction that is the crux of the parliamentary question put recently by the Social Democratic faction together with other left-wing opposition parties to Foreign Minister U. Ellemann-Jensen. And although the question was really to the point, no answer has yet been received.

Greenland, which was farmed out to the Pentagon virtually by way of Denmark's "contribution" to NATO, is being turned into a major militarist bridgehead by the U.S. military. In the hands of the United States, it is becoming one of the main instruments for undermining the very foundations of Danish military policy and policy in the security sphere. This is being done blatantly behind the backs of the Danes, whose opinion Washington does not intend to reckon with; the building of the new radar installation is further confirmation of this. It will, in effect, place Denmark in the position of accomplice in the preparations for "Star Wars," of Pentagon's underling in undermining the foundations of the ABM Treaty.

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CSO: 5200/1272

BRIEFS

TASS ON U.S.-JAPANESE TALKS--Tokyo January 24 TASS--The third round of talks to work out specific terms for Japan's joining in the U.S. "Star Wars" programme ended in Washington today. The contents of the consultations are kept strictly secret, KYODO TSUSHIN news agency has reported. Yet it has become known that the sides have decided to continue the talks after next April. According to press reports, the bargaining between Tokyo and Washington over [word indistinct] for Japan's participation in the U.S. programme has bumped into serious difficulties as local businessmen are seriously worried over the Pentagon's attempts to lay its hands on technological achievements of its Far Eastern ally. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 24 Jan 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1272

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: BOVIN, PRIMAKOV ON REAGAN'S REMAINING TENURE

PM270959 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 4, 25 Jan 87 p 6

["MN Discussion Club" feature comprising articles by Aleksandr Bovin and Yevgeniy Primakov under general headline "Washington as Partner in Dialogue"; first two graphs are unattributed introduction"]

[Excerpts] On January 15, 1986, the Soviet Union put forward a programme for the establishment of a nuclear-free world, for ensuring humankind's survival. Is the present U.S. administration, shaken as it is by a number of political blows, able in the last two years of office to undertake serious reciprocal steps for disarmament, in the development of Soviet-American dialogue?

Their impressions on this theme are shared by political analyst Aleksandr Bovin and Academician Yevgeniy Primakov.

Before the End [subhead]

[Bovin] A lot has been said and written about the luck of President Reagan in the six years since he took office. During this period he has said and done what he shouldn't have and even sat back and dozed off when he shouldn't. Some people felt sorry for the President, while others mocked and sneered at him. But Ronald Reagan has always got out of tight situations, not only through luck but also through being an experienced and hardened politician, a skilled manipulator.

As a politician he has consistently defended the interests of the social groups that nominated him, and has enjoyed their invariable support.

As a manipulator, he has keenly sensed the sentiments of the "average American" and was able, relying in the traditional features of American mentality, to strengthen fierce nationalism, make hypocritical morality more boisterous and bring to psychosis the fear of the "Reds", fostered for decades.

The first major leak in the President's ship sprang up after Reykjavik. Those for and against the President could not but realize that the head of the U.S. Administration was unable to get a grasp on complex matters of modern strategy.

Yes, Before the End But... [subhead]

[Primakov] My friend Aleksandr Bovin, who is one of the top political analysts in this country, suggests that we should start thinking about the "post-Reagan" period. It always pays one to consider the future, particularly when one takes up politics. The tone of his commentary prompts the conclusion that Reagan is a figure of the past.

One shouldn't discard the possibility of Reagan being eager to make history, thus finally giving up blocking the way to reaching with the USSR accords on important disarmament issues. It would have been unfair to say that all Reagan was doing at Reykjavik was trying to diffuse the possibility of reaching accords with the USSR, that was steadily taking on a definite shape. The President has also had his "bright moments", which still leaves some of the hopes for the future afloat.

In any case, I do not wish to argue with Bovin, because I'm sure he thinks the same, that the efforts to promote our country's initiatives should be maintained during the remaining two years of Reagan's presidency. This is the only way to try to penetrate mentally the situation that will take shape after the term of Reagan's office is over.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW RESPONDS TO PERLE MUNICH SPEECH

'Brushes Aside' Nuclear Disarmament

LD011257 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0931 GMT 1 Feb 87

[Text] New York, 1 Feb -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Kikilo reports:

Whatever Richard Perle says, the Reagan administration has in mind. It is precisely that conclusion that arises from a reading of the speech the U.S. assistant defense secretary made in Munich.

As THE NEW YORK TIMES reported, citing the text of Perle's speech which has been circulated in Washington, he called any assumptions to the effect that "one fine day the world will be able to free itself of nuclear arms" "stupidity bordering on the absurd." According to the newspaper, this high-ranking Pentagon representative "completely brushed aside the idea of complete nuclear disarmament," calling it "a diversionary tactic" of the Soviet Union. Several Western statesmen had allegedly taken the bait, "in fear of losing public support, if they simply declined" that idea.

After the summit meeting in Iceland, the newspaper recalls in that connection, "the United States agreed with the principle of complete nuclear disarmament, and the White House at the same time stated that that was the 'ultimate goal' of President Reagan."

Although Perle stressed that his statements reflected only "his personal views," that is hardly likely to mislead anyone. The assistant secretary speaks not only for his immediate boss Caspar Weinberger, but also for other extremely influential forces in the administration itself, who have a decisive effect on the formulation of the White House's policy on the issue of nuclear arms. They also do not think of hiding their hostility toward the idea of complete and universal nuclear disarmament, which runs counter to their plans for an unrestrained buildup in U.S. nuclear arsenals aimed at achieving strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

It is significant that none of the high-ranking representatives of the administration have thought to put Perle in his place for embarking upon these revelations. This can hardly be called an accident in light of the unceasing attempts by Washington to emasculate the positive content of the Reykjavik dialogue and move away from the agreements in principle achieved there.

'Irresponsible Utterances'

LD012048 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Feb 87

[Igor Charikov "Rejoinder"]

[Text] The latest pearl from Richard Perle -- the rejoinder of our international commentator, Igor Charikov, who is at the microphone:

[Charikov] Richard Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, is one of the few Americans who understands and puts into practice his own brand of freedom of expression, who irresponsibly expresses himself and, it goes without saying, with impunity. He recently stated, for example, that the idea of freeing mankind from nuclear weapons was nonsense -- yes, that's just what he said, nonsense bordering on the absurd. Not very likely but a fact, as they say. The authenticity of the quotation can be confirmed by THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Yes, in truth, even this can be said in the United States. However, not by everyone. Let someone try to assert the opposite in public, saying that stockpiling the world with nuclear weapons is nonsense bordering on the absurd. In the most free of countries, it is possible to pay for such words in the literal sense -- by a fine or by imprisonment. In Richard Perle's case, it's water off a duck's back.

Incidentally, on the topic of birds: The assistant secretary of defense repeats the same words so often, albeit with feeling, that it is very tempting to compare him with a certain tropical bird with the ability to imitate people. I hope you understand which bird I'm talking about. In the company Richard Perle keeps there are quite a few birds, too, only of another kind, hawks for the most part, and it is their words and judgments that he pronounces aloud, like the previously mentioned mimic of the human voice.

Perle pronounces these hawks' pearls without thinking of the degree to which they are irresponsible. Freedom, in the given instance freedom of expression, in no way means permissiveness. After all, there should be some boundary in this between common sense and the senseless loathing of mankind. If we're talking seriously, there has been no lack of irresponsible utterances like that of Perle in the U.S. Capitol of late and on the lips of highly responsible individuals. It's enough to recall how President Reagan, in jest as it were, announced the forthcoming atomic bombardment of Soviet towns. He got away with the joke.

Judging by the evidence, Richard Perle will get away with his pearl, too. For not a single one of the administration high-ups has taken on the task of refuting, however slightly, the statement of the assistant secretary of defense which formally, I stress, formally contradicts the speeches and assurances of the White House.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS CITES REPORT ON U.S. SECURITY, ICBM, SDI STRATEGY

LD291432 Moscow TASS in English 1114 GMT 29 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 29 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatiyev reports:

The White House released President Reagan's report to U.S. Congress on the national security strategy of the United States.

That document, prepared by the National Security Council, amounts to the program statement of the administration on its goals in foreign and military policies in the next two years. However, as a senior administration official admitted to journalists, there is nothing new in the report. Indeed, it states on 40 pages the U.S. intention to carry on its erstwhile policy "from positions of strength," a "crusade" against the forces of socialism and progress, and also a course of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The contents of the report, as one of the correspondents noted, can be summed up in one word -- anti-communism.

The President formulates the priority foreign policy goals of the administration as a further U.S. arms buildup, "unimpeded U.S. access to the oceans and space," the strengthening of military blocs and alliances with Washington's partners, and also the escalation of pressure on the Soviet Union with every means available to Washington. The White House is going to seek all those goals with the tested instruments of its policy, such as armed strength, blackmail of sovereign states, the export of counterrevolution, and generous dollar "shots in the arm" to Washington's clients. The paramount priority of the U.S. in the military field, according to the report, is the continuation of the program for "re-arming America," launched by the Reagan administration, its pivot being the modernization of the strategic offensive forces. The priorities listed here include the deployment of first strike MX and Trident-2 ballistic missiles, new strategic bombers and cruise missiles and intensive work on the "Star Wars" program.

A separate section of the report is devoted to U.S. arms control policy. President Reagan repeats that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Yet, with the exception of the admission of this obvious truth, the document does not contain even a hint of Washington's readiness to revise its obstructionist stand at the nuclear arms limitation talks. Conversely, trying to justify the U.S. massive war preparations, the President claims that "it would be exceptionally dangerous to anticipate success in arms control." He even makes the absurd statement that "neglecting strategic modernization in expectation of arms reduction agreements" will decrease the likelihood of such agreements.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD TREATIES

LD242356 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 24 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program, presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov "of the Moscow-based Institute for United States of America and Canada Studies"]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] It's been 6 years since the Reagan administration assumed office. By next Wednesday we will know definitely what's ahead for the United States and for Soviet-American relations in general, in the remaining 2 years of the administration's tenure, because on 27 January, President Reagan is scheduled to make his regular State of the Union Address. So for this edition of "Top Priority", I suggest that we take a retrospective look at a, well, how shall I put it, what has been achieved in Soviet-American relations during these 6 years and perhaps what has not been achieved during this period. I don't think we should dig into anybody's personal qualities, that is what makes a good President and perhaps what makes a not so good one, so let's concentrate on Soviet-American relations. Who is going to get the ball rolling?

[Bogdanov] It's a very good question, but it's not a fair question. I mean by that, that if you put that question say 3, 4, 5, 6 months ago, then I would say it was a fair question. Now, when the administration passing through tremendous difficulties with the well-known Irangate or whatever you call it, your question sounds a little bit, you know, yes, provocative.

[Kuznetsov] Asking loaded questions is provocative, right?

[Bogdanov] Yes, these are the fair questions, but -- you know, I would divide it into two parts. As to the American problems, that is their business, and I wouldn't like to touch it upon. [as heard] Let them judge themselves how the Reagan administration was successful in the domestic scene. But there is one field which is of great concern to all of us sitting around this table, and I mean Soviet-American relations. And, you know, honestly, that's very easy question to answer, because there's no record of Soviet-American relations. There is a (?destruction) of Soviet-American relations, consequent (?destruction) by this administration beginning from treaties and ending with, if you like, the spirit of Soviet-American...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] But this is still a record.

[Bogdanov] Yes, if you call this a record, Pavel, OK, let it be a record. To be serious, you know, if you look at the structure of the Soviet-American relations, which were built up within the last 15 years, it was something like about 40 Soviet-American agreements, beginning from prevention of nuclear war, principles of the Soviet-American relations, two SALT treaties, ABM treaties, then some other agreements on transportation, in some economic cooperation.

[Kuznetsov] Cultural.

[Bogdanov] Even cultural programs. On heart, you know, artificial heart [as heard] and so on and so forth. Something like 40. It was, if you like, it was a solid base, legal base for the Soviet-American relations. What is left now, if I'm going to answer your question?

I'm sorry to say nothing is left, but ABM Treaty which is in very, ambiguous, you know, state, because if you interpret that in the large sense, as they call it, you know, or liberal, loose interpretation, then there is no more ABM Treaty. So I really wonder, what should I answer, what should I say about that question.

[Kuznetsov] I think you've already said enough on that, I mean, calling it an [word indistinct] record (?in Soviet-American relations).

[Bogdanov] Well, yes, I don't know what is my friend Sergey's opinion about that, but that's my feeling. I'm sorry, really.

[Kuznetsov] Professor Bogdanov, I don't think I quite agree with you when you say that the domestic field is up to the American people, their government, the Senate, what have you, to decide, because, for example, the United States is perhaps the biggest debtor nation. The current debt stands at over \$2 trillion, and this is largely because of the tremendous military spending, so some of the domestic problems are I think interconnected, and very closely at that, with foreign policy, and in this connection my question to you, Professor Plekhanov: The Reagan administration's military buildup is being described as the single most important factor which had enabled the United States to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. Now this is what President Reagan himself said in his weekly radio address on 17 January. Currently there is quite a good deal of probing of public opinion and that on the Capitol Hill, concerning early deployment of what is described as a thin layer of protective space weapons by the early 1990's at a cost ranging from \$100-200 billion. Do they want to go broke completely? Do you think that (?the idea) is technically feasible or sane? What is this early deployment all about? What's your view about that?

[Plekhanov] I think it's a desperate attempt to change the situation in the favor of those who do want to continue this job of destroying arms control treaties and trying to give the United States military superiority, because the doubts are mounting concerning the wisdom of going ahead with this SDI program. The program itself is undergoing some changes, and it's clear that building a shield which would or an astrodome which would protect the United States from Soviet missile is a pie in the sky, there's no possibility...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] So what's the purpose...

[Plekhanov interrupts] of building that. Well, a limited type of an ABM defense which would not protect the United States from a first strike by the Soviet Union but would be very good to complement the American first strike capability which would make the United States military posture far more threatening and dangerous.

[Kuznetsov] I don't think anybody believes in a Soviet first strike in the first place.

[Plekhanov] Of course, there is no such thing. The Soviet Union has renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, while the United States continues to adhere to the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons.

[Kuznetsov] Which makes the whole idea all the more sinister.

[Plekhanov] That's right, but the question of this speed-up in the SDI program is very serious, because the tenure of the Reagan administration is drawing to a close; they have lost control of the U.S. Senate. There is a greater resistance to some of the more extreme programs and policies in the military sphere.

[Plekhanov] Also there is a mechanism of Soviet-American arms control, and they want to destroy that too, because when you, well, destroying is always much easier than building, especially when you're talking about building trust and agreements between two large powers who are potential adversaries.

[Kuznetsov] Since this administration announced its Star Wars program in 1983, it has been described as a purely research program and there have been other statements explaining what SDI was all about. As far as I remember, President Reagan himself told a group of Soviet journalists who interviewed him in the White House, a couple of years ago, in 1985, that a defensive shield would not be put into space until we did away with our, all our offensive weapons -- he meant nuclear weapons. When such a statement comes from an American President I think that it should be taken for what it is. Such a statement completely, absolutely rules out even a hint at cheating, deceiving, misleading, etc. So it's supposed to be a responsible and serious statement from an American President. Let us go to [as heard] and see what happened in Reykjavik when such a compromise, when such a deal -- I mean getting rid of nuclear arms at the expense of space weapons -- was so close at hand. What happened then? How serious was President Reagan in 1985?

[Bogdanov] You know, Pavel, I came long ago to the conclusion which is becoming a firm belief that any American administration, and especially this administration, has at least two policies. One is which I call a declaratory policy, and the other one which I call operational policy, and they never mix. One is meant for public opinion, for the allies, for the other states, but there is another button, you know, that's the operational policy, what they are really doing. And you take the latest example of, you know, declaratory policy that they would never deal with any terrorist state, they would never supply arms, they would never do this and that and you know...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] They would never trade hostages for money.

[Bogdanov] They would never trade hostages for money, but their operational policy was quite different. [passage indistinct] He sanctioned that [words indistinct] You know, to be frank I'm not interested, really, was it, was he informed, has he sanctioned that or not? That is their business because that is the quality of the President, you know. [laughs] Does he know or does he not know. But I would like to relate all that to the questions you put and I would not be surprised, you know. You mention that interview in the White House, but you didn't mention one thing, that several hours after that the White House denied all that; they said no.

[Plekahnov and Kuznetsov] They disavowed the President.

[Bogdanov] They disavowed the President. The same happened in Reykjavik. We have on the record, you know, on the written record, that he has agreed to destroy all...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] Strategic offensive arms, and even all nuclear weapons.

[Bogdanov continues] All nuclear weapons. Ok, now they say not, he didn't (?mean that). That's the operational policy, declaratory -- what the President said often was a declaratory. So after Reykjavik he was once again disavowed. Once again. So what I'm aiming at is that you should not be surprised. That's the American political, you know, practice. That's the American political culture, if you like, and it all begins with the elections, you know. You look at any candidate. He promises hundreds of things, but immediately it's over all comes to usual (?trick), you know, the operational policy begins. So that's inherited, that's built in the American political culture. But I, they should imagine, they should think one day it makes difficult for any other state to keep normal relations with that kind of political culture.

[Kuznetsov] Perhaps they don't care about, about the difficulties, about the other side.

[Bogdanov] That's another point, that's American narcissism, you know, that they look at the other side as something meaningless, you know. Maybe, maybe, it's a high time to think over that the other side is also meaning something, it also has some interesting, [word indistinct]. You know what I mean?

[Kuznetsov] Yes, you are going to say something, Sergey.

[Plekhanov] I think this arrogance toward the rest of the world and this belief that America can do whatever it likes in international affairs is the most startling thing about the policies of this administration. You know, people who live in glass houses, just like everybody else on this planet. And I think the chickens are coming home to roost and I think they are already reaping the results of what they had sown. I think Irangate is symbolic in that effect. I mean, they threw their net around the world so widely and so boldly in all these machinations and arms sales, and financing of the contras, and what have you, and it has taken just one article in one small Lebanese newspaper to destroy that house of cards.

Because the world is so interdependent; it's a large global village where it's increasingly difficult to say one thing and do another thing, to hide people from (?the things), from public view, and no matter how big and powerful the United States is it will be taken to account for what it does, and I think this is one of the lessons of the Reagan administration, and unless this administration learns this lesson and takes, makes the appropriate conclusions, it will take another administration to do that.

[Kuznetsov] So there is no trust between our two countries and in the world in general because there is no disarmament, and there is no disarmament because there is no trust. I've heard this argument about trust and disarmament being totally separate, independent things. As time is running out on us I'd like both of you to comment on this argument and perhaps suggest a way out if you can.

[Bogdanov] You know, Pavel, my logic is very simple. OK, we have no trust. To build up a trust it's a very long way and a very difficult way. If you don't disarm, if you pile arms, you are (?piling) another mistrust, you know. But imagine for a while. OK, you have no trust, but at the same time, on the parallel, you are disarming...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] [Words indistinct] taking some concrete steps to reduce the arsenals.

[Bogdanov] To reduce deadly arsenals. By this itself, you are reducing, you know, mistrust. Less arms you have, more trust you have on the [words indistinct] I'm aiming at (?defining) that: disarmament first, then trust. What do you think of my logic, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I quite agree with it, I quite agree with it.

[Kuznetsov] So there is no trust between our two countries and in the world in general because there is no disarmament, and there is no disarmament because there is no trust. I've heard this argument about trust and disarmament being totally separate, independent things. As time is running out on us I'd like both of you to comment on this argument and perhaps suggest a way out if you can.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV ON U.S. BUDGET, SDI, SALT, DESIRE FOR 1987 SUMMIT

OW100421 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1105 GMT 9 Jan 87

[From the "World Today" program presented by Vladimir Tsvetov]

[Text] Hello comrades. I would like to begin the program with a commentary on the recent, frequent statements by U.S. Administration representatives on the desirability of a new summit meeting.

On 5 January, President Reagan submitted a draft state budget to the U.S. Congress. It provides for a 60-percent increase in allocations for the Star Wars program, a 23-percent increase in spending for MX strategic nuclear missiles, and a 93-percent increase in funds for Midgetman ICBM's. The following day, Larry Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, found it very appropriate to announce that President Reagan's invitation to the Soviet leader to visit the United States for talks was still valid. Another day passed, and none other than Richard Perle, U.S. assistant defense secretary who takes joy in living in an atmosphere of international tension, suddenly became optimistic in connection with the possibility, as he said, of a U.S.-Soviet summit in 1987.

Washington has refused to limit SDI work to laboratory walls. It has actually abrogated the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. The administration is not hiding its desire to abrogate the AMB treaty as well. Washington, which immediately after Reykjavik tried to wreck the package of agreements on the reduction of nuclear arms and extract from it only what is to U.S. advantage, has now even dropped this preoccupation.

The White House has returned to the year 1981. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Ronald Reagan, who came to power then, has established a strong alliance with anticommunist ideologists within and outside the administration who want to produce a quantity of arms sufficient to frighten the Soviet Union and to even come out a winner in a nuclear war.

Times are changing, and we are changing too. This has been said, but we cannot see it in the current U.S. Administration. The world around it is followed the laws of nature.

The Soviet Union has submitted so many concrete and clear initiatives aimed at eliminating nuclear arms by the 21st century. Therefore, there is growing dissatisfaction in the United States over the administration's obstructionist policy in the disarmament field. Under such circumstances, the White House must pretend it is changing with the passing of time and is ready to enter into negotiations.

Irangate, the scandal over the sale of arms to Iran and the transfer of funds from this deal to Nicaraguan Contras, is still raging in Washington. Former President Richard Nixon, who was involved in a similar scandal, Watergate, has taken on the role of wise advise. He has said that Reagan can reestablish his prestige with the aid of a successful arms control summit.

In the end it does not matter whether it is the pressure of U.S. and world public opinion or Irangate that will bring the White House to the conference table. What is of value is the final result, if it leads to the reduction and then the elimination of nuclear arms. But, the practical actions of the U.S. Administration radically differ from its statements about the desire for a meeting. Such thoughts come to mind when one reads and hears the statements of U.S. Administration representatives concerning a summit.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: ARMY DAILY SCORES OBSOLETE U.S. NUCLEAR DOGMAS

PM161403 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Yeshchenko article: "Washington's Old Dogmas"]

[Text] "The 20th century has given mankind the power of the atom. But this great gain of intellect may become an instrument of people's self-destruction," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed in his 15 January 1986 statement. Guided by the need to save global civilization from the fatal consequences of the arms race and a global nuclear conflagration, the USSR through this document put forward exactly 1 year ago a specific program for completely ridding the earth of nuclear weapons by the end of this century.

It is understandable that the creation of a world without nuclear weapons does not depend on the Soviet Union alone. It is a common task for all mankind. It can only be accomplished by all the peoples. But a special responsibility in this regard lies with the USSR and the United States. The Soviet Union has done its bit. Our side has shown political will and put forward bold and imaginative initiatives. Thanks to those initiatives real prospects for a nuclear-free world were opened up in Reykjavik.

At the same time the past year has convincingly demonstrated that Washington continues to propound obsolete nuclear dogmas. Thus, recently Congressman B. Solarz wrote that "from the U.S. standpoint the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons is the strategic equivalent of the apple Eve offered Adam." Just a political anecdote? Undoubtedly. But it shows that the elimination of nuclear death is seen as a "great sin" in Washington.

The logic of confrontation by which Washington is guided freezes even the most timid manifestations of realistic thinking among the ruling class. It is apposite to note that 5 years ago the U.S. diplomat G. Kennan wrote: "The almost total militarization of the thought patterns and approach to Soviet-U.S. relations which has become typical of the atmosphere in Washington and of a considerable proportion of our press (a militarization which seems to me to be the same as if we knew that we would probably be fighting the Soviet Union in

a few months' time) is in itself a dangerous state of affairs and will be hard to rectify." Since then little has changed in the White House's actions.

Implementation of the notorious program for modernizing and building up U.S. strategic offensive forces is being stepped up. Its maniacal aim is to achieve nuclear superiority over the USSR. Today there is no longer any talk about a "window of vulnerability" or the "restoration of America's defense capability." Instead there is moanful reluctance to come to terms with military-strategic parity. Striving to wreck this parity to its own advantage, the United States is flexing its nuclear muscles and lengthening the tentacles of the nuclear octopus. The Pentagon is creating new MX and Midgetman ICBM's, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines armed with Trident I and II missiles.

Having renounced the SALT II Treaty, the United States has started equipping a whole series of B-52 bombers with long-range cruise missiles.

Star fever is shaking U.S. society. The President himself, enamored of a chimera that is profitable for the military-industrial complex, quite seriously believes that the creation [sozdeniye] of a "security shield" will make "nuclear weapons obsolete and powerless and will release mankind from the jail of nuclear terror." The United States should not count on gaining an "insurance policy for the future" at the expense of the Soviet Union's security. We have our own recipe for countering the U.S. military's predatory habits. Furthermore, life itself and the objective dialectics of the development of warfare operate against unilateral militarist tendencies. This was very accurately noted by U.S. General O. Bradley, who commanded U.S. ground forces during the Normandy landing. In 1958 he warned: "...We have corrupted our intellect by creating the kind of scientific means of destruction which means that we are now threatened by the desperate danger of destroying ourselves... Missiles will be followed by the creation of antimissile missiles, while antimissile missiles in their turn will be followed by the creation of missiles able to destroy them, but this electronic house of cards will inevitably reach the stage where it can no longer be built up... And when that time comes, we will be able to do little apart from live in alarm, suppressing our fear—a burgeoning fear under the shadow of death."

It is a convincing warning. However, even despite the fact that President Reagan himself agreed that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, bunker optimism continues to predominate in Washington. The illusion of winning a third and even a fourth world war is still held by an alliance of politickers, bankers, and generals. A report prepared for the White House by the Federal Emergency Management Agency stated that even after the most powerful nuclear strike against U.S. territory 50 percent of the U.S. harvest would remain and there would be enough poultry and cattle left to feed the U.S. population. The report claimed that it would be better if the war took place in June so as

not to hamper summer harvesting. This is truly nuclear cannibalism, multiplied by U.S. professionalism.

However, in no sphere of arms control has Washington's nuclear atavism been seen in such a barefaced form as in the sphere of nuclear tests. Neither the 18-month Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions nor an agreement on the strictest verification [kontrol] of the test ban, including on-site inspection [inspektsiya] and the use of all the achievements of seismology, stopped the U.S. Administration. Showing open disregard for the peoples' right to a world without nuclear weapons, the Pentagon is testing weapons requiring a nuclear explosion in space (the X-RAY laser) and planning to carry out more than 100 additional underground nuclear explosions aimed at developing [razrabotka] the technology for space strike weapons.

In America today there is a difficult struggle under way to overcome the historical phase of the unrestricted dominance of pathological anticommunism and cowboy morals in politics. However, real movement in this area will only be possible when antimilitarist, antinuclear thinking begins to take root in America's social consciousness.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON REAGAN STATE OF UNION ADDRESS

PRAVDA: Reagan 'Disappointing

PM291311 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 87 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "'Recipe for Impasses': The U.S. President's Message"]

[Excerpts] Washington -- U.S. President R. Reagan delivered the traditional "State of the Union" message today at a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. White House officials had earlier advertised the President's speech as "one of the most important" in all the years of his administration's rule.

The White House incumbent laid special stress on the unprecedented leap forward of U.S. militarism, claiming that "as a result of efforts in the restructuring of America's might the world has become a safer place." In this context he tried to justify the latest request for appropriations to the Pentagon by means of crude, hackneyed fabrications about "lagging behind the USSR" and about "Soviet expansionism."

The U.S. approach to arms control talks with the USSR was portrayed in a false light. The President's words gave the impression that "the United States has presented the Soviet Union with serious, fair, and far-reaching proposals" which created "a rare opportunity for arms reduction." Scorning logic, Reagan arbitrarily placed responsibility for the failure of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik on...the USSR. "They sought to cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative -- SDI. I wouldn't let them do it then. I won't let them do it now, or in the future," he declared. The President did not deem it necessary to heed the opinion of his own scientists and specialists, who regard the "Star Wars" program as incompatible with arms control. Instead he claimed without offering any substantiation that "it is the most positive and promising defensive program." [paragraph continues]

Thus, swearing allegiance to the interests of the military-industrial complex and the opponents of all measures to curb the arms race, Reagan warned Congress that he would veto "any attempt to undermine our national security."

'Many a Fine Word'

PM291159 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 87 p 3

[Vladimir Chernyshev commentary: "Following the Old, Dangerous Path"]

[Text] In his latest, sixth successive State of the Union Address, U.S. President Ronald Reagan has most clearly demonstrated once again his administration's claim to the "leading role" of the United States in the world, the wish to plant "freedom" in the American interpretation everywhere and total reluctance to take real steps to stop the arms race on earth and prevent it spreading into outer space.

The present head of the White House said many a fine word about the U.S. Constitution, whose 200th anniversary that country will celebrate this year. In the Constitution the people tell the government "that it can do only what is listed in that document and nothing more," R. Reagan especially emphasized.

But does the President himself abide by all the provisions of that document? I think that this is quite a legitimate question. Does he remember, for example, Article Six explicitly telling the government that the laws of the United States in common with all the agreements which have been concluded and will be concluded on behalf of the United States are the supreme law of the country? Most likely he does not, for Mr. Reagan has more than once declared this attitude to the treaties and agreements as "scraps of paper" and said that the point of argument could be only what weapons the United States needs, but by no means whether it should renounce weapons for the sake of treaties and agreements.

And all these are not simply words, the U.S. Administration has trampled underfoot the SALT I agreement and the SALT II treaty. It is out to undermine and in general flout and discard as a scrap of paper the ABM Treaty.

"In this 200th anniversary year of our Constitution, you and I stand on the shoulders of giants -- men whose words and deeds put wind in the sails of freedom," the current head of the White House solemnly proclaimed and quoted the founding fathers, again "forgetting" the warnings expressed by them. But they explicitly warned that America should be a friend of freedom everywhere, but a guard of it only in its own country. The wish to plant the notorious American "freedom" by force all over the world stands to mean only one thing, as Thomas Jefferson said, leading America downhill.

Reagan's address on the state of the union is fresh proof of the fact that the administration does not need at all either the U.S. Constitution, or the wisdom of the founding fathers or experience of the predecessors in the remaining 2 years of its rule. The only thing it craves is that the Congress should not "cut" the astronomical military budget, should not declare for an end to nuclear blasts and for the United States to meet its international commitments. The head of the White House unequivocally threatened the congressmen to veto "any such attempt." In my opinion the U.S. ABC television company was right in predicting the other day that by his State of the Union Address "it will be very hard" for R. Reagan. "To convince the Americans that they should see their country the way he wishes to picture it."

'Unchanging Nature' of Policy

LD290025 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1715 GMT 28 Jan 87

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Boris Andrianov; Andrey Ptashnikov commentary]

[Excerpts] Foreign news agencies report on the traditional message of the United States President on the State of the Union, which he delivered to Congress. I will ask my colleague Andrey Ptashnikov to comment on the speech by the head of the White House.

[Ptashnikov] The message, with which the United States President turns to the Congress and to the entire American nation, is an annual event. In a way it sums up the outcome of the administration's activity for the past year.

Reagan gave a very high appraisal of the foreign policy course of his administration and also its policy in the military sphere. In order not to appear without evidence, I will once again take liberty to quote the President. We can be proud of the progress that we achieved in the world. Our efforts on restructuring America's military might make the world less dangerous, he claimed. At the same time, the President let it be understood in an unequivocal way that the White House's course at crude interference into the internal affairs of Central American countries, the Near East and other regions of the world will continue.

He also directly announced that nobody is capable of making him renounce the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan demanded that Congress fully meet the government's record requirement for assigning \$312 billion in military spending in the 1987 fiscal year.

Touching upon relations with the Soviet Union, the President stated that he allegedly strives for them to become more constructive. The question arises: Who is it that prevents the head of the White House to make relations more constructive? According to Reagan's claim it is our country that is guilty of this, because its behavior in the international arena evidently does not suit the United States. It is not difficult to understand the President. The USSR's peace-loving and consistent course in the world, indeed in no way corresponds to the militaristic and aggressive aspiration of official Washington.

Such are, in brief, the basic tenets of Reagan's message. As you probably noted, comrade radio listeners, there is nothing new or more hopeful in them. Hence, the confirmation of the unchanging nature of the adventurous policy of the White House is more than sufficient.

IZVESTIYA'S View

PM301507 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Stanislav Kondrashov "Political Observer's Opinion": "Out of Harmony With the Times"]

[Excerpts] Although the White House is only a stone's throw from Congress, the U.S. President is an infrequent guest on Capitol Hill.

One of the scheduled visits takes place in late January or early February each year, when the head of the executive branch delivers the "State of the Union" message to the representatives of the legislative branch.

Ronald Reagan delivered this message, the sixth of his Presidency, on Capitol Hill Tuesday 27 January. It was the sixth and penultimate one. In 2 years' time a different President will take the oath and speak in the square in front of the Congress building, which is usually occupied by vehicles. The present, 100th Congress is beginning its work in the bicentennial year of the U.S. Constitution. This gave the President an occasion to use eloquent metaphors about wind in "the sails of freedom" and about the sun which is "only rising" on America.

Finally, there is growing concern at the unproductive foreign policy and growing understanding that it is precisely because of Washington's tough line that the opportunity to achieve substantial arms control agreements with Moscow is being missed. Unlike the Reaganites, many Americans are prepared to "exchange" the abandonment of SDI for radical nuclear arms reductions. Their opinion is now better represented on Capitol Hill.

Here is what THE NEW YORK TIMES writes: "After 6 years and two summits (that is, in Geneva and Reykjavik — S.K.) the Reagan administration's policy on the question of arms control remains in disarray. The State Department and the Defense Department continue to be at odds with each other. The inefficient apparatus of National Security Council staffers is incapable of instilling order... The President either does not understand the entire seriousness of the situation or does not know how to cope with it. Americans will find it hard to believe that President Reagan really wants to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union..."

Hard for Americans to believe. But what about us?

SDI to Continue

LD281133 Moscow TASS in English 1115 GMT 28 Jan 87

["Reagan: Address on the State of the Union" -- TASS headline]

[Excerpts] Washington January 28 TASS -- President Reagan delivered the traditional annual State of the Union Address to both houses of Congress.

Ronald Reagan said that "We have done much these past years to restore our defences, our alliances, and our leadership in the world." The President called for "more constructive relations" with the Soviet Union, but hedged his statement with a number of conditions, such as "more responsible Soviet conduct around the world" and "progress on the other items of our agenda as well -- real respect for human rights." He also maliciously attacked the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policies and the socialist system.

Claiming a desire to seek cuts in nuclear weapons, the President simultaneously lauded the "Star Wars" programme. He misrepresented the character of the Soviet-American summit talks in Reykjavik, saying that the Soviet side only "sought to cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative." "SDI will go forward," he said.

Reagan warned Congress, which has before it draft resolutions demanding the repudiation of the administration's decision not to comply with the SALT-2 treaty and an end to or drastic restrictions on the yield of nuclear tests and in which demands are made for cuts in inflated military spending, including on the "Star Wars" programme, that he would not tolerate such steps. "I must tell this Congress I will veto any efforts that undercut our national security and our negotiating leverage," he said.

'Distorted Picture' of Reykjavik

LD280609 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0534 GMT 28 Jan 87

[Text] Washington 28 Jan -- Nikolay Turkatenko, a TASS correspondent reports:

President Reagan delivered the traditional annual "State of the Union" address on Tuesday in the U.S. Congress. He demanded that Congress completely satisfy the administration's request for military expenditures in the 1988 fiscal year of \$312 billion. "Our efforts to strengthen the military might of America make the world safer," asserted the President.

Reagan spoke out for "more constructive relations" with the Soviet Union. However, he linked the United State's readiness to develop relations with the USSR to the "behavior" of the Soviet Union on the international scene. Furthermore, his positive appeals for an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations were essentially swamped in the torrent of crude anti-Soviet thrusts. Touching on the situation in various regions of the world, Reagan left the U.S. Administration the "right" to continue to expand U.S. intervention in the Near East and in Central America under the pretext of defending the national interests of the United States, its "friends" and allies.

Stating the necessity of achieving a reduction in nuclear weapons, the President at the same time confirmed the administration's adherence to the "Star Wars" program, which as is known, is the main obstacle in the way of achieving an accord on a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. He again presented a distorted picture of the essence of the summit talks in Reykjavik. The President frankly made it clear to Congress, where resolutions demanding the observance by the administration of the SALT II treaty, the cessation or sharp limitation of the power of nuclear tests, and the unswerving observance of the ABM Treaty have been introduced, that he is categorically against such steps. Reagan promised to veto any measures taken by Congress in this field that do not coincide with the approach of the administration.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW NEW TIMES CITES OBUKHOV ON GENEVA PACKAGE

PM221119 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 2, 19 Jan 87 pp 6-8

[Interview with Ambassador at Large Aleksey Obukhov, Soviet representative on the strategic offensive arms group at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms limitation, by staff writers Galina Sidorova and Dmitriy Pogorzhelskiy: "Our Package at Geneva"]

[Text] [N.T.] Soviet-American talks on further limitations of strategic offensive arms - beyond SALT-I and SALT-II have been conducted, off and on, since 1981. To a lay observer, the talks have seemed until now to focus on "technical" matters, with endless figures, ceilings and subceilings being tabled and experts racking their brains over equivalences. The Soviet proposals being tabled today are more global and accessible but, at the same time, more complex in their simplicity. Can it be said that the negotiations are proceeding at a new level?

[Obukhov] You are right. We have behind us a prolonged period of discussions. We have a solid record of agreements concluded during the SALT-I and SALT-II negotiations. Many problems were studied then. Although the American side is trying to discard existing agreements, the experience accumulated during that period is with us and will remain useful.

The Soviet initiatives, notably the programme to eliminate nuclear weapons before the end of the century put forward on January 15 1986, have now created the necessary conditions for adopting truly comprehensive decisions in the areas we are discussing.

Formerly, the issue was one of limiting strategic armaments and there was no talk of drastic cuts, although certain cuts were envisaged by the SALT-II treaty, if it had been ratified. Now the Soviet Union is proposing to get rid of the burden of nuclear weapons before the end of the century. Mikhail Gorbachev's position set out in Reykjavik was a development of the January proposal. We have arrived at joint solutions in a number of areas. They have not, however, been formalized because the U.S. is clinging to SDI. But the fact remains that in the field of strategic offensive armaments, the prospect of eliminating these arms within ten years was discussed. [paragraph continues]

Equally drastic measures were contemplated in the field of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles deployed in Europe - they would be subject to elimination.

The challenge in Geneva today is to draw up agreements on the basis of the Reykjavik accords, agreements that could mark a turning point in international development and pave the way towards a nuclear-free world. Ultimately, of course, these agreements

would have to be enshrined in legal documents to be prepared by the delegations at the negotiations. This is very painstaking work, but early success is possible given the political will and desire to come to terms.

Who Is Creating New Problems [subhead]

[N.T.] It is almost three months since the Reykjavik meeting. Has there been any noticeable change in the American position? In its tone? Has it come up with any new proposals?

[Obukhov] We should bear in mind that certain quarters were alarmed by Reykjavik. They would like to see all its positive outcome buried, to forget this episode as if it had never taken place. This, unfortunately, has been made clear by the behaviour of official representatives of the U.S. and some other Western countries.

The same concepts, so to speak, can be clearly discerned in the position of the American side at the talks. Our partners have tried to dodge Reykhavik and create additional obstacles on the already arduous path to success.

[N.T.] How, specifically, did this tendency manifest itself?

[Obukhov] Take the central issue of preventing the arms race in outer space. In Reykjavik, SDI proved to be the main stumbling block. At the Geneva talks the Americans did not exert the slightest effort to find a solution to the problem and despite the fact that our proposals remain in force.

The Soviet side does not demand that Washington abandon all work on SDI. We allow for corresponding research and tests so long as they are confined to the laboratory. Such activity would not be considered a violation of the ABM Treaty. But in order to strengthen the regime of that treaty, we propose a ban on all space tests of ABM space elements. The need for such a mutual commitment is evident. Otherwise the allowable period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as advocated by the Soviet Union would see not compliance with the provisions of this document of unlimited duration, but its dilution and erosion.

After that, in accordance with our plan, the sides would hold talks in order to assess the situation and decide what to do next. The American representatives, however, would not discuss any limitations on SDI.

Interpreting to Violate [subhead]

[N.T.] In the U.S., there is talk of two interpretations of the ABM Treaty, the "narrow" and the "broad." What exactly is meant?

[Obukhov] Judging from official U.S. statements, Washington is currently adhering to the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. [paragraph continues]

I think the use of this term is imprecise because there can be only one interpretation of the treaty, namely, the correct one. The essence of the treaty is clearly expressed in its text. Article 1, for instance, reads that the parties have no right to create an ABM system in their country's territory or conduct preparations for creating it. All the other provisions are geared to Article 1, ensuring compliance with it. Article 5 forbids the creation, testing and deployment of a space-based ABM system or components thereof. The "broad" interpretation actually means an arbitrary

interpretation whereby the treaty does not impose any limitations on ABM systems based on alternative physical principles. An attempt is being made to convince us that the treaty allows the corresponding tests anywhere, including outer space.

The U.S. is trying to justify its commitment to SDI and to conducting work that would essentially wreck the ABM Treaty.

Meanwhile, according to the treaty -- which sets strict limits on the scope and areas of ABM deployment -- the so-called "exotic" types of ABM systems can only exist in a land-based stationary shape. Hence, such systems cannot be tested in outer space, in the air and at sea or on a mobile ground basis.

[N.T.] After the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, the Western press revived its old thesis that the U.S.S.R. is taking an "all-or-nothing" stand. Official representatives have also said this, citing our package of proposals. Could you comment on these statements?

[Obukhov] The United States and other Western countries should consider and give its due to our package. For it promises a solution to incredibly complex issues and makes it possible to cut the Gordian knot of the Number One problem -- restraining the arms race.

The U.S.S.R. has offered very considerable concessions. Take, for instance, strategic offensive weapons, an area close to me. We have withdrawn our demand to count in U.S. medium-range missiles that can reach our territory.

On medium-range missiles, the U.S.S.R. would exclude the British and French nuclear potentials, provided the Soviet Union and the U.S. liquidates their medium-range missiles in Europe. And yet these potentials are not negligible.

The package balances compromises and the interests of both parties. Let me stress that our package is not a precondition. It is a weighed and thoroughly considered set of measures paving the way to a nuclear-free world.

These who ascribe to us an "all-or-nothing" position want to prevent progress at the Geneva talks. They want to tear the package apart, retaining those aspects that suit the West, while forgetting that we too have our own security interests. We will not agree to that.

Needed: Compromises, Not Manoeuvres [subhead]

[N.T.] The package contains the Soviet "zero option" concerning medium-range missiles. The U.S. stand on SDI blocked an agreement in this area when it seemed within reach. And yet it has recently been suggested in Western Europe that this is the area where progress is most realistic. Is this a justified viewpoint?

[Obukhov] The Soviet Union has exhibited unprecedented flexibility in this matter. I have said that the French and British potentials are not negligible and continue to grow. It is no secret against whom they would be used. Paris and London are Washington's allies in NATO and are closely cooperating in the alliance, as is well known.

And yet, in order to achieve progress on the whole range of issues, the U.S.S.R. has agreed not only to exclude the Anglo-French potential, but even not to raise the question of its growth. This is proof of our readiness to negotiate and look for a mutually acceptable solution.

Incidentally, the American side has offered its own "package" on medium-range missiles. It seems to have lost interest in the problem of medium-range missiles and is trying to get shorter-range missiles into the focus of attention.

I must stress that inasmuch as we are talking about very far-reaching and real disarmament measures, they should be carried out together. Our approach cannot lead to an impasse. On the contrary, it paves the way for an agreement. In the negotiations, we proceed in such a way as not to block the path to success on any of the issues on the agenda. We are prepared to advance in all directions.

[N.T.] We are well aware of the ambivalence felt in the U.S. in the wake of Reykjavik: What did the President agree to? How far did he go in accepting Soviet proposals? Did this affect the behaviour of your partners on the other side of the table?

[Obukhov] It is on paper that Reagan had agreed to the complete elimination of strategic offensive weapons within the specified period of ten years. After the summit, our partners suddenly began to talk along different lines. We are being told that by the end of the said period the U.S. would only be ready to eliminate ballistic missiles. This is a far cry from what has been agreed in Reykjavik.

[N.T.] But THE NEW YORK TIMES has reported the Reagan Administration as stating that the U.S. intends to abandon its proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years, and is not insisting on it. What is behind this? Is it a sign of flexibility?

[Obukhov] So far, the U.S. stand in Geneva is the one I have just described. Let us look at what we are being offered. If we remember the figures of agreement under SALT-II, the U.S. has a little under 600 strategic bombers. The U.S.S.R. has about 150. Let us imagine that as a first stage, i.e., before 1991, they are reduced by half. Then, if IBMs alone are eliminated, the U.S. will gain a considerable edge. This is no basis for agreement. You are right in saying that Washington is now talking of modifying its position, departing from a hard line, of its readiness to preserve a certain number of IBMs. But this is not flexibility. It is a departure from Reykjavik, where what was under consideration was the elimination, by the end of 1996, of all offensive strategic systems constituting the triad.

[N.T.] Furthermore, as you have mentioned, the U.S. is violating the SALT-II agreement. Will that affect negotiations?

[Obukhov] It is easier to conclude a new agreement - which is our aim - proceeding from what has been achieved than to start from scratch. The atmosphere at negotiations is very important for the course of the discussion. [paragraph continues]

It can either make the adoption of decisions more difficult or contribute to an agreement. If the arms race makes a spurt in every direction while negotiations are in progress, it is far more difficult to agree. The arms race outstrips, as it were, efforts toward an agreement. This is how we should view the U.S. action in exceeding the SALT-II limits. That is why we say that their manoeuvres impede negotiations and create further obstacles.

[N.T.] Let us dwell on the talks on nuclear and space arms limitations. Could you tell us about the procedure and the composition of the groups?

[Obukhov] The goals and subject of negotiations were agreed by the Soviet Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State in January 1985: to prevent the arms race in space and halt it on earth. It was then that the organizational framework was determined: The delegations were divided into three groups according to three areas of negotiations. The first deals with space weapons, the second, with strategic offensive weapons and the third, with medium-range missiles. Representatives of the groups meet regularly in conference. These are the plenary sessions newspapers report in a few lines.

Looking for Points of Contact [subhead]

[N.T.] How do the talks proceed in practical terms? Is it a matter of heated arguments and debates, or is it the mere exchange of figures, ceilings and subceilings?

[Obukhov] The forms of procedure took shape gradually as a result of mutual experience. The key elements in the negotiations are the meetings of delegations as a whole, or of groups. The venue is alternately the Soviet and the American missions. The sides exchange statements on this or that issue, or issues they deem it necessary to raise at a given moment. Then the heads of delegations and groups retire for so-called talks after session to have further discussions. Experts have separate meetings.

The debates can be "heated" or calm. We seek businesslike discussions because the aim is to achieve agreement. It is my deep conviction that the main thing is not to start unnecessary arguments and try to outshout each other, but to identify points of contact and work out a common approach that would yield a solution.

Unfortunately, in the post-Reykjavik period our partners have so far failed to take any constructive steps conducive to progress. But progress is only possible if both sides are ready for it.

[N.T.] On a purely human level, do you feel your partners on the other side of the table want to see success in Geneva?

[Obukhov] We have heard assurances of a wish to achieve progress many times. I would like to hope that they are sincere and reflect the attitude of the people whom we have been looking in the eye for nearly two years. The problem is the official position our colleagues represent.

[N.T.] Has it become more or less difficult to work after Reykjavik?

[Obukhov] We have been negotiating for exactly a month since the Reykjavik meeting. The U.S. has tabled its proposals on all three areas of talks. Unfortunately, they are not aimed at progress but at departure from Reykjavik.

The U.S.S.R. for its part tabled its proposals on November 7, summing up the positive experience of the Icelandic meeting and providing a basis for advance.

[N.T.] How did the Americans react to these proposals?

[Obukhov] The round came to an end a few days after the proposals were made and we managed to exchange only very preliminary and isolated remarks. Nor did the American side have anything positive to offer at the working meeting between the heads of groups

at the negotiations held in Geneva in early December. Of course, one hopes that by the start of the next round the partners will have arrived at constructive positions, and helped to clear the impasses.

[N.T.] So, you are an optimist?

[Obukhov] Most definitely. Of course, we are dealing with very intricate problems. But let me say that in Reykjavik the flexibility of the Soviet leadership made it possible to reach agreements of a truly revolutionary significance for progress towards a non-nuclear world. This fuels my optimism. Another source of optimism is the demands of millions of people on our planet that are consonant with the Soviet proposal to eliminate the threat of nuclear war for all time. The voice of millions is making itself heard and the anti-war movement will play a growing role and one which is not to be discounted.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR REPORTS, COMMENTS ON OPENING OF SEVENTH ROUND

Vorontsov Replaces Karpov

LD131432 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 13 TASS -- Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, the new head of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, is leaving for Geneva for talks. An official statement to this effect has been made at a press conference today by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the new level of the delegation's leadership will make it possible to ensure a resolute change for the better at the talks, that the Reykjavik accords should become a reality of international politics, and ensure advancement without delay towards a non-nuclear world, he stressed.

USSR Delegation Arrives

LD141236 Moscow TASS in English 1233 GMT 14 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva January 14 TASS -- The Soviet delegation has arrived here to take part in the seventh round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons scheduled to open on January 15. It is led by Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister.

Dubinín on Talks' Importance

LD142154 Moscow TASS in English 2133 GMT 14 Jan 87

[Text] Washington, January 15 TASS -- The USSR's approach to the solution of disarmament problems is all-embracing, and it is fully determined to continue persistently the implementation of its chief goal, that of establishing a nuclear-free world.

This idea has been emphasized by Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, at a press conference here.

The press conference was devoted to the results of 1986, proclaimed International Year of Peace by the United Nations. The Soviet Union's activity on tackling the most acute problems of the current period was described.

"It is symbolic," Dubinin said, "that talks on nuclear and space arms are resumed in Geneva on January 15 this year, the first anniversary for the proclamation of the USSR'S large-scale programme for nuclear disarmament."

"We attach immense importance to the forthcoming seventh round of negotiations and are convinced that it can become a turning point in the work of the delegations from the two countries and launch practical preparations for the conclusion of the complex of agreements to comprise and build on the positive results of Reykjavik.

That will require the political will and readiness of both countries. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated them."

Dobrynin-Hartman Talks

LD140941 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0925 GMT 14 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, 14 Jan (TASS) -- Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received Arthur Hartman, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, at his request. In the course of the conversation some question connected with the renewal of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva were examined.

Round Opens 7 January

LD151243 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva January 15 TASS -- The seventh round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms began here today with a meeting between the delegation leaders.

The Soviet delegation is headed by Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and the U.S. by one Max Kampelman, special counsellor to the U.S. secretary of state.

In an interview with a TASS correspondent, the leader of the Soviet delegation has said that the Soviet side sees the principal task of the new round to secure progress in a practical solution to the entire range of the issues of nuclear and space arms through the joint efforts of the two delegations on the basis and in development of the understandings on that score, which were revealed as a result of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

"Considering particular importance and topicality of this task, the Soviet delegation will seek to take the talks out to the road of concrete, constructive work".

"We count on reciprocity on the part of the U.S. delegation in this respect".

Vorontsov Meets Kampelman

AU151315 Paris AFP in English 1307 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva, Jan 15 (AFP) -- Max Kampelman and Yuliy Vorontsov, the leaders of the U.S. and Soviet delegations at arms talks here, on Thursday dispensed with the planned first full session of the seventh round in favour of lunch together.

Mr. Vorontsov, who asked for the meeting, greeted Mr. Kampelman warmly. U.S. spokesman Terry Schroeder said Mr. Kampelman replied: "Good food."

Mr. Vorontsov, meeting Mr. Kampelman for the first time since his nomination as Soviet delegation leader last week, smiled and repeatedly shook Mr. Kampelman's hand for the benefit of photographers. He said: "Wait for the end and we will be hugging each other."

Mr. Schroeder said he could not say when the full delegations would meet. The Soviet side was to hold a press conference.

TASS Foreign Editor on Talks

LD271539 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 27 Jan 87

["Putting the Disarmament Problem on a Practical Footing", presented by Vitaliy Yakovlevich Chukseyev, TASS chief foreign editor]

[Excerpts] Tense discussions are currently in progress in Geneva at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. The seventh round of these talks began on 15 January. It so happened that these talks reopened exactly a year after the Soviet Union published its all embracing program for the phased elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons for the mass destruction of the people by the end of the century. These proposals announced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on television and the repeated extension of the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, the bold initiatives of the USSR in Reykjavik, as well as the Delhi declaration, were some of the most important milestones of the International Peace Year. Leading western observers recognize this fact. It may be recalled that the Soviet-U.S. summit in Iceland, the Soviet leadership made energetic efforts to put the disarmament problem on a practical footing, for the experience of Reykjavik showed the realism of that approach.

APN recently published a brochure entitled 'Reykjavik: Documents and Materials.' It publishes for the first time the full text of the Soviet draft directives to the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States on preparing agreements in the field of nuclear weapons. These directives envisage reducing the strategic forces of both sides by half by the end of 1991 and then reducing the remaining strategic nuclear arsenals over the next 5 years. There is a proposal to completely reduce Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and at the same time to reduce these weapons in the Asian part of our country to the level of 100 warheads.

The right of the United States to deploy [razvernut] 100 warheads on such missiles on their territory is safeguarded. Finally, the directives propose the agreement that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should depart during the coming 10 years from the ABM Treaty limiting antimissile defense systems while research on the SDI should be restricted to the laboratory. These proposals, which were as their starting point the principles of equal security for both sides, have also formed the foundation of the Soviet position in Geneva. [passage omitted]

The fact the United States is not enthusiastic about holding the talks in an active and constructive manner is indicated by a statement from Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation, who has not concealed that the U.S. delegation will not be making concessions but will be hoping for concessions from the Soviet side. The impression is being created that as before, U.S. delegates at the talks are gambling on trying to achieve unilateral advantages for the United States to the detriment of the security of our country. One cannot fail to draw attention also to the fact that in recent weeks, the military-industrial complex has been making strenuous attempts to push through Congress the new record Pentagon budget for the 1988 fiscal year to the tune of \$312 billion, in which there are plans to further increase the U.S. nuclear arsenals, as well as various first strike weapons systems.

Literally not a day goes by without Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger appearing before an audience, trying to scare the Americans with the mythical Soviet threat. He is particularly active in pushing the Star Wars program. Speaking recently in Colorado Springs, the Pentagon chief stated that the administration may soon decide on deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the initial stages of SDI by the start of 1990. Individual U.S. observers consider that in this way, the ruling clique of the military-industrial complex is striving to make the implementation of this dangerous program into an irreversible process and present it to the next administration as a fait accompli. [passage omitted]

Finding that they are coming up against a lack of trust, the Washington propagandists are resorting with increasing frequency to attempts to hush up the Soviet position and to hide the truth from Americans about Soviet proposals on disarmament questions. That was the case, for example, with the recent message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the leaders of the nonaligned countries. The notorious free press of American simply ignored it.

The papers in the United States and other Western countries now sometimes reflect on whether or not it would be best to wait for a new administration to take office before embarking on important disarmament talks from the beginning, going back to the drawing board, so to speak. Under conditions of an accelerating arms race, to spend 2 years doing nothing while waiting for the next presidential elections would be a criminal waste of time.

The Soviet leadership has stated it is ready for a serious examination of any idea aimed at achieving mutually acceptable accords on the key issues of disarmament.

Group Talks Continue

LD301728 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 30 Jan

[Text] Geneva, 30 Jan (TASS) -- This week intensive meetings within the framework of the groups on space weapons, strategic weapons and medium range nuclear weapons have been continuing here at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

There is progress on certain aspects of work on agreeing joint draft documents.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA ON KAMPELMAN'S 'ANTI-SOVIETISM'

PM311925 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Melor Sturua article: "Kampelman's Anti-Soviet Carillon"]

[Text] Max Kampelman is the head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. On the eve of the current round of these talks he was promoted to the rank of counsellor.

As the Washington newspapers reported, Kampelman moved up to number 17 in the U.S. State Department hierarchy. However, being 17th on the diplomatic ladder in no way means being a long way down the ranks of anti-Soviets. In the field of anti-Sovietism Max Kampelman is one of the front runners. "Mr Seventeen" brilliantly confirmed his leading position in this little-honored field when he spoke in London recently at the Royal United Services Institute for, naturally, Defense Studies.

Kampelman's speech was neither defensive nor, even more so, studious. It can be described in two words as follows -- aggressive lies. He began with a complaint, or rather a groan. "The government of the Soviet Union... has survived longer than many people expected," Kampelman laments. Indeed, the expectations of the end of the Land of the Soviets entertained by first the Entente and then Hitler have not come about. Mr Kampelman is painfully forced to remember this every year: By a cruel irony of fate he was born on 7 November!

Kampelman went on to say the Soviet Union "evidently continues to exist on the basis of Leninist faith." Precisely is the correct word, not "evidently"! Since it is not in Kampelman's power to put an end to our existence he attempts to distort the point of this existence, attributing monstrous intentions and animal instincts to us. In the latter respect he is a great expert since he once held the post of president of the Friends of the National Zoo society.

Thus this friend of animals and enemy of communism claims that the Soviet Union is striving for world domination through violence, including terror, operating on the principle: "What's mine is mine, and what's not mine will be." Kampelman cites as witnesses Henry Kissinger and... M.S. Gorbachev! Everything is clear as far as Kissinger is concerned. In such cases it is accepted practice in the east to say that a fox will call its own tail as a witness. But surely Mr Kampelman -- a diplomat, lawyer, and doctor of philosophy, no less -- knows about the existence of the international document known as the Delhi Declaration on the Principles of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and Violence? This historic document bears the signature of a Soviet leader whose name is linked with the introduction of new thinking into international politics, thinking which makes panhuman priorities and values paramount.

The whole point is that when you feel zoological hatred for communism it is as if you are looking at the world through a camera obscura. Our "friend of the anti-Soviet zoo" looks in the mirror, sees his own reflection, or rather the reflection of American imperialism, discerns its essential features, but attributes its bestial characteristics to us. For example, Kampelman claims that "the Soviet regime propagates its credo by force of arms," that "the Soviet doctrine" is "the right to use force," and so forth. Has Kampelman -- a diplomat, lawyer, and doctor of philosophy, no less -- really forgotten his predecessor John Foster Dulles -- also a diplomat, lawyer, and doctor of philosophy and architect of the "position of strength" policy? Has Kampelman really forgotten the instructions Reagan gave him to "conduct dealings with the Russians" exclusively from a position of strength? Can it really be that Kampelman, sitting in Geneva, is ignorant of what Washington has done and is doing out of -- extremely dubious -- kindness in Libya, Grenada, and Nicaragua? (There is no room here to delve into the history of, say, Vietnam, Chile, or the Dominican Republic.)

But Kampelman does delve. He alleges that "the Soviet doctrine... recalls the 19th century Russian tsars." He continues: "Lenin called the Russian empire 'the prison of the peoples.' Lenin's heirs now call it 'the socialist community.'"

All this rubbish can be dismissed as cheap posturing, of course. It is no coincidence that Kampelman has been not only president of the Friends of the National Zoo society but also a member of the board of directors of the Arena Stage theater. The point is that these fabrications conceal a policy of social revenge. Let us again recall Dulles with his policy of "containment" and "rolling back" communism. The Kampelmans of this world -- those who rank 17th or elsewhere in the hierarchy -- would like to replay history and drive the socialist community back into the "prison of the peoples," as is currently happening to the blacks and the Spanish-speaking population in the United States. That is what they would like, but it's not that easy. So they gnash their teeth in impotent malice.

Using the primitive mirror image method, Kampelman obstinately attributes to the Soviet Union the intention of forcing virtually the whole of mankind into its "geopolitical frontiers." (If that is the thinking of a responsible diplomat, lawyer, and doctor of philosophy, no less -- number seventeen, would you believe, in the U.S. State Department hierarchy -- then what can you expect of the creators of the television series "Amerika," which is about the "occupation" of the United by the "Soviets" and UN troops?!!)

Let us move on a little. It is not the Soviet Union but the United States -- or rather that country's ruling circles -- who dream of world domination and a Pax Americana. Their imperial dreams are costing the American people dear, but the cost is even greater for those peoples which Washington wants to corral within its "geopolitical frontiers" by force of arms, with the power of the dollar, and sometimes with both together. It is laughable, Mr Kampelman, to hear you express to the "Soviet elite" the "hope" that it will realize that "there is no room for violence in our nuclear age." Misdirected, your message is misdirected. You if anybody should know at first hand why our nuclear age is not moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. Surely your political geography cannot be so poor that you are ignorant of, say, Geneva, Reykjavik, Nevada? Allow me to doubt the possibility of such strange ignorance on the part of the man who ranks seventeen in the U.S. State Department, a diplomat, lawyer, and doctor of philosophy, no less!

Max Kampelman is a fully qualified, card-carrying anticommunist. He once wrote a book entitled "The Communist Party Versus the CIO" [Komparty protiv profsoyuzov]. He is an active member of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, a bellicose Zionist organization. So he was perfectly at home when speaking in London. Thus, for example, he alleged not only that "the Soviets are trying to get" equipment and technology from the West but also that they are using our terminology in an attempt to conceal what they are doing with the aid of words like 'democracy' and 'human rights.'" There is another curious lapse of memory here: Who is refusing to ratify a whole number of international conventions in the field of human rights? Who frustrated the successful completion of the Bern forum? Who is spurning the Soviet invitation to come to Moscow for an international conference on humanitarian problems? Who is supporting the apartheid system in South Africa and dictatorial regimes in all parts of the world? All these questions are rhetorical, incidentally.

Concluding his passage on "human rights," Kampelman said: "We have long known that the Soviets' attitude toward Western culture can be defined as a 'love-hate' relationship." There is indubitably a grain of truth in this assertion. Soviet people feel the most profound respect for advanced Western culture. We love Faulkner but hate "Rambo"; we love Mark Twain but hate "Rocky"; we love Jack London but hate "Amerika." In short, we love philanthropic culture but hate misanthropic culture, and particularly its extreme manifestation -- the cult of the nuclear bomb.

Now it is time to return from London, where Kampelman played the orator, to Geneva, where he is a negotiator. Kampelman performed his anti-Soviet carillon on the banks of the Thames not out of love for pure art but to justify Washington's negative stance on the shores of Lake Geneva. Mr Kampelman attempted to cast a shadow over the way the Soviet Union is conducting the talks and attempted to sow doubts about its sincerity and the constructiveness of its compromise proposals and even its serious concessions. At the same time he attempted to whitewash the tactics of endless procrastination to which the American side is resorting, setting forth as the key to success "patience and determination to stay one day longer at the negotiating table than the Soviets are prepared to." We do not lack patience and determination when it is a question of curbing the arms race. The moratorium on nuclear explosions is a convincing example of this. Time will not wait, however, since irreversible and fatal processes are hanging over the world. Victory at the negotiating table in Geneva must be measured by the yardstick of reason and goodwill, not by who can outlast whom. Because the extra day which Kampelman goes on about could turn out to be "judgment day."

Addressing the audience at the Royal Institute in London, Max Kampelman said, in part: "It worries us that the Soviet Union is a self-styled Leninist state." The number seventeen man in the U.S. State Department with a 7 November birth date will know the Soviet Union is not a self-styled entity but a state whose lawful master is our free and peace-loving people with the banner of the great Lenin as their canopy. What really causes concern is the aggressive course of the self-styled claimants to world domination. This is where the roots of today's troubles should be sought, Mr Kampelman!

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR GEN YASHIN DISCUSSES STRATEGIC BALANCE, SDI

PM121409 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Yu.A. Yashin, first deputy commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces, by correspondent V. Lukashin: "Who Threatens Peace"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The world's progressive public supports the Soviet stand on the question of nuclear weapons tests formulated in the replies of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the questions put by the American journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith. The program advanced by our country for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century has elicited warm approval from mankind. It is only the official U.S. Administration that is still trying to intimidate the world with the "Soviet nuclear threat." Washington's policy remains unchanged in the new year too. This was the subject of Colonel General Yu.A. Yashin's conversation with IZVESTIYA's correspondent. [passage omitted]

[Lukashin] What constitutes the Soviet Union's missile arsenal?

[Yashin] Our missile arsenal includes a wide range of types of missiles capable of hitting enemy targets on land, at sea, and in the air. Combat missiles are divided up into classes depending on the launch site and the target location: "surface to surface," "surface to air," "surface to ship," and so forth. According to the nature of the tasks to be resolved, they are divided into strategic, operational-tactical, and tactical missiles. Strategic missiles are subdivided into ICBM's and medium-range missiles.

Modern strategic missile complexes and their automated control systems ensure very high readiness to inflict a counterstrike. Regardless of weather conditions and time of year or day, they are capable of launching missiles over virtually unlimited distances with the necessary strike accuracy. Soviet strategic missiles are capable of overcoming an enemy ABM system and maintain their combat qualities under the impact of the harmful factors of a nuclear explosion. If we speak of our motherland's strategic nuclear arsenal as a whole, then, as is known, the USSR had a total of 2,504 delivery vehicles at the time the SALT II treaty was signed; that number has not increased by a single unit today.

Nevertheless, Washington does not tire of claiming that the United States is lagging behind the Soviet Union in strategic forces, since, it says, ground-based ICBM's account for approximately 70 percent of the warheads in the Soviet Union, but approximately 20 percent in the United States. [paragraph continues]

This does not upset the balance of the sides' strategic potentials. There is cunning in the fact that Washington deliberately remains quiet concerning the fact that more than 80 percent of U.S. warheads are deployed on SLBM's and on heavy bombers. This is several times more than on Soviet analogues. The Pentagon needs a deliberate fabrication to secure one-sided advantages. But the schemes for military superiority are not fated to be realized. "The Soviet Union does not aspire to greater security and will not agree to less," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared from the rostrum of the 27th party congress.

[Lukashin] Please speak about the U.S. strategic missile forces.

[Yashin] In accordance with Pentagon terminology, they are called strategic offensive forces and embrace the triad of ground-based ICBM forces, sea-based missile forces, and strategic air forces. The combat strength of the ICBM forces includes more than 1,000 Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Titan II, and MX launchers capable of delivering more than 2,000 nuclear warheads onto the Soviet Union's territory from the North American Continent at one time. The sea-based missile forces' combat strength includes 672 Trident I, Poseidon C-3, and Polaris A-3 launchers deployed on 38 nuclear-powered submarines. They contain approximately 50 percent of all the strategic ammunition. The strategic air forces' combat strength includes approximately 600 heavy bombers. Medium-range nuclear arms, including the 108 Pershing II missiles and 256 ground-based cruise missiles deployed in the FRG, Britain, Italy, and Belgium, as well as many thousands of American forward-based nuclear weapon carriers, constitute an important addition.

The American triad is already capable of delivering to USSR territory more than 12,000 pieces of nuclear ammunition with a yield of between 50 kilotons and 10 megatons each. Nevertheless, the U.S. military-political leadership is planning to increase the combat potential of the ground- and sea-based missile forces, as well as the strategic air force, by 50-150 percent by 1990. Fulfillment of the strategic program is being greatly accelerated. Nuclear explosions are rumbling in Nevada in response to the silence of the Soviet nuclear test site.

[Lukashin] Much is being said and written in the West to the effect that SDI is America's sole salvation from the "Soviet nuclear threat." What can you say about this?

[Yashin] Our leadership has already repeatedly evaluated SDI as a further attempt by the United States to secure military superiority over the USSR.

In point of fact, American imperialism is planning to create a forward-based strike echelon of strategic offensive forces in space. This echelon can be brought as close as possible to strategic targets on the Soviet Union's territory and will be capable of ensuring the minimum flight time in comparison with the other components of the strategic offensive forces. Thus, a new sphere of war has been chosen -- space. In a military respect, posing a direct threat of warfare in space and from space, SDI harbors additional calamities for the entire world community. What is dangerous is not just the unpredictability of the development [razvitiye] of the latest types of weapons but also the lack of any guarantees of comprehensive control of those arms.

Their deployment in space will give rise to the natural need to create [sozdaniye] means of combating them -- which inevitably turns the SDI program into a "Star Wars" program. The latter means the chance of war being unleashed from space is increasingly out of man's control. [paragraph continues]

Thus, from the military aspect SDI is nothing but a disguised attempt to sharply increase the U.S. strategic offensive forces' potential for inflicting a surprise preemptive nuclear strike, upsetting the existing military-strategic equilibrium, and securing one-sided superiority. From the political aspect it violates the ABM Treaty and creates conditions for an irresistible temptation to unleash and win a war. Of course, we take all this into account.

Our country has extensive opportunities for countering SDI with asymmetrical measures. So SDI will not enhance America's security. The package of large-scale proposals for the radical reduction and then elimination of nuclear weapons expounded by M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik provides a radical solution to the problem of ensuring equal security.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S., USSR ARMS 'RECORDS', STANCES ON SDI, SALT, INF

PM221109 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 17 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Sergey Losev: "No Going Back"]

[Text] The start of the new year has been distinguished not only by severe frosts and snowdrifts, but also by a storm of activity in the international arena. January 15 saw the opening of the latest round of the Soviet-American Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, and at the very end of the month the Vienna CSCE meeting will begin and the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and arms in Central Europe will resume.

The historic program to eliminate nuclear, chemical, and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the century, put forward on 15 January 1986 in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, will serve as a starting point for the Soviet Union at these talks and as the basis of its position. The frontiers in the creation of a nuclear-free world which were mapped out at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik clearly demonstrated that an accord on eliminating nuclear weapons is feasible now rather than in the distant future.

There is no doubt that the complex of Soviet initiatives has the broadest possible international support. The socialist community countries pursue a coordinated foreign policy and, naturally, they not only support but develop the Soviet Union's initiatives. Participants in last November's working meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the CEMA socialist countries' fraternal parties supported the USSR's principled stand in Reykjavik and stressed the need to increase joint efforts in the interests of the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, reduce conventional weapons, and strengthen peace and international security.

The conference of nonaligned countries' heads of state and government in Harare called for curtailing the arms race in all its aspects and using the resources thus freed for the purpose of eradicating hunger, illiteracy, poverty, and disease.

In their recent declaration, the "Delhi Six" -- the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania -- spoke decisively in favor of urgently drawing up specific measures to prevent an arms race in space and stop the arms race on earth.

Frank displeasure and doubts as to the "health" of the American leadership are growing among the U.S. NATO allies in Europe. As "Irangate" develops, these feelings are also making themselves felt in the United States itself. It is no accident that the first days of work by the 100th U.S. Congress have seen three bills submitted for discussion by the House of Representatives: on the introduction of a "partial" moratorium on nuclear tests, on the extension of the bans on testing the ASAT antisatellite system on real targets in space, and on a U.S. return to the framework of the basic limitations stipulated by the SALT-II treaty. Efforts to limit the administration's militarist programs are also evidenced by opposition in Congress to the draft federal budget for fiscal 1988.

The United States and NATO, however, still prefer to ignore the people's will and are failing to show readiness to reach mutually acceptable accords.

From 1981 through 1987 the R. Reagan administration -- a protege of the military and industrial complex -- has not signed a single agreement on the reduction of arms or armed forces. Moreover, it has taken a course aimed at derailing the SALT-II treaty and the termless ABM Treaty and smashing the entire structure of agreements with the Soviet Union created with the participation of the four preceding American administrations. "Reagan," the authoritative American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS says, "has proved to be the most anti-Soviet American president in the last 30 years and perhaps ever. He has set himself the aim of over-turning rather than strengthening the East-West status quo."

On the eve of the resumption of the Soviet-American Geneva talks, the U.S. President assured people that he would be making efforts to "achieve significant, fair reductions in the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals that can be effectively verified" [proverka]. But specific action is needed now -- not words and assurances. Meanwhile, the "service record" of the current administration is highly revealing. While the Soviet Union has observed its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions for 17 months, the United States has conducted 24 nuclear tests in this time and is preparing for a new series.

Our country has not exceeded the limit stipulated by the SALT-II treaty. The United States has deliberately exceeded these limits by deploying 133 B-52 strategic bombers with nuclear cruise missiles and the MX ICBMs with multiple warheads.

The Soviet Union has not only "frozen" the number of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR -- it has also reduced their number by dismantling, in particular, the launch equipment for these missiles on the Kolskiy Poluostrov and the greater part of its launch equipment in the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts. During this period the United States, on the other hand, has increased the number of American medium-range missiles in Europe to 364 units.

The USSR has not withdrawn any of the proposals it made in Reykjavik. The American side, on the other hand, is constantly going back on the proposals it made in the Icelandic capital, attempting to conceal its "slippery retreat" with crude falsification and forgery. Convincing examples of this were cited at a recent USSR Foreign Ministry press conference. President Reagan was prepared in Reykjavik to pledge not to renounce the ABM Treaty for 10 years. Ten days later Kampleman, head of the American delegation in Geneva, said the United States could not unconditionally pledge not to renounce the treaty and could only discuss with the Soviet side the "rules" for renouncing the ABM Treaty.

With regard to strategic offensive weapons -- in Reykjavik the President agreed to the elimination of all offensive strategic weapons over a 10-year period. [paragraph continues]

At the Geneva talks the U.S. delegation is only prepared to discuss the question of eliminating ballistic missiles.

With regard to medium-range missiles, the American delegation is seeking to gain the right to deploy medium-range missiles on U.S. territory in such a way as to be able to strike the territory of the Soviet Union.

The litmus test making it possible to unerringly determine the direction of Washington policy is the present administration's desire to accelerate implementation of the "Star Wars" program with the aim of gaining military superiority over the USSR and creating a "first strike" potential.

Under U.S. influence, NATO continues to delay in answering the Warsaw Pact's specific proposals of June 1986 regarding a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

On 13 January, in a message to the Senate, the U.S. President expressed the administration's willingness to agree to ratify the 1974 Soviet-American Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. It could appear to the ill-informed that Washington's approach is at last showing some positive improvement. On closer inspection, however, it emerges that this is simply a maneuver designed, to quote THE WASHINGTON POST, to block U.S. Congressional approval of an amendment banning the United States from carrying out nuclear tests.

As M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his reply to a message from the mayor of Hiroshima, "we still remain loyal to the idea of a general moratorium. Even in the event of the USSR's being forced to resume nuclear explosions it will be prepared to reintroduce the moratorium if the same decision is taken by the American side.

"We firmly believe that ending nuclear explosions is the simplest way to stop the arms race. Whether or not this way will be cleared and unblocked depends entirely on the United States.

"It is time for everyone to draw the firm conclusion that the policy of acting from a position of nuclear strength and the policy of nuclear blackmail have become totally obsolete."

The Soviet Union intends to continue to consistently and resolutely offset the U.S. administration's irresponsible course with its own policy aimed at disarmament and the creation of comprehensive security.

The scandal in the White House caused by the disclosure of the secret arms supplies to Iran has greatly undermined the administration's position in the United States itself and abroad. Many American observers are now conjecturing as to how the White House will find a way out of its present unprecedented difficulties: whether it will embark on foreign policy adventures or seek accords with the USSR. Former U.S. Under Secretary of State Eagleburger has voiced the opinion, for example, that a Soviet-American agreement on nuclear arms limitation in the present circumstances would be given support in the United States by "the left, the right, and the center."

It goes without saying that there are also other, more weighty factors involved here -- factors of an economic nature, compelling the American ruling class to give serious thought to its future course. [paragraph continues]

After all, the U.S. state debt has risen from 1.5 to 2.5 trillion dollars in the time the present administration has been in power. This is the outcome of American imperialism's illustory, impossible attempts to exhaust the Soviet Union in a nuclear arms race. The world cannot depend on the choice made by the White House. The elimination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in space is a vital task for all states and peoples, large and small, because mankind's survival depends on it. At the same time, while waging a consistent fight for universal peace, the Soviet Union does not forego its own security one iota.

Life convincingly shows that a new, sensible way of thinking will gain the upper hand in present-day international relations. There is simply no going back on Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. NUCLEAR, SPACE POLICY THREATENS PRC

OW262337 Moscow in Mandarin to China 0700 GMT 23 Jan 87

[Volskiy commentary]

[Text] Facts have proved that the U.S. Administration is attempting to continue its militarist policy by refusing to abide by SALT II and by testing MX and Trident missiles and other new laser weapons. U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger and his assistant secretary, Perle, have continued to issue belligerent statements concerning U.S. actions, which threaten global and regional peace. For example, they talked about increased U.S. military threats against Nicaragua, sending U.S. warships to the Persian Gulf, and the provocative U.S. stand impeding Afghanistan's national reconciliation. The United States plans to hold increasingly large military exercises in the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk. The spearhead of this policy is primarily directed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries allied with it.

Nevertheless, it is also directed at China to a considerable extent, despite the fact that the United States is trying its best to seek cooperation with China. This can be verified by the U.S. war preparations and political provocations themselves. These actions are being conducted in areas near China's border. It is no accident that the regional conflicts instigated by Washington -- from the Iran-Iraq war and the situation around Afghanistan to the undeclared war in Cambodia and the tensions on the Korean peninsula -- surround the People's Republic of China from the south, west, and east. U.S. military bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Pakistan are threatening China. It should be pointed out that there are U.S. nuclear weapons and their carriers on many of these bases, just as there are nuclear weapons on warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet that cruises along China's coast. Some of the weapons can reach China's coastal as well as hinterland areas.

In fact, imperialism is holding nuclear weapons over the heads of the Soviet Union and the PRC. Imperialism has its inherent logic in pursuing a policy against the stand of these two socialist countries. To imperialism, socialism is totally unacceptable. This policy is hostile to the Soviet Union and also to China on very important issues, including foreign policy issues. Let us point out two such issues: First, the issue of space militarization. Both the Soviet Union and China oppose space militarization and advocate conquering space for peaceful purposes, but the United States is striving to realize its so-called SDI plan or Star Wars program. Second, both the Soviet Union and the PRC have promised not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, but Washington and its allies in the West not only refuse to undertake such a commitment but place their hopes on using nuclear weapons first; that is to say, they regard the dangerous unleashing of a nuclear war that would destroy everything, including mankind, as the basis of their ideological theory.

We also want to point out that the question of space militarization is closely related to the question of launching a first strike with nuclear weapons. U.S. imperialism is trying to ensure, through its Star Wars program, that it can launch a first nuclear strike free from punishment. The Soviet Union and its allies are determined to maintain the military equilibrium.

One year ago, Soviet leader Gorbachev put forward a proposal for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century. It is obvious that the realization of this proposal accords with the fundamental interests of the people of all countries.

To realize this proposal calls for unified action by the people of all countries, first of all the people of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China. The similar stand taken by these two countries on some major issues, such as the nonmilitarization of space and no first use of nuclear weapons, shows that it is possible to realize this goal. The 27th CPSU Congress pointed out that there is great potential for Sino-Soviet cooperation. This is true. The potential is based on two closely related and inseparable concepts for peace and socialism. If imperialism, proceeding from its class interests, opposed world socialism and threatens it with a nuclear war, the defense of peace resolutely requires the unity and efforts of the Soviet Union and China, as well as other socialist and progressive forces.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

Obstacles Assessed

HK200317 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 17 Jan 87 p 6

[Commentary by Fan Min (2455 2404): "Let Us See if the Deadlock Can Be Broken -- The Situation Facing the Seventh Round of U.S. -Soviet Arms Control Talks"]

[Text] Another round of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks began on 15 January in Geneva. Since talks between the two countries resumed in March 1985, this is the seventh round of their talks on nuclear and space weapons. It is still difficult to forecast the prospects. However, a comprehensive survey of the U.S. -Soviet talks over the past 2 years has shown that controversies over different opinions on how to control armaments between the two sides were intense. Although they came closer in their views concerning some aspects of nuclear weapons, great efforts are needed to narrow the considerably wide gap between them before an agreement is reached, while particularly acute antagonism exists between the two sides regarding strategic defence using space weapons.

With Much Bargaining, the Two Sides Have Come Closer in Their Views [subhead]

Over the past 2 years, both the United States and the Soviet Union have successively proposed quite a few arms control projects, and each has made some concessions. Especially during the Iceland summit meeting between the two countries in the latter half of 1986, unanimous agreement was reached in their views on some arms control issues. The main points were: Concerning strategic nuclear weapons, the two parties consented to reduce the number of their strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent in the next 5 years, and it was stipulated that each side should cut back the number of the delivery vehicles for strategic weapons (namely land-based intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and long-range bombers) from the existing more than 2,000 to 1,600, and the number of strategic nuclear warheads from more than 10,000 to 6,000. Regarding medium-range ballistic missiles, the two sides initially decided to reduce to zero their deployment in Europe within 5 years, while the Soviet Union and the United States would each retain 10 respectively in Asia and the United States proper. The two sides were relaxed even on the strategic defense issue, and showed their willingness to continue to observe the antimissile treaty in the next decade.

The Differences Between Them Are Still Great, and They Are Still in Deadlock [subhead]

Starting from their own interests, however, the United States and the Soviet Union have each insisted on their own views, whether on nuclear disarmament or strategic defense, and major disputes remain. As a result, deadlock keeps emerging in the bilateral talks on disarmament between the two countries. The Soviet Union holds the view that each side might decide on its own the number and proportion of weapons and warheads of various categories to be retained after the cutback within 5 years, while the United States holds the view that would be favorable to the Soviet Union maintaining the existing advantages of its land-based intercontinental missiles; therefore, the United States stands for making specific stipulations on the numbers of guided missiles and warheads of various categories, and limitations on the warheads of land-based intercontinental missiles and their payloads. Of course the Soviet Union will not agree to this, and considers the U.S. proposal to be aimed at sabotaging Soviet defense strength and maintaining U.S. superiority. Also, on the issue of destroying medium-range missiles, the two sides differ in their opinions. The United States accepts the demand of its West European allies, and has made the proposal that in destroying medium-range missiles in Europe, it is necessary to take into consideration the balance of short-range nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in Europe, because the Soviet Union has great advantages in these two respects at present.

But the greatest difference lies in space weapons. In fact, the U.S. strategic defense project has become the focus of dispute in the U.S.-Soviet talks. One of the major aspects of the dispute is how to deal with the antimissile treaty. The Soviet Union holds the view that the antimissile treaty should not only be maintained, but its system strengthened. It proposes that the research, development, and testing of space weapons be banned in the next decade, and demands that the United States restrict the research and testing of its strategic defense system to within the laboratory. But the United States holds that it is entitled to conduct research and testing of its strategic defense system in or outside the laboratory. Another aspect is whether nuclear disarmament should be linked to space weapons. The Soviet Union reaffirms that nuclear disarmament must be linked to restricting research on antimissile systems, and resolved as a package. It stresses that without an agreement on space weapons, any agreements on nuclear disarmament will be out of the question. The United States, for its part, holds the view that the issues of nuclear weapons and space weapons should be separated and that they should not be combined.

It can be seen that through their talks over the past 2 years, many outstanding issues remain. This reflects the complexity and acuteness of the current round of U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks.

The Stakes Are Great, and Struggle Is Unavoidable [subhead]

The endless disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union on disarmament issues are closely related to the strategic interests of each.

In the mid-1980's both the United States and the Soviet Union successively proposed their long-term national strategies. Both of their visions rested not only on beefing up their military strength but on reinforcing their comprehensive national strength in an all-round way. The United States worked out a strategic defense project, attempting not only to make some breakthroughs in new military fields, but also to seize a commanding height in technology, to lead its economy with high technology, and to boost

its national strength, so as to leave the Soviet Union lagging far behind. The Soviet Union for its part proposed "a strategy of accelerated development" aiming at racing against time to change the relatively backward state of its domestic economy and technological field while maintaining its military strength, so as to upgrade its national strength and place itself in a more favorable position to contend with the United States.

Regarding the present condition of nuclear armaments, the nuclear strength of the United States and the Soviet Union is in balance and in an 'over-kill' state, and the butback in number of each of their huge nuclear arsenals will not affect their nuclear strength, but will benefit them by reducing their military expenditures. On this point, it is possible for the two sides to reach some agreement on reducing nuclear weapons. The question is how each will gain more in disarmament, which is one of the aspects in the mutual struggle in their talks. Another aspect in their struggles will be between restricting and safeguarding the strategic defense project. The Soviet Union attempts to bargain for a restriction of the U.S. Strategic defense project with its concessions in nuclear disarmament, while the United States wants to benefit from nuclear disarmament, while simultaneously safeguarding its strategic defense project. Therefore, the proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union reflect their own strategic intentions, as well as their intention of preserving their military strength.

On the eve of the current round of disarmament talks, both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed their will to make progress on the basis of the achievements of previous Geneva talks. However, the Soviet side says "now we'll see how Washington will act," while the U.S. side says "now the ball is in the Soviet court"; both have shifted responsibility to the other party. It seems that the current round of talks will not be smooth sailing.

Opening Ceremony Noted

HK201320 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 19 Jan 87 p 6

["Jottings" by Cang Mang (5547 5413): "After a 'Sumptuous Luncheon'"]

[Text] At the beginning of the seventh round of U.S.-Soviet talks on arms control, the new Soviet chief negotiator Vorontsov adopted an original approach and changed the opening ceremony. Instead of holding a meeting attended by all members of the two delegations, he held a luncheon for the two chief negotiators. When reporters asked the U.S. chief negotiator Kampelman what he wanted to get from the opening ceremony, he answered: "A good lunch."

People may imagine how "sumptuous" their lunch was, and it is possible that Kampelman will give a more "sumptuous" lunch to repay his Soviet counterpart's hospitality, as this is called for "by etiquette."

However, it is certain that the business at the negotiating table will not be as pleasant and relaxed as the clinking of glasses on the dining table. People may have noticed that since the U.S. and Soviet leaders reached some understanding at their Iceland summit meeting, although both sides have put forth some tentative proposals, their positions are still far apart from each other on the concrete agreement

provisions. Neither of the two sides is willing to give up its military superiority, and each is trying to impose the arms control program most favorable to itself on the other side. It seems that the good food on the dining table will not cover up the smell of gunpowder on the negotiating table.

Although the two sides have great differences, holding talks is better than no talks at all. The issue is that they really should achieve some results that are favorable to world peace. As for the hope of the world's people, they want to see that after enjoying their "good lunch," the Soviet and American negotiators will also produce some decent results in their arms control talks so that the people throughout the world can also have good things to eat.

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CSO: 5200/4051

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA ON TURKEY: U.S. NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS, SDI ROLE

PM291100 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 87 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent A. Stepanov report: "Turkey and NATO"]

[Text] Ankara, January -- Debates continue in the Turkish press over the decision to review the American-Turkish "Defense and Economy Cooperation Agreement" (DECA), in operation for some years. Under this agreement, in exchange for credits for the purchase of arms and nonrepayable military aid, the United States may use bases and electronic surveillance centers on Turkish territory. But this is evidently not enough for Washington. The United States is exerting unceremonious pressure on Turkey, making the question of the expansion of military and economic aid directly dependent on a stepping up of the U.S. military presence on Turkish soil and the deployment of new nuclear missile systems there.

In mid-December a new version of the agreement was initialed by the sides. It was announced that the content will not be revealed prior to the final signing. But Turkish officials stated that the quantity and quality of American aid will increase substantially. This naturally leads to the idea that Washington expects concessions from Ankara in return.

Alongside the DECA talks, talks on the conclusion of another agreement, "on the receiving country in the event of war," are nearing completion. Under this agreement, dumps containing weapons, ammunition, and spare parts for American forces will be created in Turkey beforehand.

According to the published reports, in particular, in the newspaper CUMHURİYET, construction is continuing at a rapid rate in eastern Anatolia of two large air bases at Mus and Batman not far from the border with the USSR, to which yet another American-Turkish agreement, on the joint use of military airfields, applies.

At the same time, the Americans are modernizing their nuclear weapon dumps in that country. At the region's biggest Turkish-U.S. Base at Incirlik, near Adana, the newspaper MILLİYET writes, USAF nuclear-capable F-4 fighter-bombers are being replaced with more up-to-date F-16 planes, which have a far greater range. Work is actively under way to expand this base, where a significant proportion of U.S. nuclear ammunition is already stockpiled. And, as MILLİYET also notes, the "dual key" system, that is, joint U.S.-Turkish control, does not apply to this ammunition. In effect the American command can use this ammunition at its own discretion.

This was confirmed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle, who has become a frequent visitor to Turkey; he stated that U.S. troops at U.S. bases outside the United States will carry out U.S. orders exclusively, regardless of whose territory they are on. This position amounts to a considerable encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, and threatens to draw the country into Washington's military adventures, with all the unpredictable consequences that entails.

In the last few months, within the framework of "Atlantic solidarity," Turkey has been worked on vigorously by leading NATO circles, headed by U.S. General B. Rogers, commander in chief of the bloc's forces in Europe. A wide range of methods has come into play -- from a visit to Istanbul by the American battleship Missouri with nuclear cruise missiles on board and the holding of a North Atlantic Assembly session on the banks of the Bosphorus, to the open intimidation of the Turks with fabricated reports about the supposed "threat from the north" and all kinds of promises on the part of high-ranking figures from the U.S. Administration and NATO. The purpose of this massive pressure is the stationing on Turkish territory of an additional quantity of nuclear systems, above all Pershing-1 and Lance missiles, which, according to a decision of the NATO nuclear planning group, adopted in Montebello in 1983, are to be removed from the FRG.

The Turkish Government's repeated statements that it is not a question of siting additional nuclear weapons on its territory are literally drowned out by a harmonious chorus of NATOites in an entirely different key. They keep asserting that the "Montebello decision" is virtually binding, and that the Turkish authorities will have to submit, like it or not. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington stated frankly that talks are under way with Turkey on this question. R. Strausz-Hupe, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, has also joined in the NATO chorus, which evoked a very negative reaction from the Turkish authorities and the broad public in the country. A number of newspapers here have rightly christened this approach to Turkey "nuclear blackmail."

There is another area in which energetic pressure is being brought to bear on the Turkish Government. This is Reagan's "Star Wars" program. American specialists believe that you could not find a better place, for geographical and climatic -- in short, strategic -- reasons, for the siting of land-based SDI elements.

The far-reaching U.S. and NATO militarist plans are causing serious concern among the Turkish public and various political forces in the country.

By imposing new nuclear systems on Turkey, as the well-known Turkish journalist (Kh. Gerger) has stated, the United States is pushing it into the arms of nuclear war. The missiles that the United States wants to station in Turkey, (I. Onen), deputy general chairman of the Social Democratic People's Party, noted, will not be of any benefit to Turkey from the standpoint of defense. (O. Soysal), chairman of the parliamentary group on Turkey's relations Soysal), with NATO and parliamentary deputy from the ruling Motherland Party, stressed that he is categorically opposed to the siting of new nuclear systems in the country, since in the event of nuclear war they will make Turkey a target.

Former Prime Minister B. Ecevit assessed the new U.S.-Turkish DECA agreement as "a compromise which will increase instability, weaken security, and step up Turkey's dependence on the United States." Deep concern was expressed in connection with U.S. military plans regarding Turkey by former Foreign Minister (I.S. Chaglayangil) and former Defense Minister (Kh. e. Ishyk). They came out against the appearance of new U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil, since, in their words, this in no way accords with Turkey's national interests and can only lead to the exacerbation of Turkish-Soviet relations.

These people, who have the wisdom of great experience and are respected in the country, cannot be accused of shortsightedness. And their position fits in with the mood of broad sociopolitical circles in Turkey, which see national interests not in playing along with Washington, but in pursuing and strengthening an independent course with regard to their neighbors, a course based on the principles of peace and cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

HOWE OPTIMISM--[No dateline as received]--Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe today expressed his "sense of optimism" about the progress of nuclear disarmament talks in Geneva. He told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of MPs there had been a "perceptible improvement in atmosphere" following the Reykjavik summit. "I have a sense of optimism," he said. "I think there is a wish on both sides to make efforts. I believe there is a common will there." Sir Geoffrey told MPs: "There are some signs of progress, spiritually." But he conceded: "There has not been a matching willingness to sit down and discuss details." He said the Reykjavik summit had "shaken the kaleidoscope of arms control discussions very dramatically. "And it has taken some time for the pieces to settle. Now that they are doing so, it contributes to significant progress in the whole field. "It does open up opportunities, provided the participants in arms control discussions concentrate on objectives that are obtainable and substantial. [Text] [By Andrew Evans] [London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1519 GMT 28 Jan 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5240/040

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: HUNGARY'S OVARI ON EUROPEAN VIEW OF INF

PM181931 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 1, 12 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Miklos Ovari, secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee and member of the Politburo: "That Is The World We Are Fighting For"]

[Text] For centuries armed force was the natural arbiter in interstate disputes: it determined frontiers, social formations and even the existence of entire historical systems--colonialism, for example. But it is not the 16th, but the 20th century that is now ending. After the 20th century has been marked by the unprecedented advance of technology which has brought man's capabilities (particularly as regards the development of weaponry) to the critical point beyond which, apparently, the power of reason ends. How and for what purposes will we use this technical and technological explosion, will this situation serve to accelerate and intensify the arms race or will mankind be able to use the powerful potential released for the solution of its urgent tasks?

Ask any Communist--Hungarian, Soviet or any other--whether a nuclear-free world is conceivable. There will be only one answer: That is precisely the kind of world we are fighting for. And we shall exert every effort to ensure that the world is really free from nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, there exist different views on this question. NATO, judging by the decisions recently adopted, proceeds from the assumption that security lies in nuclear missile potential. But such reasoning is built on obsolete views and runs counter to the realities of our time, to plain common sense. True, there is by no means as much unanimity in NATO on this subject as it would have the public believe. In my opinion, the West European countries have their own specific interests to think of. Clearly the U.S. wants to retain its dominance of NATO, leaving Europe the role of handmaid. Today some West European governments are supporting Washington's resistance to nuclear disarmament. But there are serious differences among the allies, primarily in the economic area where this factor--expenditure on armaments--is decisive. To my mind, the West European countries are pursuing a more sensible policy

than the United States. They are more receptive to new ideas and are more keenly aware of the dangerous role allotted the European Continent in the strategic plans of the overseas politicians.

What is needed in the modern world of rapid scientific and technological progress is new thinking that would allow of a new, sober, realistic approach to these problems. More weapons does not mean more security. Rather the reverse. And the present political struggle is a struggle aimed at the assertion of the idea of new political thinking. I believe that this idea will win through. With difficulty, but it will. Because it accords with the laws of the social development of our world. On the threshold of the new year I believe in this. It is impossible, of course, to predict when and at the cost of how much effort we shall come to a world free of nuclear weapons. But if mankind wants to survive, it will have to get there.

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CSO: 5200/1271

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW NEW TIMES DISCUSSES UK, FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES

PM291001 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 3, 26 Jan 87 pp 20-23

["Aleksandr Lebedev article: "Bomb for Europe? The British and French Nuclear Arsenals"]

[Text] How important are the arsenals in the overall nuclear strategic balance between East and West? How much of an obstacle are they on the way to the nuclear-free world envisaged in the three-stage plan for nuclear disarmament put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev a year ago?

Whether mankind is to move from a nuclear into a non-nuclear age and when now largely depends on the United States, but also, to no small degree, on the two other Western nuclear powers, Britain and France. Their reaction to Reykjavik, however, was close to panic-like a child from whom a favourite toy is being taken away. Strangely, even Bonn found a non-nuclear perspective frightening.

How is this to be accounted for? Is it just another spectacle being acted out on the "Atlantic stage"? Or are Britain and France really so attached to their nuclear brainchild that they are unable to part with it now (which, incidentally, no one is asking them to do) or in the future?

How Britain Went Nuclear [subhead]

A good number of prominent nuclear physicists were working in the British Isles before and in the early years of the war. Many of them had been spirited away from the continent by the British secret services under the noses of the Nazis (along with quantities of heavy water). Britain was well advanced in the development of the new, "ultimate" weapon.

Subsequently, the scientists and the research equipment were, for security reasons, moved to Canada whence, under an agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill, they were transferred to the U.S. It looked like a joint Anglo-American enterprise, a nuclear dimension to the "special relationship" between the two countries. Gradually, however, classified information came to be withheld increasingly from London until the McMahon law passed by the U.S. Congress in 1946 completely barred the British from the holy of holies of American military secrets (the law was only amended in 1958).

Britain, loth to be in the position of a rejected partner, set about developing its own nuclear weapon, first under the Labour government of Attlee and then, with renewed energy, under Churchill. In 1952 it held a successful atom bomb test in Australia, followed by a hydrogen bomb test in 1957.

Britain's nuclear potential was intended, of course, to supplement the Western military arsenal, and also to scare the peoples of its crumbling empire. "I felt that this force was important for Britain, just as similar force would be for France," Harold Macmillan said. "It was the symbol of independence and showed that we were not just satellites or clients of America." Possession of a nuclear weapon created an illusion of equality.

It has to be said for the sake of fairness that London took a guarded and responsible view of the formidable weapon, all the more so as, having accepted U.S. nuclear-armed bombers in its territory, Britain automatically became a target for a Soviet retaliatory strike. Both Attlee and Churchill, fearful of the adventurism of the Pentagon generals (who pressed for the use of the atom bomb in the 1950s, first in the Korean war and then in Vietnam) made repeated trips to Washington to restrain U.S. Presidents from rash moves.

This did not, however, prevent London from seeing its nuclear weapon as an important instrument in atomic-age diplomacy and a symbol of belonging to the select nuclear club.

The British nuclear arsenal began to lose its value with the advent of the era satellites and ballistic missiles. Bombers became obsolete as a means of delivery and the development of the British Blue Streak missile was making slow progress.

London turned to Washington for help. However, the British were in for a disappointment. Its requests met with coolness in Washington. Influential officials—Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, Under-Secretary of State George Ball and others—tried to talk President John Kennedy out of giving American missiles to London. In the summer of 1962 McNamara openly spoke out against sharing nuclear weapons with the allies (Macmillan described his speech as "foolish"?).

Many people in the U.S. at the time spoke in favour of letting the British nuclear forces die a natural death, as they would grow obsolete. They cited, not without reason, the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the situation getting out of control. But Washington had other motives as well. It hoped to take advantage of the transition to a new generation of weapons—missiles—to assure its nuclear missile monopoly in the Western world.

Kennedy, however, did not want to risk further humiliating the privilege partner. In December 1962, after an arduous negotiation in Nassau (in the Bahamas), an agreement was signed under which the U.S. was to sell missiles for the Polaris submarines.

But Britain had to pay a heavy price. The Americans pushed us hard and many have "out-smarted" us altogether. It is very hard to judge," Harold Macmillan wrote later. Nevertheless, it is possible to judge. In return, Britain gave the Americans a submarine base in Holy Loch, Scotland. In addition, Macmillan agreed, reluctantly, to consider the American "multilateral nuclear force" project (MNF), designed to meet the nuclear claims of Bonn and other American European allies.

The labour government of Harold Wilson, which succeeded the Conservatives, honored the Nassau agreement, with the exception of one point. Mindful of the opposition in Britain to the prospect of the F.R.G. getting a nuclear weapon, Wilson resorted to a deft manoeuvre (offering the patently unrealistic Atlantic nuclear force project) to torpedo the "multilateral navy," a brainchild of McNamara.

As a result, the basis of the independent British nuclear force was formed by five Polaris submarines. The status of this force, however, is somewhat ambiguous; while the submarines and the warheads are manufactured in Britain, the enriched uranium for them comes from the U.S., the charges are tested in Nevada, and targeting is done jointly with U.S. headquarters through American intelligence satellites. The British nuclear force has been placed under NATO command, with London allowed to make independent use of it only if its "highest national interests" are threatened. "Some independence, exclaimed Liberal MP Paddy Ashdown.

The French Force de Frappe [subhead]

The development of the French nuclear force followed a different course. Work in the field had begun under the Fourth Republic in the late 1940s, and was stepped up when General de Gaulle came to power in 1958. [paragraph continues]

If Britain had been able to acquire atomic and nuclear bombs, the General saw no reason why France, which had comparable resources and scientific potential, could not join the "nuclear club." Paris saw this as a symbol of restored French greatness, its actual and not merely formal return to the category of a great power. At that time de Gaulle did not rule out nuclear cooperation with the U.S. and Britain.

In fact, in 1958 Paris made a confidential proposal to Washington and London to set up a kind of "triumvirate" to run the West's affairs and pursue a concerted policy in the Third World. It was understood that in that case the U.S. would cooperate with France in the nuclear field on the same terms as with Britain.

However, while Washington reluctantly accepted the obligations stemming from its "special relationship" with Britain, it had no intention of extending the same terms to Paris. Eisenhower's reply was seen by de Gaulle as humiliating, which spurred the French effort to develop its own nuclear weapon. In 1960 the French tested their atomic device in the Sahara. However, a good deal of effort was still required to create a battle-effective nuclear force. The French thought cooperation with Britain highly desirable in view of a certain asymmetry in their achievements in the nuclear missile field. The British had their own nuclear warheads and the French had their own missile. Cooperation seemed logical and, on the eve of the Anglo-American meeting in Nassau, de Gaulle tried to persuade Macmillan to that course, stressing the prospects of West European integration and the need for greater independence from the U.S.

The British Prime Minister, who needed French backing for Britain's entry into the Common Market, was not against de Gaulle's idea but said he would leave the last word to Washington. Washington's word, uttered in Nassau, reminded de Gaulle of Churchill's wartime warning that if Britain had to choose between France and America it would always choose the latter.

When Paris realized that London's position remained unchanged, it decided to go it alone. As if to spite the British, de Gaulle signed in 1963 the Elysee treaty of cooperation with the F.R.G. and stepped up work to build an independent nuclear potential, which came to be known as force de frappe (strike force). The idea of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation was shelved but, as later events showed, not buried.

The French strike force comprised a fleet of submarines (soon to be brought up to seven), 18 ballistic missiles in silos on the Albion plateau and Mirage bombers.

In addition, the French troops stationed in the F.R.G. have Pluton tactical nuclear missiles and the Britain Army on the Rhine is equipped with U.S.-made Lance missiles.

A comparison of the British and French nuclear forces in the 1960s reveals an underlying difference. The French military doctrine of the time was based on the "all azimuths" strategy. To be sure, the use of the French strike force against the United States was highly unlikely, but it could well serve to deter the F.R.G. if the Elysee treaty began to split at the seams.

At critical moments under de Gaulle (as during the Caribbean crisis in 1962) Paris made no secret of whose side its nuclear forces were on, but for all that France always distanced itself from the more adventurist U.S. acts, for example, in Indochina or in the Middle East. It withdrew from the NATO military organizations.

The Weak Not So Weak Any More [subhead]

Let us look at the state of affairs today. Both London and Paris feel that their nuclear forces are obsolescent and are planning a drastic modernization in the 1990s. Both capitals tend to be over-modest about the size of their nuclear potentials (just a few per cent of the Soviet one).

This is not so, even if one compares present levels, not to speak of tomorrow. Today, Britain and France are estimated to possess between them about three hundred nuclear warheads. As a result of modernization, they will have about five hundred each by the beginning of the 1990s. This makes a combined total of thousand warheads. By the year 2000 the figure will have grown to some 1,500, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But it could be much higher for the simple reason that the French M-4 and M-5 missiles, to replace the M-20s, and the Trident-2 (D-5) system to replace the British Polaris, can carry different numbers of warheads depending on the modification.

In the opinion of many experts, in the 1990s Britain will probably have not five hundred, but over a thousand nuclear warheads (1,088). This figure can be doubled by adding the French potential. The two countries' nuclear forces would then constitute a large percentage of the Soviet nuclear potential (even strategic, not to speak of the European potential).

Referring to the alleged weakness of the French nuclear force several years ago, former French minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement remarked: "The weak is not so weak anymore." And Colonel Jonathan Alford, deputy director of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, has said that Britain and France have no grounds -- military (under the pretext of weakness) or political -- to refrain from nuclear weapon cuts. This opinion is shared by Thomas Hirschfeld, a former head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

All this is being said with reference to the present situation. But the introduction of Tridents would increase the British nuclear potential 16-fold, according to Neil Kinnock. The D-5 missiles, in their speed and accuracy, belong to the category of first-strike weapons, as both British and American experts believe. But if the existing Polaris potential is an adequate deterrent, why increase it? This is the question being asked by many British experts, a question all the more relevant now that the prospect of cuts in American and Soviet nuclear forces is being discussed.

Why, indeed? After all, London and Paris have repeatedly stated that if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. make deep cuts in their nuclear forces, they will follow suit. Even after Reykjavik, when the British and French leaders, contrary to their former declarations, have tended to look on the idea of a nuclear-free world as at best a goal for a very remote future, they still magnanimously agree to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. eliminating half their strategic weapons.

Suppose this does happen. The Soviet and American strategic potential would then comprise 6,000 warheads on each side. Britain and France would meanwhile have increased their forces by at least 5 or 7 times. Some two thousand Anglo-French warheads to 12,000 Soviet ones is one thing, but the same number constitutes a third of 6,000. Combined with 6,000 U.S. warheads, they would give the West a considerable lead. The British and French nuclear weapons would make the West's superiority even more impressive if a "zero option" in medium-range missiles were to materialize.

The arithmetic involved is simple enough, and so are the policies: to try to gain an edge on the U.S.S.R. under the pretext of the "independence" (for which read "not counting") of the British and French nuclear forces. These forces are independent of the Soviet Union, but not of the U.S. and NATO. This is so not only because of the formal status and level of operational interaction between the British, French and American nuclear forces, but also because of the dramatic change in the policies of Britain, France and their closest allies.

Let us think back to the 1960s. At that time the French and British leaders, like their West German counterparts, made repeated moves towards detente in Europe and the world.

London (under a Conservative government) played a positive role in the drafting of the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and of the 1967 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (under Labour), as well as in the early stages of the tripartite talks on a total ban of all nuclear weapon tests. Can Britain in the 1980s boast of at least one notable constructive idea to help break the deadlock in the disarmament negotiations, or check the arms race?

In France, too, much has changed since the time when de Gaulle dreamed of a "united Europe" from the Atlantic to the Urals on the basis of "detente, concord and cooperation." The leaders who have since come to power espouse a different philosophy. There has been a thaw in Franco-American relations as the once sharp divergences on many international issues have been blunted. The world "Atlanticism" has lost its former negative connotation in the French lexicon. Correspondingly, the positions of Paris and London have drawn closer together. The French no longer describe Britain as the American Trojan horse in Europe.

The degree of harmony in transatlantic relations should not of course be overestimated: Friction and fierce arguments recur in the Washington-London-Paris-Bonn "quadrangle" and in the Anglo-French-West German "triangle." New axes are being formed and once stable politico-geometrical figures are falling apart. Contradictions persist and will not go away.

But we are not here concerned with this aspect of the objective processes at work in the Western world. Rather, we would like to draw attention to the following facts. While 10-15 years ago the West European countries came up with independent initiatives that tended to improve the international climate and to some extent induced the U.S. to take (or contemplate) steps in the same direction, nothing of the kind can be observed today.

The reverse seems to be the case. London, Paris and Bonn are anxious to warn Washington (much, one suspects, to its pleasure) not to be carried away by an accommodation with Moscow. They seem almost genuinely concerned lest the U.S. should "over-reduce" its strategic weapons (which are meanwhile being increased), lest the Americans should be too hasty in removing their medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe (while in the meantime more and more of them are being deployed).

It is in this context that one has to assess the role of the British and French nuclear forces both as a military and political factor on the side of the NATO and West, whatever their formal status.

It is no accident, perhaps, that the British and French nuclear potentials are often referred to as Anglo-French. This may not be so in legal and operational terms. Not yet. But the idea of close cooperation between the two nuclear submarine fleets periodically becomes the subject of lively discussion, especially when the Anglo-American nuclear cooperation agreement is up for renewal or the problem of modernization arises.

In the early 1970s, the London papers wrote that Britain was going to offer to sign a "nuclear pact" with France. There was of course a good deal of exaggeration in this, as well as a two-pronged diplomatic ploy. London sought to curry favour with Paris to get into the EEC. By the same token, it wanted to blackmail Washington should it begin to have second thoughts about its nuclear alliance with the British.

Eventually, the problem of Britain's entry into the Common Market was resolved and the U.S. extended the Anglo-American nuclear cooperation agreement. Michel Debre, the then French Defense Minister, commented that France should now wait for another date with Britain in the creation of the next generation of nuclear weapons. Such a moment has now come, and contacts between the two capitals have become more active. During their Paris visit last autumn, David Steel, leader of the British Liberal Party, and David Owen, leader of the Social Democratic Party of Britain, discussed the possibility of nuclear cooperation between the two countries, notably the prospect for having the French M-4 missile replace Tridents on British submarines.

Margaret Thatcher, during her visit to Paris in November of last year, avoided giving a clear answer on the possibility of concrete cooperation, but did not deny that the subject may come under discussion. Speculation on this score is undoubtedly fuelled by the statements of the French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (for example, in his speech at the assembly of the Western European Union in early December) on the need for a "European defense" backed up by an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent.

It is notable that the Bonn government looks at such ideas with keen interest (the Social Democrats on the whole support the British Labor Party's line on renunciation of the nuclear weapon). It looks as if the F.R.G. is still hoping to gain access to nuclear weapons rather than just granting its territory for these weapons. Bonn would like to see the Anglo-French "nuclear bomb" as a "European deterrent" and would like to have a say in decisions on its use, possible within the framework of the Western European Union, which is now being reviewed.

Whether or not a "European nuclear force" will even be formally organized, one thing is clear even today. The nuclear forces of Britain and France, separately or together, represent a formidable weapon targeted on the U.S.S.R. Moscow's tolerance of it does not mean that it does not notice them. Simply the U.S.S.R. is trying not to complicate the process of reduction of the two largest nuclear potentials—the Soviet and the American. The British and French nuclear forces remain outside the brackets, as it were, at their present level. But to go ahead and build them up, while pretending that nothing is happening, is less than gentlemanly, to say the least.

How do British and French politicians justify their insatiable passion for nuclear warheads? This will be the subject of our next article.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

GORBACHEV RESPONDS TO FRENCH ACTIVISTS' APPEAL ON TESTING

LD281916 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Reply to French Peace Supporters"]

[Text] The reply of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the message of the French peace champions sent late last year to the leaders of the five nuclear powers has been delivered to the leaders of the French peace movement.

The message from the French peace champions contained a call for putting an end to nuclear tests and taking measures to curb the arms race.

The Soviet leader states:

"We in the USSR understand well the concern of French public about the serious danger stemming from nuclear tests to peace and security of peoples. The Soviet leadership is doing everything in its power to ensure a total ban on nuclear testing. Displaying goodwill and wishing to contribute to the creation of conditions for reaching international agreement on that issue, the Soviet Union has repeatedly extended on a unilateral basis the moratorium on nuclear tests and urged the United States and the other nuclear powers to follow this good example.

"The Soviet Government declared that the USSR is prepared to adhere to its moratorium further too, but would be forced to resume nuclear tests after the first nuclear explosion conducted by the United States in the new year. We have thus given the United States a new opportunity to join in the moratorium. The Soviet Union also proposes that full-scale talks on total or stage-by-stage ending of nuclear tests be started without delay in any composition and at any forum.

"Yet in disregard of the will of broad international public, the United States continues implementing its programme of nuclear tests and nuclear weapons race. Unfortunately, France also holds a negative stand on the question of ending nuclear tests and the nuclear weapons race.

"We are convinced that in the general process of mankind's freeing from nuclear weapons every voice is important, there is a place for all countries and peoples. Not a single government, not a single serious public force can evade responsibility and stand aloof from the fight for nuclear disarmament.

"Under these conditions it is important that the public of all countries of the world should vigorously work in support of the vitally important demand for an end to nuclear testing, demand that an end be put to the nuclear weapons race. We set high store by the activities of the French peace champions in that field and wish them every success."

We are deeply excited and fully satisfied by Mikhail Gorbachev's answer, said Jacques Le Dauphin, national secretary of the French peace movement. It is noteworthy that Mikhail Gorbachev is the first of the leaders of the five nuclear powers to have responded to our appeal. The Soviet Union has thus demonstrated yet again its intention to continue implementing a broad range of measures aimed at stopping nuclear explosions and curbing the arms race. And it is not just talking about it, but taking concrete action. An eloquent instance of this is the now 18-month-old Soviet unilateral moratorium. French peace supporters also consistently advocate the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament. We have urged all countries to turn this year into a year free of nuclear tests, which will promote the improvement of the international climate and the strengthening of mutual trust.

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CSO: 5200/1276

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR ON U.S. 3 FEBRUARY NEVADA TEST

'True Intentions' of Test

LD021715 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT 2 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS -- TASS political observer on military questions Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Washington's stand on nuclear weapons test is the most characteristic indicator of the true intentions of the present U.S. Administration on a wide range of problems connected with war and peace. In the past six years the military-industrial complex invariably insisted that the White House should go on with nuclear explosions.

Preparations for another U.S. nuclear test, the 25th after the announcement by the Soviet Union of a unilateral moratorium on all the nuclear explosions, are coming to a close. The explosion scheduled for February 5 cannot be described as an ordinary or routine one.

Demonstrating its criminal disregard for world public opinion, Washington is going to conduct a nuclear test at the time when the Soviet Union has not been conducting any nuclear explosions for 17 months, when the Soviet Government announced its readiness to further observe the moratorium. However, the Soviet Union will resume nuclear tests after the first nuclear explosion conducted by the U.S. in 1987.

The impression is that Washington prefers to build its relations with the Soviet Union not on the basis of treaties and understandings on lessening the danger of a nuclear war, but on the basis of the action-counteraction principle in the sphere of the creation of new mass destruction weapons. Neither the complete discontinuation of nuclear explosions, nor the moratorium on nuclear tests, nor just the talks on this problem suit the U.S. Administration.

By refusing to stop nuclear explosions, President Reagan demonstrates his readiness to endlessly play with fire on the brink of a nuclear abyss hoping against hope to make humanity reconcile itself to the inevitability of the nuclear arms race.

However it is beyond doubt that sooner or later even the most reckless adventurers in the U.S. will be forced to take into consideration people's right to life and to put the interests of humanity above the selfish calculations of the military-industrial complex.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

LD031445 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1404 GMT 3 Feb 87

["Statement by USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (TASS) -- Today is the 547th day of silence at Soviet nuclear test sites. Over those 547 days nuclear blasts have been conducted 24 times in Nevada. This was said by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, when he spoke at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

We have suggested to the United States that they should come to their senses and stop, he said. We have reminded the U.S. and the world that the United States has, in any case, already conducted many more explosions than the Soviet Union. We have warned the United States that we cannot go on endlessly giving them a head start.

Recalling that there are only 2 days until the nuclear weapon test planned by the U.S. Energy Department, Gerasimov said that by all accounts U.S. militarism has got the bit between its teeth. Further confirmation of this is provided by the statements by U.S. Administration spokesmen about the possibility of a staged deployment [razvertyvaniye] by the United States of a large-scale ABM system at the beginning of the nineties. If, as individual components envisaged under the SDI program are developed [razrabotka], there begins within a certain period of time a staged deployment [razvertyvaniye], then it will no longer be a case of research, as the U.S. Administration stated earlier, but of the practical conversion of space into an arena for the arms race. This step will abrogate the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of both limited and large-scale ABM systems with space-based elements. These plans contradict the aims and tasks which are the subject of the nuclear and space weapons talks in Geneva.

Such a prospect alarms the Soviet Union, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed. We shall be attentively following the development of the situation.

Test Held 3 Feb

LD031736 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Text] Washington, 3 Feb (TASS) -- The United States conducted an underground nuclear explosion at the testing ground in Nevada today. This was reported by an AP correspondent from Las Vegas, citing a spokesman of the U.S. Energy Department. In this way the Reagan Administration, demonstratively throwing down a challenge to the world public, has again ignored the Soviet Union's call to join it in the unilateral moratorium that it announced on nuclear tests, and has reaffirmed its intention of pursuing its dangerous course toward escalation of the nuclear arms race.

Bogachev on 'Irresponsible' Test

LD031938 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 3 Feb 87

["Explosion in Nevada" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS -- Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

The wire services have brought bad news: Today, February 3, the United States set off a nuclear device with a yield of 20 kilotons at the range in Nevada.

The explosion, conducted two days earlier than planned, undoubtedly will hold a special place in the Reagan administration's already odious "service record" over the past six years.

Challenging public opinion on all continents, Washington has again demonstrated its irresponsible determination to build its relations with the rest of the world in a field related to security not on the basis of generally accepted international standards but on a principle harking back to Stone Age.

As is known, for a year and a half the Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear explosions and recently confirmed once again its readiness to further adhere to the moratorium until the first American blast in 1987.

So the President of the United States was given a chance to choose between silence at long last at all nuclear testing ranges in the world and a resumption of nuclear explosions with redoubled force.

On refusing to stop nuclear explosions President Reagan decided further to balance on the brink of the nuclear precipice.

Test Considered 'Severe Blow'

LD032331 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2022 GMT 3 Feb 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Vitaliy Ilyashenko]

[Excerpts] Today the United States carried out an underground nuclear explosion at the testing area in Nevada. [passage omitted]

I will recall the United States planned the first nuclear test for this year for 5 February. Obviously the militarist urge is so strong in Washington they decided to press on faster there. They cannot help but know in the White House that in conducting a new test the United States will therefore deal a severe blow to the Soviet moratorium which has been going on now for 547 days.

USSR Ready to Resume Tests

OW031455 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1135 GMT 3 Feb 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Today is the 547th day of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. Silence has reigned on our nuclear testing grounds for 18 months. The United States has conducted 24 nuclear explosions during the same period. The 25th explosion is scheduled for day after tomorrow, 5 February. It is code named Hazebrook.

If the explosion is carried out, the Soviet Union will be forced to resume its testing in the interests of its security. But as you know, not everything is lost. The Soviet

Union, even if it is forced to resume these tests, will be ready to return to the moratorium again if the United States ends its testing in Nevada. Just a few hours remain for Washington to decide.

The international community expects restraint, prudence, and wisdom. Whether or not these hopes are fulfilled remains to be seen.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON U.S. TEST BAN STANCE

PM271153 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

[Vitaliy Korionov commentary: "Day 539"]

[Text] Today is day 539 of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. The silence on Soviet test ranges is being recorded by U.S. seismic apparatus set up in the Semipalatinsk region. But the U.S. press is reporting preparations in Nevada for the next U.S. nuclear explosion -- the 25th since the Soviet moratorium was announced.

The fourth round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on ending nuclear tests started at the end of last week in Geneva. At these talks too the USSR continues to uphold its principled line that a total nuclear test ban is the paramount measure on the way to reducing and subsequently eliminating nuclear arms. This question must be resolved urgently.

But what about the United States? Recently the White House informed the Senate that the administration was finally ready to examine the question of ratification of the 1974 Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. So then, has the ice perhaps been broken? Unfortunately, there are as yet no grounds for such a statement. The fact is that the administration simultaneously announced that treaties purportedly cannot be effectively verified [proverka] and therefore verification [kontrol] measures must be perfected beforehand.

Thus, it is the same old story. As is well known, the United States has modern technical verification [kontrol] measures at its disposal which provide a cast-iron guarantee that any nuclear explosion will be picked up. It is also well known that the United States obtains seismic information from almost 200 verification [kontrolnyy] stations located in various parts of the world, including along the Soviet Union's borders. Soviet territory is completely "covered" by these stations. It is also well known that the Soviet Union is no less interested than the United States in establishing the strictest forms of verification [kontrol].

Those who oppose the United States joining the Soviet moratorium highlight yet another "argument": The USSR, you see, "violates treaties." The administration has alleged that Moscow "in all probability" has stopped observing the 1974 treaty.

However, such conjecture has already been exposed by people whose probity the White House cannot doubt. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on this

question the other day. Speeches were made at the hearings by R. Batzel, director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and (Z. Kheker), director of the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. Research has shown, R. Batzel stated, that the "treaty is being observed" by the Soviet Union. There are no grounds for claiming that the USSR has ever gone beyond the limitations laid down under the treaty, (Z Kheker) stated...

The Soviet Union has given the Reagan administration around 18 months to think over one of the most urgent questions of our time. So is it not time for Washington to come to its senses, join the moratorium, and set about curbing the nuclear race in deeds rather than words -- which is what the peoples worldwide are so ardently expecting and what the Soviet Union has been urging it to do.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSALS

LD012155 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 01 Feb 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer, and Viktor Levin, All-Union radio commentator on foreign politics; presented by Nikolay Agayants]

[Excerpts]

[Agayants] On Tuesday 27 January, the first day of work of the CPSU Central Committee plenum when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev delivered a report to it, across the ocean in Washington, at a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, the head of the White House, Ronald Reagan, made a speech. It was announced beforehand as one of the most important in all the years in power of the current Republican administration, as almost an epoch-making event in the year of the 200th anniversary of the U.S. Constitution. Alas, nothing new was heard in it. As an ABC-TV commentary said, the President has not changed his basic stance on Star Wars, on aid to the Nicaraguan contras, or on the budget. His program is a classical recipe for political deadlocks in the forthcoming year, the TV company noted. Hackneyed anti-Soviet fabrications alternated in Reagan's address on the state of the union with counterfeit statements about the Reykjavik talks, avowed assurances to continue to support the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries with malicious accusations of terrorism against the Soviet Union. In a word, all this rhetorical cocktail talk was patently tainted, and once again it confirmed the obvious; that is, that Ronald Reagan's administration is absolutely out of step with the times and is contemplating no new approaches or shifts. This stance by the White House, unconstructive and lacking in good will, was seen as a mockery of the hopes and aspirations of millions of Americans. Americans are particularly worried, of course, that Ronald Reagan himself, and his aids, are going all out to resist the curbing of the arms race and are endeavoring by hook or by crook to put it into near-earth orbit as soon as possible.

[Levin] Well, we've been saying, quite rightly, that the international situation remains complicated, difficult, tense, and the fact the United States intends to conduct another nuclear explosion on 5 February is clear evidence that the U.S. policy is not becoming constructive. Nonetheless, it's important to note that there are encouraging elements. I see one such element in the results of last Sunday's Bundestag elections in the FRG. Consider, comrades: One can already say quite definitely -- and there is virtual unanimity on this among political observers in the FRG itself -- that victory has gone to those parties and those politicians who have been stressing the

need to carry out a constructive, realistic policy directed toward detente. On this the Free Democrats have gained, and on this the Greens have very noticeably strengthened their position. There's no disputing that this must modify the positions of the ruling Christian Democrat bloc.

[Agayants] Now I'd like to deal with a question currently attracting a lot of attention: the question of what destiny awaits the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, and what can be expected in the immediate future. All this is bound up with the fact that, as you know, the United States is planning another nuclear explosion.

[Levin] You know -- and the Soviet Government has issued a very precise and clear statement to this effect -- that the very first U.S. nuclear explosion this year will force us to resume our own nuclear tests. We don't want to do this. Our statement says quite clearly that we've extended our moratorium four times, and then extended it a fifth time to give the United States a chance to analyze its position thoroughly once again, to consider carefully its approach to what is one of the crucial questions of modern international life. If the United States does not carry out nuclear tests, silence will continue at our test site at Semipalatinsk. We've given the United States an 18-month start. In that time, the United States has already conducted 24 blasts. Taking into account that the United States was already very considerably ahead of the Soviet Union regarding the number of explosions, they have, of course, amassed much more experience in this respect. We can no longer put the interests of the security of the Soviet Union at risk. In the event of another new nuclear explosion in the United States, we will be forced, compelled, to start nuclear testing ourselves. Even then, it is by no means our intention to shut the door to a constructive solution. No, we say that at any moment, any day or any hour, we are willing to stop those tests if the United States stops them, too. Parallel with this, we propose beginning talks immediately on a total or staged ban on nuclear tests. This idea was expressed, in particular, in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's reply to a message from the French peace supporters. I want to draw your attention to this, because it embodies a very profound thought; namely, we are not only willing to negotiate on a total nuclear test ban but we're also willing to talk about a staged ban.

[Kornilov] Incidentally, this idea was first expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at his meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik. We were already talking about it there, and it looked as if the points of view of the sides had moved closer together; but you know that, because of the negative position of the United States, above all on the question of Star Wars, no accords were achieved at Reykjavik.

[Levin] We are again reminding them of that proposal. If the United States is not willing at present to start talks on a total nuclear test ban, if they think it is a vital necessity to conduct some number of further explosions -- albeit this time on a mutual basis with us -- we're also ready to agree to that. The main thing is to start moving without delay toward a total nuclear test ban. I want to remind you why we have devoted, and continue to devote, so much attention to our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions: This is an exceedingly simple, yet at the same time very effective, step toward stopping the arms race.

Nuclear explosions mean, primarily, the improvement of nuclear weapons. We propose putting an end to this, now, at once. It can be done. It can be done very easily, though only if the good will exists.

[Agayants] Unfortunately, we have yet to see that good will on the part of the United States. Neither of the partners of the United States are not evincing it; not Britain, not France.

[Levin] However, even if only the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to stop testing, that would already be a huge, gigantic step forward. Here I want to remind you again, comrades -- we've already mentioned this in our broadcasts, but it does not hurt to remind ourselves of it -- that China has not carried out any nuclear explosions for many years and has no intention of resuming them. That is also a factor that introduces, if you like, an element of stabilization into the international situation. The question has arisen with great urgency just at this particular time: Today is the 545th day of the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. The number of those days could be extended to infinity if, I repeat, the United States would renounce explosions. What we hear from Washington, however, gives us no reason to hope for that. Of course, I agree this is not a positive development, no two ways about it. Nevertheless, chances of stopping the nuclear arms race remain. A very important factor is the increased vigor with which public forces are making themselves heard. This is a very important, a fundamentally important factor to which I would like to draw attention. The struggle continues; the forces urging an end to nuclear tests and a curb on the nuclear arms race, with the ultimate aim of averting the threat of nuclear destruction of our planet, are on the increase.

[Agayants] Let me remind you, comrades, that even before the resumption of the latest round of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space armaments, an influential U.S. public organization, the Committee for National Security, published a report entitled "Breaking the Deadlock: Proposals on Arms Control." It says that the most serious obstacle to achieving accords is Reagan's Star Wars program and Washington's stubborn refusal to limit SDI projects to laboratory tests. I want to draw attention to the fact that this is being said by Americans of the stature of Paul Warnke, a former director of the Arms Control Agency and a former head of the U.S. delegation to the talks on SALT-II; former CIA director William Colby; and Vice Admiral Thomas Davis. Analyzing the world situation since Reykjavik, the authors of the report write: The United States and the USSR now stand at an important crossroads: One road leads to the complete wrecking of arms control and the acceleration of the lethally dangerous nuclear rivalry to hitherto unprecedented rates of speed; the other, to strengthening existing treaties and the signing of new accords on a deep and stabilizing reduction by both sides of their accumulated nuclear arsenals. The key to such accords is to limit SDI projects to laboratory research in response to a reduction of strategic arsenals and continued strict observance of the ABM Treaty, says the report. That is the approach to one of the key problems of our time on the part of right-minded Americans. What about official Washington? How long will it stubbornly persist in its desire to gain military superiority over the USSR? How long will it go on testing the patience of millions of people of good will, including citizens of the United States?

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS ON LATE JANUARY U.S.-SOVIET TEST BAN TALKS

USSR's Persistence

LD211643 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 21 Jan 87

[Text] Soviet-American consultations over the problems of nuclear tests resume in Geneva on 22d January. More from our observer Yuriy Solton, and this is what he writes.

Last year similar meetings of experts yielded no positive results. The American delegation was even against having the word ban in the name of such consultations. This detail reflects the position of the Washington administration seeking to uphold the program for extensive nuclear tests needed by it for the purpose of developing space weapons first and foremost. The United States has refused to accept the Soviet Union's invitation to join in its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which has entered its 534th day on 21st January and was recently extended for the fifth time until the United States carries out its first explosion in 1987.

In order to alleviate in some way the public discontent with the administration's negative position, President Reagan has submitted to the Senate two Soviet-American agreements for ratification. One, signed in 1974, set the ceiling the 150 kilotonnes for underground nuclear tests and the other, signed in 1976, outlines measures preventing the use of nuclear blasts for military purposes. The White House, however, attached such reservations to the ratification of these agreements that even the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell declared that to discuss the agreements on the conditions put by the administration would be just a waste of time.

Why does the Soviet Union still agree to hold consultations in Geneva? This is because it doesn't want to miss a single chance in its effort to halt nuclear blasts once and for all. The Soviet Union's stand on the issue is consistent and principled. In his message to the leaders of the Delhi Six, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, states that the Soviet Union regards, as before, a total ban on nuclear weapons tests as a priority measure on the way to reducing nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination.

The Soviet Union proposes that this question be solved without delay, even if the situation compels the Soviet Union to resume nuclear tests, it will continue campaigning with the same persistence for the opening of full-scale talks over the issue to be held at any level and at any forum, but with participation of the United States of course.

GDR Radio on Soviet Proposals

LD212113 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1605 GMT 21 Jan 87

[Text] A new round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear tests begins in Geneva tomorrow. Here is a report from our Moscow correspondent, Klaus-Juergen Fischer, on the negotiating position of the Soviet side.

[Fischer] The following situation exists at the resumption of the talks: When the experts sit down opposite one another tomorrow, the Soviet test sites will have been silent for 535 days, while in the meantime the United States will have carried out 24 nuclear tests. The Soviet delegation has been instructed to propose to the American side that the new round of talks be used as a direct preparation for the start of comprehensive negotiations with the aim of concluding a treaty on a final test ban.

The shortest and simplest way to such an agreement would of course be opened by a willingness on the part of the United States to immediately join the Soviet moratorium. We have already extended our moratorium five times, say people here in Moscow. Washington would only need to join once. Work could then begin on devising a treaty without haste or fear on the one side that the other might achieve military advantages.

However, as Washington has so far shown its unwillingness to follow this simple path, Moscow has proposed other variations. If the United States does not want to end nuclear tests immediately, there could also be agreement on ways of limiting the strength and number of the tests. The final aim here would also be a complete ban, because that would be an effective means of putting a brake on the modernization of existing weapons and on the development of new ones, if not preventing them.

Other possibilities of reaching a solution are being proposed by the Soviet side. For example, there could be agreement to expand the Moscow treaty on banning nuclear tests on land, at sea and in the air, so as is also to ban underground tests. A further Soviet proposal envisages resuming the trilateral talks on these questions, in which Great Britain was also involved and which were broken off by the western partners shortly before a successful conclusion.

Mikhail Gorbachev said recently in his reply to the six-state initiative: We are ready to negotiate. We are ready to conduct negotiations in any body and at any forum, and of course involving the United States. The Soviet delegation is going into the new Geneva round tomorrow with these proposals. All this is faced by the announcement from Washington that the plan is to conduct a further nuclear test on 5 February. This would lead to the Soviet Union, as a government statement says, seeing itself forced to abandon its unilateral moratorium. The American scientists, who in an experiment with Soviet colleagues have since summer 1986 been observing the silent Soviet test site in Semipalatinsk, would have to register the first Soviet explosion. Even then the Soviet Union will keep the door open for results-orientated negotiations. Every day and every month, Mikhail Gorbachev said in his message, we will be ready to return to the moratorium if the United States decides to end its nuclear tests. The best variation would of course be the first named one- for the Soviet moratorium to carry on without a break because an American one is announced. This would create the best climate for negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests and strict control measures, as the Soviet delegation will propose tomorrow at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva.

Soviets Seek 'Full-Scale' Talks

LD291730 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1634 GMT 29 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva, 29 Jan (TASS) -- A routine session took place here today within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on the problem of halting nuclear weapons tests.

The Soviet delegation is headed by A.M. Petrosyants, chairman of the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, and the U.S. delegation by R. Barker, assistant to the secretary of defense for questions of atomic energy.

The Soviet side considers it essential that a task vital to humankind -- a complete end to all nuclear tests -- be resolved speedily. In this regard the Soviet delegation is trying to achieve a start to full-scale talks, which have as their ultimate aim the elaboration of accords which could ban nuclear tests for all time.

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CSO: 5200/1276

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON REAGAN-CONGRESS DEBATES ON MORATORIUM

LD011045 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 31 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program, hosted by Pavel Kuznetsov: with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov, both of the United States and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; date, place not specified--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] On Tuesday, the 27th, President Reagan announced his State of the Union address; in it he devoted 75 percent of his address to domestic issues. Anyway he said quite a lot of things about international relations, and, for example on arms control President Reagan threatened to veto any legislation that undercuts our national security. He was not specific, but he seemed to be referring to proposals that Congress require compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that was negotiated with the Soviet Union but never ratified by the Senate, and I mean the SALT II treaty. On such a controversial issue as the Star Wars program he said it would go forward.

At the same time President Reagan said he would seek more constructive relationships with the Soviet Union and at the same time we know that the first American nuclear blast in Nevada in 1987 has been scheduled for 5 February and it will effectively terminate the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing which has been in effect for almost 18 months now. I would like one of you to start the ball rolling by trying to, if it's possible, to reconcile some points of the State of the Union address made by President Reagan and the scheduled nuclear blast in Nevada.

[Bogdanov] Pavel, I'm afraid it's not our business to reconcile the message that the President delivered to the American Congress with the real American, or I call it operational American policy -- that is their business. Our business is just to take [the] President's words as they are and try to, really for ourselves, to assess it, to understand what does it mean and, to be honest with you, what is behind it. I welcome of course his statement that he would like, he would like to have more constructive relations with the Soviet Union. I hear that not for the first time, and every time I'm a little bit puzzled, you know. What does it mean in President's mouth, in President's words, in President's thinking? What he means by constructive relations with the Soviet Union? So far, so far I have no answer to it, you know. If he means by that to have a huge, immense military budget, if he means by that to threaten every time the Soviet Union, if he means by that to build up American superiority, military superiority, then it's ok, maybe that's really constructive. But that rather belongs to the sphere of jokes. But let me, let me say one thing which is really serious.

We at our end, we are really very much interested in constructive relations with the USA and we've been very closely watching what's going on in this country and I believe that they had, they have and they still have many, many ways to signal to us that they are really wanting constructive relations, and what's (?going) to happen on 5 February at Nevada that may signal to us that again you have to deal with empty words and with ominous deeds because every nuclear test is just exactly what destroys the remnants, let me put it like that, the remnants of the Soviet-American relations.

I never belonged to the [word indistinct] crowd of, you know, wishful thinkers and I never believed that they would stop, you know, nuclear tests. And what I believed that, you know, at some stage they will understand, you know, that we are sincere. Now I had a good opportunity, you know, to study the message that their representative in Geneva, and we started talks with them now in Geneva on testing, nuclear testing, brought the message, very clear one. [sentence as heard] We are not going to stop testing. It is not in our national interest, and we will stop only in case if there is no more nuclear weapons, you know. It's like that, it's like that.

[Kuznetsov] And so far as I know about, about 50 American congressmen have appealed to President Reagan not to go on with their nuclear blast on 5 February, to give the moratorium another chance. But going back to what Professor Bogdanov said about what President means, or perhaps does not mean, all this business about signals and so on and so forth, let me quote just one sentence from his State of the Union message. In advocating a high military budget, President Reagan insisted, and I quote: There is no surer way to lose freedom than to lose our resolve. I'm sorry, but to me it doesn't make much sense. It's a platitude to me, perhaps it makes a lot of sense to Americans. Who is going to rob them of their freedom, or how do they picture such a situation when they're going to lose their freedom? What does that mean, Sergey, in your view?

[Plekhanov] Well I guess President Reagan is talking about images from movies like "Amerika," "ka," which picture the United States being overtaken by the Soviet Union. Some other movies, perhaps. Yes, yes, apparently imagery like that which is so far removed from the real world and the most dangerous thing is that such images do impel, such images do affect decision-making in the United States. I think that the time when such rhetoric could really have an impact on the public mind is past, because the images that President Reagan, images of the Soviet Union that President Reagan paints in his speeches and the reality of the Soviet Union today, are so different, they're poles apart, and that fact will not be lost on the American people and you can fool all of the people some of the time, you can fool part of the people all of the time, but you can't fool everybody all the time. And I think that dictum by President Lincoln has been borne true so many times that I think that the people will see the point this time, too.

[Kuznetsov] I think that our moratorium which, as we have already said, has been in effect for almost 18 months, has been a terrible embarrassment for the American administration, for the Reagan administration, because it has unmasked much of that same rhetoric you've been talking about, about the Soviet Union being an evil empire while the United States was this good guy with [words indistinct]. And so on and so forth. But, when everybody keeps exploding, it's a very usual and familiar pattern, political pattern. But when a major power like the Soviet Union does not, something is terribly amiss. That's how I see the situation. So, by trying to make us resume testing they would like to go back to this very comfortable political situation and perhaps this psychological factor is, is as important in their policies, in their attempts to make us resume as any others. Would you agree with that?

[Bogdanov] That's right, I would agree with that and I would add another dimension to that policy, you know. They have to stay in power something like 2 years now, and they would like to (?tie) up any future American administration that may emerge in the White House by their behavior. You know, from the psychological point of view it's like that.

We were tough to those bloody Russians, we were very tough, you know. You will have to follow the suit otherwise you will be weak in the eyes of the American people. They don't care about, you known about the realities of the [word indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] I don't think the tone of the address was so bellicose but there is certainly this, this kind of message: America has to fight so many issues around the globe. Does this reflect the character, the nature of this Republican administration as a group of very extreme, I would say, conservatives?

[Plekhanov] Yes, it certainly does. The administration came to power with a promise that it would get tough with the rest of the world. They charged their predecessors, both Republicans and Democrats, with, well yielding too much, weakening American power and resolve, and President Reagan kept saying that America would now stand tall, and I think that found a responsive chord in part of the American public and there's been some psychological satisfaction from this tough guy rhetoric, this machismo. So this incitement of a bellicose sentiment in the American mind, in the American people, has been a characteristic feature of the Reagan Administration since it came to power.

[Kuznetsov] Excuse me, and I think that the Soviet moratorium has dispelled some of those myths about this country.

[Plekhanov] Yes, certainly, it certainly did, and then not only the moratorium. A lot of things which have been happening in the Soviet Union have been damaging to the key myths of American foreign policy on which that policy has been based for decades.

[Kuznetsov] But, let's go back, as time is running out on us, let's go back to the moratorium and the planned American nuclear blast on 5 February.

This country has said that after the first American explosion in 1987 we will resume testing because our security cannot be risked indefinitely, put at a terrible risk for an indefinite time. There is a limit to our tolerance and restraint, but at the same time, as far as I know, this country has said that it would be ready to stop any testing, any time, and day when the American, when the United States does the same. How realistic is this hope that one fine day the American side might move in that direction?

[Bogdanov] You know I would make a distinction. When you say American side what do you mean by that? If you mean this administration, I say it's hopeless. You know why it is hopeless because the President again stated that SDI, that is his you know beloved child, and they need to test. If you mean by American side somebody else, I don't know whom, but when we say America, Americans we have a very large [word indistinct] and still, you know, I believe in common sense. People are coming and going. Maybe one day the common sense will prevail, but not with these people, I'm sorry to say.

[Kuznetsov] And your view? Do you agree with what Professor Bogdanov has just said?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I think the Reagan administration (?does have) a ray of hope during those 2 years that are still left for this administration. I don't think that the Reagan administration is interested in stopping testing and I think that they will fight tooth and nail against any attempts to force them to do so. I don't know what kind of an attempt will be made, but Congress of the United States does have some power and theoretically one might imagine the situation where a resolution would be taken which would try to compel the administration to end the testing. Whether there would be enough votes to hand (?them) such a resolution is an open question. But I tend to be on the pessimistic side, frankly. But the important thing is that I don't think that the moratorium -- despite the fact that it had not been picked up by the American side -- that it was not worthwhile. I think it was a very important and useful step. We really started the ball rolling as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. I think that it had a hell of a response around the world and a lot of people are much more determined to advocate nuclear disarmament, to fight against the nuclear arms race, than they were before we started the moratorium.

[Kuznetsov] Well, I'm not a rosy-cheeked optimist but I think that certain steps will be taken, even in the 2 years that remain for this administration, at least toward limiting the number of tests, perhaps the lowering of the yields, something along these lines...

[Plekhanov interrupts] That's a possibility.

[Kuznetsov] That's a possibility and I would not rule this one out. Perhaps if we cannot achieve a total, comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, if we could not convince this administration to follow our example, a very sincere step toward a non-nuclear world, well, perhaps certain steps will be taken along this lines [sentence as heard]. I would very much like to believe in that.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S VINOGRADOV COMMENTS ON FINNISH NFZ PROPOSAL

LD290518 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 28 Jan 87

[Excerpt] Moscow: 28 Jan (TASS) -- Finland's proposals on establishing a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and introducing measures to strengthen trust between states are acquiring particular relevance today, said Vladimir Vinogradov, RSFSR foreign minister. He was speaking today at the sixth all-union accountability and election conference of the Soviet-Finnish society.

The new steps taken by the USSR, announced in Helsinki last November, show that the Soviet Union is still ready to promote by practical deeds the implementation of these proposals. The Soviet leadership and our people, the minister stressed, have great faith in the foreign policy course of the Finnish leadership. The Soviet Union and Finland are manifesting a high level of stable relations of good-neighborliness, mutual understanding, and trust. The fruitful and dynamic development of Soviet-Finish relations convincingly shows the viability of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems and is an important factor in strengthening peace in northern Europe. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1276

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: XINHUA NOTES SOVIET COMMITMENT TO TEST BAN

PM281811 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Consistent, Realistic Policy"]

[Excerpts] The USSR's wide-ranging peace initiatives and the program put forward a year ago to eliminate mass destruction weapons by the end of the century continue to be at the center of the world public's attention. Press articles and statements by politicians and public figures emphasize that the message from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania in connection with the declaration they issued at the end of 1986 convincingly reaffirms the consistency of the Soviet Union's peace-loving policy and its resolve to do everything to remove the threat of mankind perishing in the flames of a nuclear catastrophe. [passage omitted]

Beijing -- The Soviet Union continues to view a complete nuclear test ban as a prime measure on the road to reducing nuclear arms and subsequently eliminating them, XINHUA stressed. The news agency spotlighted the words of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee that the Soviet Union, even if forced to resume nuclear explosions, will be equally persistent in advocating the start of full-scale talks on the problem, talks which it is prepared to hold at any level and at any forum with the participation of the United States.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

DANISH PROFESSOR WRITES IN MOSCOW WEEKLY ON VERIFICATION

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 2, 18-25 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Ove Nathan]

[Text]

A COMPREHENSIVE and verifiable international treaty, banning all testing of nuclear weapons, without exception, might constitute a decisive step towards the termination of further nuclear weapons developments. The point is that qualitatively new types of nuclear weapons only can be developed up to a certain point in the laboratory. To decide whether the new design works as expected one must perform an actual test. Some people maintain that computer simulations may replace actual testing, at least to a certain degree. However, the weapons designers themselves apparently only really believe in their new products after a successful firing of the warhead in a test field, be it above or below ground level.

It must be stressed that a comprehensive test ban treaty does not make an end to nuclear weapons from one day to another. But such a treaty probably will reduce the continuous pressure for creating technological innovations in the nuclear weapons field. A downwards curbing of the nuclear arms race between the large powers thus must be expected to follow in the wake of a comprehensive ban. In addition, the treaty may become a barrier against further nuclear proliferation, since clandestine nuclear testing will come under more stringent observation than previously.

It is sometime postulated that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the reliability of the existing nuclear stockpiles, and that continued testing, therefore, is decisive for maintaining the present "balance" in the nuclear strength between the large powers. The argument is disputed by many experts. Nuclear weapons are checked for reliability by disassembly and subsequent quality control of the mechanical and electronic, non-nuclear components. The properties of the fissile material, that is the uranium and the plutonium, remain the same over periods of many years. Reload of fresh tritium components may be required, but actual firing of the warhead is unnecessary, unless the purpose is to create a qualitatively new weapon.

Since 1963 the large powers have stopped atmospheric testing, but there is still no international agreement to ban underground testing for nuclear explosives with a yield below the equivalent of 150 kilotons conventional explosives. The question of a comprehensive ban was discussed prior to 1980 in negotiations between the large powers, but no agreement was reached, and specific negotiations on this issue have not been resumed since, at least not to my knowledge.

A major issue in the above-mentioned negotiations was the question of verification. This question is technical as well as political. Technical, because verification involves sophisticated seismic techniques. Political, because national technical means probably are insufficient in themselves, if very small nuclear explosions are to be safely identified. Thus, a political agreement is necessary on international, on-site inspection in order to verify accomplishment of a treaty. However, the extent and the content of such on-site inspection remain to be agreed upon.

Since 1980 considerable progress has been achieved on the technical side, as was described earlier in 1986 by the American geophysicist J.F. Evernden and his coworkers in an article in the journal *Reviews of Geophysics*. Their analysis suggests that even the smallest nuclear explosions no longer can be successfully hidden, not even if one tries to "muffle" the explosion by arranging it inside a large underground cavity.

The authors of the above-mentioned article claim that it should be possible to detect underground nuclear explosions in, say, the Soviet Union by means of 15 monitoring stations outside the USSR, and by network automatic seismic stations within the territory of the USSR. In this way, nuclear explosions with yields equivalent to one kiloton should be safely detectable also when they are carried out in a cavity. The detection method involves new, so-called high-frequency techniques.

As I see it, scientific and technical progress now has removed previous obstacles to an agreement between the large powers on a comprehensive, verifiable test ban. What remains is to find suitable conditions for opening serious negotiations on the issue. In this context it is reassuring that both the US and the USSR in general have accepted the principle of on-site inspection. At the next thaw which hopefully is underway in the international, political climate, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, therefore, ought to be given high priority.

However, progress in nuclear arms control, such as a comprehensive test ban treaty, will have restricted effect unless a simultaneous development towards international openness and mutual trust is encouraged. If the superpowers continue to mistrust each other, they may, in a period of tension, return to an arms buildup by other means than nuclear, be it by conventional, chemical or biological weapons. Or one of the parties may decide to denounce the treaty and resume nuclear testing. Thus, progress in arms control and buildup of mutual trust must go arm in arm to ensure a durable peace.

Since I write these lines to a Soviet public, I would like to spell out the above theme in more detail as regards the USSR in particular. The Soviet Union, to my mind, could greatly accelerate the peace process by strengthening its recent efforts to create a more open attitude in international affairs. In the summer of 1986 I had the pleasure of participating in two meetings of scientists in Moscow on the question of the nuclear arms race, and I was struck by the many signs, indicating greater openness. Still, I feel that more could be done.

An important step, for instance, would be to invite Academician Andrei Sakharov to participate in such future meetings. This would demonstrate the willingness of the USSR to discuss the complex problems of the arms race at such meetings in an even more relaxed and open atmosphere. Such a step surely would make a tremendous positive impression in the West, and make it difficult to maintain that the Soviet Union wishes to "streamline" discussions on the test ban, and on other issues of the nuclear arms race. To the Soviet Union an invitation to Academician Sakharov would constitute a great advantage. The point is that many scientists in the West – and also other people – who work against nuclear armaments, would listen with more attention to the Soviet arguments, if they knew that Academician Sakharov could speak up at meetings in Moscow.

In conclusion, I wish to thank Moscow News for giving space to this contribution from abroad. This in itself proves that the editors wish to contribute to a more open world and to a broad debate on the problems of a test ban treaty and its verification. Few items are more important in the present world. The continuing nuclear arms race presents a deadly threat to civilization. A way must be found to establish a durable and peaceful coexistence of two different systems in the East and the West. East and West need not be each other's enemy. The common enemy number one, after all, is nuclear war.

* Ove Nathan, Professor, Dr. (Philosophy), Denmark.

Is Trust at all Possible?

[Commentary by Yuri Bandura]

[Text]

TRUTH, as is known, reveals itself through debate. It is for the sake of mutually coming nearer to the truth that Moscow News asked Mr. Nathan to share his thoughts with our readers on the issue of nuclear tests, and in a broader aspect, on the problem of trust between East and West. But did it come to a debate?

It is not an easy question to answer. Our points of view on the issue of nuclear tests coincide practically in all aspects – from realizing that the threat of nuclear conflict is a peril for all mankind to admitting the necessity of urgent talks on a nuclear test ban.

So, it turns out that both Mr. Nathan and myself know the truth. Consequently, there is no point in arguing. The only thing to do is to shake hands in agreement and....

And what comes next?

Then, according to my opponent, "what remains is to find suitable conditions for opening serious negotiations on the issue". The words "what remains" reveal Mr. Nathan's stand: it is simple – just find some suitable conditions. But is it indeed so simple?

In recent times Moscow has proposed quite a few conditions for the talks, the acceptance of which could get the issue of nuclear tests moving without undermining US security. But the blasts continue.

What's preventing the start of the talks? A possible, just possible, answer might be: "mistrust on the part of the White House towards the Soviet Union's intentions".

The question of mutual trust between East and West is very important, according to Mr. Nathan.

an. Indeed, it has every right to be. Humankind will hardly be able to secure its own survival in the nuclear-space age if mutual distrust continues to grow. We in the Soviet Union proceed from a position based on realities that have taken shape. We have heeded the necessity to strengthen trust with concrete deeds, which include the extension of the moratorium (which we have done five times). This process, however, should develop from both sides, i.e., East and West. It should, but it seems to be far off, though.

Mr. Nathan's article was sent to MN prior to the arrival of the news of Academician Sakharov's return to Moscow. The article predicted that if Andrei Sakharov were allowed to participate in public discussions, it would make a "tremendously positive impression in the West".

Almost a fortnight has passed since the Academician's return. He is meeting with Western mass media and giving interviews (in which he criticizes SDI, by the way). According to the Voice of America radio station, A. Sakha-

rov has been given an unlimited access to the Western press. So what? Washington has not changed, even slightly, its stand on the nuclear tests issue. It looks as if A. Sakharov's and other names popular in the West – rather than causing a "lack of trust" – are used simply as a pretext for evading agreement on today's urgent issues.

Hence, the problem directly connected with trust: what shall we do concerning our relations with the Washington administration, when all our steps towards mutual trust do not bring Moscow and Washington closer? What's more, with evidence of the White House's renunciation of the Reykjavik understandings, SALT-2 and consolidation of the ABM Treaty, distrust grows.

In other words, is it at all possible to have sufficiently reliable and profound trust between Moscow and Washington? A trust capable of promoting understanding which could pave the way towards a nuclear-free world and to mankind's survival? We would love it if Mr. Nathan and other MN readers could answer these questions.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

GROUP URGES TEST BAN--Geneva January 10 TASS--The Special Committee of the Non-Governmental Organisations on Disarmament has urged all nuclear powers to halt nuclear tests. The committee also favoured talks on concluding a treaty banning them. Its statement emphasizes that "people on every continent are deeply concerned and alarmed by the continued testing of nuclear weapons. According to the statement by the USSR Government, 18 December 1986, the Soviet moratorium will cease following the next test by the USA," the statement stresses, "which we understand is to take place end of January 1987. [no closing quotation mark as received] [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 10 Jan 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1276

RELATED ISSUES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON DANGERS OF NUCLEAR ARMS

HK271151 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 25 Jan 87 p 6

["Jottings" column by Shan Ren [1472 0086]: "From 'Masters' to 'Slaves'"]

[Text] According to a report, due to the fact that the relevant U.S. parties' anxieties about stockpiles of nuclear arms and nuclear arms accidents have been "growing stronger day by day," they have dragged in many troops and people to organize quite a few "maneuvers for dealing with nuclear accidents" with the aim of preventing terrorist raids upon nuclear arms and accidents involving nuclear arms. On 20 January this year, the U.S. Air Force was forced to promptly destroy an intercontinental ballistic missile that drifted off its testing course. A similar accident occurred for another nuclear power.

The owners of nuclear arms used to terrorize other people with their nuclear arms, but now they are imbued with "increasingly strong anxieties" about the nuclear arms in their own hands. This is a wonderful change. The birth of nuclear arms immediately attracted certain people's boundless worship. They thought that if they had a nuclear bomb, the whole world would submissively obey them. With the breaking of the nuclear monopoly, this kind of nuclear worship was replaced by the nuclear arms race, a race for both qualitative and quantitative superiority. The race has brought constant expansion of the superpowers' nuclear arms stockpiles, which not only far exceed their national defense needs but also bring the whole world into a condition of "overkill."

At the same time, things have begun to change in the opposite direction. Those people who have tried to rely on huge stockpiles of nuclear arms to ensure their hegemony now have to worry about the security of their stockpiles of nuclear arms. They have a fear that their nuclear arms may be stolen and that suicidal disasters may be created by technological accidents. They also have a greater fear that a nuclear war may be created by a hostile mentality and misinformation. Nuclear arms are showing their dual character: They not only can kill people, but can also kill their owners. After developing large numbers of nuclear arms in order to seek hegemony, the superpowers have found that too many nuclear arms have become a great burden. The "masters" of huge stockpiles of nuclear arms are in a sense becoming "slaves" of the stockpiles.

What is to be done? The one and only way out for the superpowers to cast off the burdens that distract them lies in ceasing their nuclear arms race and destroying all their nuclear arms.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS ON ASIAN STATES' MOSCOW MEETING

IZVESTIYA Report

PM131904 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Consultative Working Meeting"]

[Text] A consultative working meeting of deputy foreign ministers of the SRV, the PRK, the DPRK, the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR], the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], and the USSR was held in Moscow 8-9 January.

An extensive exchange of opinions on a broad range of international and regional problems took place during the meeting, which proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and comradely mutual understanding.

Profound concern was expressed over the military-political situation in the world, which has become aggravated as a result of actions by the United States and other imperialist states which are continuing the arms race, opposing the termination of nuclear tests, and building up military preparations in different parts of the world. The representatives of the SRV, the PRK, the DPRK, the LPDR, and the MPR confirmed their support for the Soviet Union's constructive stance at the Reykjavik talks, which produced a real opportunity for freeing mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The meeting confirmed the resolve of the participating countries to struggle, together with all socialist community states, against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for disarmament and the maintenance and consolidation of universal peace, primarily in the Asia and Pacific region, which is becoming increasingly important in world politics.

Emphasis was placed on the exceptionally great and long-term importance of the Soviet program outlined in Vladivostok for ensuring peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia and Pacific region. It was said the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons is a document of the new political thinking which is in line with the conditions of the nuclear and space age. The principles formulated in it offer Asian and Pacific countries a way to lasting and fair peace in Asia, and to the best possible solutions, suitable for everyone, to the complex problems of this vast part of the planet.

The participants in the meeting acclaimed the Soviet Union's decision to sign the protocols to the Treaty on a Nuclear-free Zone in the Southern Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty).

They spoke in favor of the implementation of the DPRK's well known initiatives aimed at the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, the peninsula's transformation into a nuclear-free zone, and the attainment of the country's peaceful democratic unification. Support was declared for the DPRK's new proposal to conduct military-political talks between the North and the South, and emphasis was placed on the impermissibility of perpetuating the country's split in any way, including by so-called "cross-recognition," "simultaneous admission to the United Nations," and other methods for creating a "two Koreas" situation.

The creation of an atmosphere of trust and security in the Asia and Pacific region would further the implementation of the MPR's proposal to conclude an international convention on nonaggression and nonuse of force in relations between Asian and Pacific states.

The complex situation prevailing in Southeast Asia dictates the imperative need to step up the quest for ways for the region's states themselves to solve the problems existing there on the basis of total respect for their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity without outside interference in their internal affairs. These are the objectives pursued by the constructive proposals made by the Indochina countries and their line of developing a dialogue with ASEAN states in the interests of turning this region into a zone of lasting peace, stability, good neighborliness, and cooperation, of normalizing relations with their neighbors.

The meeting declared support for the DRA leadership's political course of creating conditions for the beginning of an open all-Afghan dialogue for the purpose of achieving national reconciliation.

The participants in the meeting spoke out in favor of eliminating all military bases existing in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the prevention of the establishment of new bases, condemned attempts to build up a military presence in this part of the world, and called for the swiftest implementation of the UN declaration on the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

The participants in the meeting believe that the normalization and further development of relations between the PRC and socialist countries will have a positive effect on the improvement of the situation in the Asia and Pacific region and on the strengthening of peace and security in that region of the world.

It was noted with gratification that the Nonaligned Movement, resolutely standing against war and the arms race and against the solution of international problems through the use of force, is at present making an important contribution to the shaping of the new political thinking. The Nonaligned Movement has become a substantial factor of international relations and has turned into an influential force in the people's struggle to preserve peace and affirm equal international relations.

The representatives of the countries participating in the meeting expressed confidence that a major contribution to the process of improving the situation in the Asia and Pacific region could be made by the organization regarding broad trade and economic cooperation between the states in the region and declared their countries' desire to participate in it on a mutually advantageous and equal basis.

The meeting discussed measures for the further coordination of the fraternal countries' actions on questions of ensuring peace and security in the Asia and Pacific region.

Shevardnadze Speaks

PM121048 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In an Atmosphere of Cordiality"]

[Text] On 9 January E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, received the deputy foreign ministers of the SRV, the PRK, the DPRK, Laos, and Mongolia.

E.A. Shevardnadze spoke of the steps being taken by the Soviet Union to advance the program put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok for ensuring peace, security, and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. The Delhi declaration was an important step in developing this program.

The Soviet side expressed satisfaction in connection with the fact that the working consultative meeting of deputy foreign ministers of the SRV, the PRK, the DPRK, Laos, Mongolia, and the USSR, held in Moscow, was a useful exchange of opinions on questions of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and other international problems. The Moscow meeting is one indication of the growing activeness and coordination of efforts by the socialist countries in Asia in the struggle against turning that vast region into an arena of military-political confrontation and for the strengthening of security and the establishment of broad, equal cooperation there. It was noted that each socialist country represented at the working meeting makes its contribution to the quest for constructive solutions to the key problems which exist in the Asia-Pacific region and the conflict situations.

The talk took place in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete mutual understanding.

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CSO: 5200/1259

RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA ON USSR, U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC POLICIES, ASIAN SECURITY

PM261537 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 5

[D. Volskiy article: "The Delhi Declaration and the Modern World: Barrier to Confrontation"]

[Text] Soviet proposals aimed at strengthening security and developing cooperation in Asia are receiving more and more support on the continent, while the untenability of attempts to sow doubts as to the feasibility of practical steps in this direction is becoming more and more evident. The opponents of a collective approach to security in Asia claim that it meets some "special aims" of the Soviet Union in the region and counter the program proposed by our country by citing the need to settle regional conflicts individually.

What answer can one give to this? Yes, we do have our own "special" aim in Asia, namely, that the Soviet Union's Asian land and sea border -- the longest in the world -- be calm and that there be no situations in this part of our world fraught with the threat of war. Is this really at variance with the interests of the other states of Asia?

From our standpoint, ensuring security and genuine, equal cooperation on the continent and in the Pacific would also make a large contribution to strengthening international peace as a whole. As for regional conflicts, there are actually more of them in Asia than anywhere else. Some blaze threateningly like the Iran-Iraq war, others smolder away unseen, for example, as on the Korean peninsula, but could be equally dangerously explosive. It is obvious resolving each of them will be much simpler if the general atmosphere in Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans becomes less tense. Conversely, Asian security as a whole will benefit greatly from the settlement of local conflict situations.

The Soviet proposals on this score are not just good intentions as they are sometimes depicted. They are taking shape at this very moment, as it were, and are being reinforced by practical actions. The USSR's support for the program of national reconciliation put forward by the DRA leadership, its readiness to resolve the question of the return of the Soviet military contingent, which, as the USSR foreign minister stated in Kabul, is "not far off," and the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan that has already been carried out are all realities of the new political thinking. The withdrawal -- scheduled for April-June -- of a motorized rifle division and several other units of the Soviet troops temporarily present on Mongolian territory is a quite new example of the manifestation of these realities.

M.S. Gorbachev's official friendly visit to India and the Soviet-Indian documents signed there, particularly the Delhi Declaration on the Principles of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and Violence, have had an important positive effect on the situation in the region. The declaration contains not only a political meaning but a profound meaning as a world view and philosophy. Countries with different socioeconomic systems agreed to a common platform designed to prevent war and save civilization.

The document, for all its global significance, is of special value to Asia. It has shown the sort of potential that exists both for increasing its peoples' contributions to the cause of general security and for improving the political climate on the continent itself and in adjoining regions.

"Progress in this direction," the Soviet-Indian Joint Statement stresses, "could be achieved in phases..." This phased approach -- from the simple to the more complex -- was put forward 1 year ago by the Soviet Union, which proposed holding an "Asian-Pacific Helsinki" as a realistic, albeit long-term goal. This involves not a mechanical transference of European experience but its creative use in the light of the realities and problems of the region. Such a conference naturally demands serious, careful preparation, hastiness here being neither feasible nor desirable.

The most immediate task today is seen as follows: Bilateral talks, multilateral consultations, the creation of an atmosphere of trust and a constructive attitude to the problems of Asia, that is to say, everything the leaders of the USSR and India, and indeed a whole number of other Asian countries, have advocated.

It is instructive to see that opposition to implementation of the idea of a joint search for ways of ensuring security on the continent does not come from Asia and its peoples. The main source of this opposition comes from outside Asia. It lies in the schemes of imperialist circles, particularly those in the United States.

Let us recall the recent American-Japanese maneuvers in the Sea of Okhotsk, the decisions on supplying South Korea with Lance missiles capable of carrying nuclear charges, the installation of cruise missiles on ships of the 7th Fleet, which ply the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the accelerated expansion of military installations in Micronesia and on Diego Garcia atoll -- that is to say, on territories Washington is colonizing illegally.

The geographical location of American bases in the region, including those where nuclear missiles are stored, and the range of the missiles and aircraft ready to deliver them to potential targets all indicate it is not just socialist but also the developing and nonaligned countries of Asia that are in their lethal sights. The story of the secret deliveries of American weapons to Iran has confirmed again the United States is deliberately kindling regional conflicts in Asia. Who, after "Irangate," will believe these conflicts flare up and burn on their own, without American "gasoline"? Washington needs them to sap the strength of the Asian peoples and create pretexts for interfering in their affairs and maintaining tension in Asia.

No one denies America's legitimate interests as a Pacific power -- not just American soldiers but American businessmen too travel across the Pacific. However, these interests have nothing to do with Washington's course of destabilizing Asia. The rejection of neocolonialist diktat could help introduce into practice the principle of genuine mutual benefit, benefit for all, and consequently establish lasting and just peace throughout the Pacific and Asia as a whole.

"We again urge all interested states," M.S. Gorbachev said on welcoming Najib, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, to Moscow, "to pursue joint or parallel courses toward this goal and to seek optimal solutions to the complex problems of this enormous part of the world that suit everyone..."

Without lapsing into exaggerated optimism, it can be noted that while this movement has not yet built up the necessary momentum, it has nevertheless speeded up since the signing of the Delhi declaration. The Soviet Union's specific proposals on strengthening security in Asia are also finding increasing understanding in Asia.

"Recently, particularly since the Soviet-Indian summit in Delhi in November, these proposals have acquired a new importance," Delhi's PATRIOT newspaper observes. "The initial indifference has suddenly disappeared, and even countries which have always opposed everything Soviet have intimated they are ready to think about the USSR's proposals."

The documents signed in Delhi convincingly demonstrated the Soviet Union does not at all seek to impose any models of economic development of sociopolitical systems on the independent Asian states. Our country bases its policy on respect for the right of "every people to make their own choice -- social, political, and ideological --" which is enshrined in the Delhi Declaration. The Soviet Union is successfully developing relations with virtually all countries on the continent, including those which the United States high-handedly considers as falling within the American "orbit."

Parallel courses? There is also movement there. The treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific came into force last December. Noteworthy trends have been observed in Southeast Asia, where a number of ASEAN countries are showing a desire to improve relations with the states of Indochina. In south Asia, despite the conflict situations, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is beginning to put its words into actions.

Perhaps all this is not directly connected with such large-scale undertakings as the Soviet proposal for the Asian-Pacific region or the Delhi Declaration. They have given a new boost to positive processes taking place in Asia and the Pacific, whose peoples are becoming increasingly aware of the vital need to fight for a peaceful and safer future and a new approach to solving the region's problems.

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CSO: 5200/1278

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW RADIO ROUNDTABLE ON SDI, ASIAN SECURITY, NFZ

LD251908 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 25 Jan 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Boris Andrianov, all-union radio foreign political commentator; Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of ZA RUBEZHOM; and Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov, international observer of KOMMUNIST]

[Excerpts] [Andrianov] Hello, Comrades! This week, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev sent a message to the leaders of the so-called Delhi Six. This document was sent to statesmen from Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, with regard to the declaration they adopted in connection with the ending of 1986. In his message the Soviet leader first of all expressed complete agreement with the view that it is essential to preserve by joint efforts the historic landmarks along the road toward a nuclear free world which were achieved at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, and to prevent the specific landmarks in nuclear disarmament which were mapped out there from being washed away. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee stressed how important it is now to concentrate specifically upon the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons, rather than on developing [razrabotka] all manner of programs based on the premise that these terrible weapons are endlessly going to threaten the end of our planet, and in order that ridding the world of nuclear weapons before the end of the present century may not remain an unfulfilled dream.

[Nekrasov] I would say that the message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the leaders of the Delhi Six fits in closely with his message to the UN secretary general, which was published somewhat earlier. In that message, the results of the past year were added up; in this one, the precise prospects for action in the new year are mapped out. Clearly this is precisely the reason why Comrade Gorbachev's message has attracted attention not just from the leaders of the Delhi Six, because it deals with the same basic issues which are currently at the center of international life and at the center of international relations. Thus, as you will recall, the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments have resumed in Geneva and the Soviet delegation there is continuing to defend the proposals we have submitted, which are aimed at sharply reducing and then eliminating all nuclear armaments and at ensuring a peaceful space. I would say that currently the world is waiting for U.S. nuclear tests. As you remember, they first scheduled them for 29 January, then another date was announced --

5 February -- and the peoples are waiting and wondering whether in fact common sense is going to gain the upper hand in Washington. Well, frankly speaking, this does not look likely.

[Andrianov] By all accounts the position of the U.S. side on this vitally important issue continues to remain totally unconstructive.

[Nekrasov] Here is another thing I would like to mention about an event on a day that is not long past. News of this event has only now filtered through into the press, though it took place more than a month ago, on 17 December. On that day Reagan held a conference, taking part in which were the director of the organization which is implementing the Strategic Defense Initiative -- there already is such an organization which is in charge of these Star Wars plans; and then Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Richard Perle, his assistant for political affairs.

The President was given an outline of a plan for accelerating preparations for the militarization of space. Let's remember how these matters used to be presented in the past by Reagan himself. To begin with we will study the possibilities, how effective it is, and how much it is going to cost. Then we will decide whether we are going to develop [sozdavat] such a system in practice. It was expected -- and this was reported by American journalists -- that the whole of these preparations would take approximately 10-12 years.

[Andrianov] In this connection I think it would be useful to remember Reykjavik. When President Reagan said at his meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that the United States is prepared to give an undertaking to observe the Soviet-U.S. treaty limiting antiballistic missile defense systems -- the so-called ABM Treaty -- for a further 10 years, his thinking was that these 10 years would indeed be spent on preparations for the creation [sozdaniye] of space weapons. That is precisely the way in which well-informed American journalists explained the gist of Reagan's proposal.

[Nekrasov] Well, given the fact that we have gotten onto the subject of Reykjavik, I think it would also be worth reminding our listeners of the alarm with which reactionary circles in the United States received the news about the progress which had been made there on the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range weapons in Europe. More than 3 months have already passed since Reykjavik, but it has to be said that to this day in these U.S. circles, when the Reykjavik accords are mentioned, they disown them as though they belong to the devil himself.

But there's nothing to be done about it. Reykjavik showed that there is a real possibility of reaching agreement on building a nuclear-free world. This fact cannot be shaken by any propaganda attacks. In this situation, then, the circles of the military-industrial complex began undermining these accords in a practical way. The conference in the White House which I have just mentioned was one such intrigue. Those taking part in it proposed that Reagan should confirm a plan for starting creation [sozdaniye] of the space shield -- as it was called -- in 6 or 7 years' time, that is to say in 1993 or 1994. It means not waiting for the development [sozdaniye] of models of real space strike weapons, but starting to launch into space what is already available today and what is going to be available tomorrow. Why the hurry? What does all this mean? It means -- having started the practical development [sozdavat] of the so-called space shield -- forestalling and breaking any accord dealing with radical reductions in nuclear weapons. Those behind this plan are clearly proceeding from the view that the Soviet Union will take such a decision as an irreversible step in the militarization of space and will itself renounce its proposals regarding the reduction of strategic armaments. A blatant provocation on a major scale has thus been conceived.

[Andrianov] Vadim Nikolayevich, those behind such plans must be taking into consideration the fact that such a fervent champion of Star Wars as Reagan will leave the White House by the beginning of 1989 and no one knows how his successor will behave. In other words, they cannot be sure that their calculations will be supported by the next incumbent of the White House.

[Nekrasov] That's the point, this is what they are taking into consideration. None other than Edwin Meese, the U.S. Attorney General, and one of the people very close to the President, said, and I quote, that the enthusiasts for the Strategic Defense Initiative -- that is what the Star Wars plans are called -- are seeking the commencement of experimental design work, partly in order that the program may not be harmed by a future administration.

[Andrianov] And do you expect they will be able to bring off their plan, Vadim Nikolayevich, or more accurately, do you think they have grounds for counting on success?

[Nekrasov] Well, of course there is going to be a struggle here, and not a straightforward struggle. The significance of this plan, its true meaning, has not escaped the attention of sensible people in the United States, and some fairly broad public forces have joined in on this issue: Kurt Gottfried, for example, the director of the United States Union of Concerned Scientists, states the only result of such a step would be to deal a mortal blow against the arms control process and to guarantee the continuation of work on the Strategic Defense Initiative, irrespective of the conclusions reached in further scientific research. As I have said, the struggle ahead is going to be a fairly serious one. It remains a fact that the U.S. propaganda media is responsible for the fact that a majority of Americans believe that the Strategic Defense Initiative -- this notorious space shield -- is the best means of preventing a nuclear conflict, and there is therefore a great struggle ahead on this issue.

[Andrianov] Action by the forces of peace gives rise all the time to opposition from international reaction, and I should like to stress in this connection, that peace efforts by the Soviet Union, for example, are giving rise to apprehension in certain circles of the capitalist world. This is indicated, specifically, by the recent trips of Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari to several countries in the South Pacific. He traveled around for nearly 2 weeks. He visited Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu and Papua-New Guinea. The trip was accompanied by a noisy, not to say hysterical, propaganda campaign. The Japanese newspaper ASAHI, for instance, claimed that the Japanese minister's trip resulted from the wish to strengthen political stability in the South Pacific Region. But let's leave that claim to one side for the moment to come back to it later. Let's take a look at the Kuranari trip from the viewpoint of a person who has a right to ask the perfectly natural question: Why has Tokyo suddenly started to devote such fixed attention to the South Pacific? After all, it's no secret that the Japanese minister's visit is just one item in a whole package of measures designed by the Nakasone government to rapidly activate the links of the Land of the Rising Sun with the island states in that region.

[Nekrasov] Yes, the facts indicate that it's clearly a matter of a whole package of measures. Well, I should think it's enough to say that in the foreign policy department of Japan a special headquarters has been established, charged with coordinating all Tokyo's measures to influence the countries of the South Pacific. The Kuranari trip seems to have been one of these measures. During the visit, he expounded

Tokyo's so-called Pacific doctrine. It contains the main thrusts of Japanese foreign policy in the South Pacific, and, laying on the lofty words unstintingly, the Japanese foreign minister called his plan the Pacific community of the future, which he seems to regard as being on the road to joint prosperity. He chose words that hark back to World War II.

[Andrianov] Yes, that's true. The terminology is certainly not new. One only has to recall the imperial trade of the greater East Asia coprosperity sphere under the aegis of Japan.

It was once preached by Japanese militarists to justify the policy of aggression directed against other countries and peoples. What that policy led to is well known. However, the milieu that sustains militarism and expansionism has not disappeared at all. It resurrects all kinds of antiquated notions that are nowadays in favor with official Tokyo, which has set itself the objective of perpetuating the position of the South Pacific island states as estates of the West. One does not, of course, need to possess a vivid imagination to see why the ruling circles of Japan were in such a hurry. They are now anxious to sweep away, by any means, the strengthening contacts between the Soviet Union and the states of the Asian-Pacific region, and to ward off the attractive force of our country's proposals for normalizing the situation in that part of the world.

The Japanese Government gave a hostile reception to the large-scale program for peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation, and the establishing of a stable system of comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific region. That program, as you recall, was set forth by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the speech he made in Vladivostok on 28 July last year.

[Volskiy] In that connection, Boris Vasilyevich, I should like to draw attention to the fact that our country has demonstrated not only an unconventional approach to the solution of the problems which have become imminent in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. It has also taken a number of practical steps, too, in that direction. Last November, for example, the Soviet Union participated for the first time in the work of the conference on economic cooperation of the countries of the Pacific Ocean basin. Moreover, it expressed an interest in becoming a fully-fledged member of that non-government organization. Our country signed a mutually beneficial fishing agreement with Kiribati, a small island republic in the South Pacific. We are conducting talks over such an agreement with another similar republic, Vanuatu. By word and deed the Soviet Union is confirming its peaceful aspiration, which pervades the program set out by Comrade Gorbachev in Vladivostok.

[Andrianov] Official Tokyo interprets this program as something quite different. It does not perceive in it the prospect of turning the Pacific Ocean into an area of peace and prosperity. Japan's ruling circles have seen in this peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union above all a threat to their own interests. However, the Soviet proposals provoked such a broad positive response in the states of the Pacific Ocean that Japan felt it essential to oppose our country's peace initiative with at least something. It is no secret in official Tokyo circles that it was all organized at Washington's insistence. The U.S. Administration is literally being driven mad by the striving of the South Pacific states to establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the Soviet Union. But that is not the only issue, of course.

Washington is also annoyed at the growth of antinuclear feelings in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. Both the example of New Zealand, which does not allow ships

carrying nuclear weapons to enter its ports, and the decision of the South Pacific Forum, which includes 13 states, to sign a treaty banning the siting [razmeshcat], production, and testing of nuclear weapons in that region, are proof that these feelings are acquiring more and more influence in that region.

[Nekrasov] By all accounts, precisely those circumstances, also the Soviet Union's rapid agreement to support the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, and by signing the corresponding protocols -- all that was regarded in Washington, and Tokyo, too, as a weakening of political stability in that region.

Behind that formulation can be detected a fear that the independent course of the states situated there may undermine the United States' claims to hegemony in that part of the planet. According to the phrase in the London magazine THE ECONOMIST, the United States is trying to check the spread of nuclear allergy, as the magazine puts it. They are alarmed by the effect of New Zealand's example on the public in the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. It is apprehension over such an outcome of events that has forced Washington to resort to Tokyo's assistance, and this in no small measure because the United States itself, by not wishing to take account of the national interests of the island states, has well and truly ruined its relations with them.

[Andrianov] The design behind Japan's present venture is perfectly clear: To retain the South Pacific as a sphere of Western influence. We have already talked about that.

At the same time, by stepping up its economic pressure in the region, Japan has, in my view, planned to solve one more task. Together with an increase in the United States' military presence, it is wholly evident, that Tokyo's actions are called upon to hinder the implementation of the decisions by the South Pacific Forum for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region. This means Tokyo's so-called Pacific doctrine turns into an attempt to erect a barrier obstructing the Pacific Ocean states' striving toward peace and cooperation on behalf of future generations.

[Nekrasov] Today we have talked about the United States and the Pacific Ocean region, but I would like to make a remark of a general nature. What led me to make this remark was a publication in the U.S. magazine INTERNATIONAL POLICY REPORT. This is the organ of the New York Institute for the Study of World Politics -- this private research organization exists in the United States. In one of the latest issues it devoted a large article to the general state of, and prospects for, the development of the world situation. The magazine writes: It is difficult to say whether the Western countries will speak in favor of further militarization, as a means of guaranteeing their security, or whether they will depart from the present military plans, including the plans for developing [sozdaniye] space weapons, and will follow the path of demilitarizing international relations. As you see, the formulation is a sharp one. What conclusion does the magazine draw? This is the conclusion: Taking account of the dynamic nature of the present arrangement of political forces, both paths are possible. As you see, the U.S. magazine's opinion coincides with the conclusion drawn by the 27th CPSU Congress regarding the watershed nature of the present stage in the development of international relations. So I repeat, a struggle lies ahead for improving the world situation. A serious, intense, and prolonged struggle. And of course, in that struggle a great role and a great responsibility will be had by public forces throughout the world, including the United States and West Europe, by the same social forces which have already been struggling energetically for a number of years, for an end to nuclear tests, for the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Europe, for the

total elimination of nuclear weapons and for the practical implementation of the ideas and proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in accordance with the new political way of thinking.

[Andrianov] There we end our meeting today at the roundtable. All the participants thank you for your attention, esteemed comrade radio listeners. Goodbye. All the best.

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CSO: 5200/1278

RELATED ISSUES

U.S.-SOVIET SYMPOSIUM: PACIFIC SECURITY, FIRST STRIKE RISK

PM181901 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 51, 26 Dec 86 pp 17-21

[Unattributed report on "NEW TIMES symposium": "Bridge or Gulf?"]

[Excerpts] Can a bridge of cooperation and mutual understanding be built between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.? Much in the world today depends on the answer to that question. So far it has not been answered. Yet there is less and less time for procrastination. The world is groaning in the grip of confrontation. And this cannot go on indefinitely.

The following is a compilation of interviews taken at various times in the past several months. Of course, the subject of Soviet-American relations has many angles. We, therefore, dwell only on some of them, above all, their bearing on the multi-faceted end-of-century world.

In each case the same questions were put, and the general picture that emerged was that it is not easy to build a bridge when even among the Americans themselves there are so many different and often mutually exclusive ideas about what should be done first of all, what should not be done, what is important and what is irrelevant, what is hindering and what is promoting progress. Sometimes there was an obvious lack of the basic elements of mutual understanding, of any sign of the new thinking that would make it possible to go over from talk about "maintaining nuclear peace" to joint blueprints for a nuclear-free-secure epoch.

In the meantime much has been happening in the world. There were the hopes and disappointments of Reykjavik. There were and still are the Soviet proposals advanced there for stage-by-stage elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. There was and still is the American clinging to SDI, to which has been added the recent U.S. refusal to observe the existing strategic arms limitation agreements. There was and still is anti-Sovietism fostered by the U.S. military-industrial complex and ultra-right politicians.

The fact remains, however, that, according to opinion polls, 96 per cent of Americans believe that to seek a collision with the U.S.S.R. in the nuclear age is far too risky. The Soviet people stand 100 per cent for normal, stable, businesslike and ultimately friendly relations with the United States.

Can that bridge be built? That question is still open.

Taking part in this NEW TIMES symposium are Jack Matlock, a special assistant to the U.S. President, Vladimir Lomeyko, U.S.S.R. special envoy, and Strobe Talbott, chief of the Washington bureau of TIME magazine. The interviewers were NEW TIMES staff writers Galina Sidorova and Andrey Arkhipov.

NEW TIMES: Is the modern world bipolar or multipolar? What is the place of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in this world and what is the responsibility they bear for the solution of the main problem, the problem of war and peace?

Matlock: Whether the world is bipolar or multipolar depends upon what one is talking about. It's bipolar only in the sense that the United States and the Soviet Union have the greatest nuclear arsenals. So, on security questions, particularly involving nuclear questions, there is a large degree of bipolarity. In every other area, however, we live in a multipolar world, or a world where power is much more diffused.

Talbott: My own feeling and that, I think, of a lot of Americans of different political persuasions, is that the Soviet-American relationship is still central and paramount. It really has to do with two factors. First of all, this is the most dangerous adversary relationship in the world today, and, second, these two countries are the custodians, the caretakers of the arsenals of mass destruction weapons which represent a threat to the survival of the whole planet.

At the same time, the world has grown much more varied and complicated since the end of World War II. Through the process of decolonization there have grown up many more countries than there used to be. Since the Soviet Union achieved a status of a rough overall strategic nuclear equivalence with the United States foreign policy has taken a more active role, farther from the borders of the Soviet Union. This has brought the Soviet Union into conflict with the self-pursued interests of the United States and has created another arena of competition, namely, the rivalry for influence in the Third World.

Lomeyko: We live in a multipolar world characterized by an interweaving of complex contradictions, conflict and cooperation. These poles differ as regards the power and nature of their influence, their force of attraction and of repulsion. Above all, there are the two world systems--the capitalist and the socialist. And within these systems are the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the biggest nuclear arsenals, three imperialist centres--the U.S., Western Europe and Japan, the non-aligned movement and socialist China. We do

not look at the world through the prism of Soviet-American relations, although we recognize the particular responsibility of both powers for the maintenance of international security. It is precisely awareness of its special responsibility for the world's future that prompted the Soviet Union to advance its proposals for stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, and for a substantial reduction of conventional weapons, given, of course, strict observance of the principle of equal security for all countries and peoples.

Some U.S. political scientists prefer to look at the world through geopolitical spectacles. In my opinion, a new thinking, dictated by the realities of the nuclear age, would be more productive. And these realities call for an intensive search for an answer to the main question of our time: how to live so as to survive together and not to be at loggerheads with one another.

NEW TIMES: But surely it is not a matter of pessimism or optimism. Let us look at these ups and downs from another angle. Take the past six years. Under the present U.S. Administration Soviet-American relations have dropped to what is practically an all-time low. Washington ignores Moscow's readiness for negotiation and compromises. This was once again confirmed by Reykjavik and what has happened since: no sooner had the contours of comprehensive agreements emerged than the American leadership refused to abide by SALT-2 limitations and is seeking to undermine the ABM treaty. The impression is that right-wing forces are bent on giving effect to an unprecedented buildup of U.S. armed might at all costs. It looks as if the U.S. side is responsible for the ups and downs.

NEW TIMES: In what spheres is it realistic to speak of cooperation between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union?

Talbott: I think arms control is the only area where we can have regular, sustained, institutionalized cooperation. It's ironic that two adversary nations should not be able to agree about anything except the composition of the weapons that they would use against each other if they were ever to go to war. A paradox? Of course, precisely because war is not really an option for the political leaders of the two countries, no matter how hostile their relationships become. Therefore, they do have a mutual interest in preventing war, and one way at least to diminish the chances of it is to try to cooperate in managing the competition in the acquisition and deployment of weapons in such a way as to discourage the development of weapons that by their very nature might lead to war. When I say that arms control is the only area of American-Soviet relations, I mean that it is the only area where you can have cooperation. Obviously, there is room for cultural exchange, people-to-people exchanges, but that is not the main thing.

In the interests of survival we must above all display a desire and a will for joint action in the sphere of nuclear and conventional arms.

NEW TIMES: The relations between our countries in the military-political sphere rightly occupy the central place since the promotion of contacts in other spheres--economic, cultural and humanitarian--depend in large measure on the state of these relations. But the latter, in their turn, can create the atmosphere, the climate for the former. Here everything is interconnected. We have not yet touched upon another important aspect, namely, regional cooperation. What prospects for such cooperation are there in the Pacific region, for instance?

Lomeyko: The Pacific region is a vast untapped field for international cooperation. The Pacific Ocean washes the shores of such giants as the U.S.S.R., the United States, China and Australia. The "Japanese miracle" basks in its beneficence. This region is experiencing an economic boom. If the spirit of cooperation among all of its countries predominates the entire region will benefit. It was this consideration that prompted the proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speeches in Vladivostok and in Delhi.

Matlock: I don't think a conference on the Pacific of the sort that the Helsinki conference was in Europe is needed at this time. Problems of the Pacific are rather different. And we don't see them as necessarily of the same nature as those in Europe. Also I would say that we have been disappointed that the Helsinki Final Act has not been more completely implemented, and there would also be the consideration why duplicate Helsinki when Helsinki has fallen short of the expectations.

Talbott: I think one of the problems between the United States and the Soviet Union is the difference in the way in which each is a superpower. The United States is a super-power in large measure because of its economic strength, because of its vast commercial commitments and involvement in the economic lives of other countries. The Soviet Union is a superpower overwhelmingly and certainly primarily because of its military strength and the physical size of the country. That creates a certain asymmetry or tension between the two powers in the way they are going about or trying to exert their influence as superpowers. By definition it means that the United States is going to rely primarily on exertion of economic muscle and the Soviet Union on exertion of military muscle. I think this is very much true in the Pacific, where the United States has been in a period of retrenchment since the end of the war in Vietnam, although in the same period the Soviet Union has been considerably increasing its military presence in the area, including outside the borders of the U.S.S.R.

NEW TIMES: A strange assertion in the light of the increasing American presence, nuclear included, at many bases in the Pacific, in Japan and South Korea.

In this connection it might be in place to recall the Soviet initiatives envoy Lomeyko referred to. The U.S.S.R. proposes: resolving the problems relating to a regional settlement, raising an obstacle to the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific; starting talks on reducing naval activity in the Pacific, especially of ships equipped with nuclear weapons; securing a radical reduction within reasonable limits of armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia; carrying to a practical plane the discussion of confidence-building measures and of non-use of force in the region. Incidentally, no one is being urged to mechanically copy the Helsinki pattern. What is meant is the application of the positive experience of the all-European process to the specific conditions of this enormous region.

Let us turn to Europe. What role in your view could this continent play in safeguarding peace?

Matlock: Well, Europe is obviously a central point and the economic strength of Western Europe makes it a very important factor, and for the countries of Western Europe and internationally peace in Europe is, of course, essential.

Talbott: Europe emerged from World War II devastated, poor and demoralized. During the late 1940s, 1950s and even in the Kennedy Administration Europe was seen as the potential flashpoint, the geographical region of the world where, if the United States and the Soviet Union got into conflict, World War III would begin. Since Europe is a region with which the United States fell historically, politically, culturally and economically very closely bound, it felt itself terribly threatened by the expanded presence of Soviet armed forces after the end of World War II. And the creation of NATO, the creation of the Warsaw pact increased Soviet-American confrontation in Europe. In the early sixties we had a very severe crisis over Berlin. But all that seems to be in the past. I don't want to seem sanguine or overconfident, but it seems that the focus of Soviet-American tension has shifted in the last two decades from Europe to the Third World. So, I think that while there remain many problems to be solved and it would be irresponsible to say that there is no danger of war the situation in Europe is essentially stabilized.

Lomeyko: Europe's influence on world affairs is so great and so multiform that it can hardly be overestimated. It is compounded of history, culture and the spiritual potential deriving from all the knowledge accumulated over the centuries. It is a whole European civilization extending to the entire world.

Having experienced the losses and suffering of two world wars, Europe was able to appreciate more keenly than others the blessings of detente in the seventies and to keep its spirit alive in the eighties. The grim experience of war and the fruits of peace entitle Europe to be the trailblazer in a mixed continental undertaking--the building anew of detente. This, of course, is not facilitated

by military blocs. But one would like to hope that gravitation to cooperation and common sense will prove stronger than confrontation.

NEW TIMES: Is it correct to say that in the modern world the interdependence of states has grown markedly?

Matlock: Well, there are obviously interrelationships in the world. Whether these are so close that you have some sort of domino effect I'm not at all sure. Clearly, things can happen in one region which do not affect, in a critical sense, other regions.

NEW TIMES: And if you look at interdependence from the standpoint of security?

Lomeyko: In my opinion, in an age of nuclear overkill, when the planet has become a single crowded house, interdependence has reached a point where a striving for unilateral advantage to the detriment of another in the final analysis becomes detrimental to oneself.

Matlock: You know this is a term which it is difficult to be exact about. In a sense, both of us have enough military power to prevent the other from striking with impunity. On the other hand, there are large imbalances between the two. For example, the Soviets have many more heavy landbased missiles than does the United States, missiles which are the most accurate types. This imbalance worries us greatly. The United States has more systems in some other areas. However, these are usually slower and less accurate, and hence are not immediate threats. Also there are regional factors, so that I would hesitate to use the word parity. We feel that in destructive force the Soviet arsenals are now greater than ours, for example. Whether this means anything strategically is something else, but it does mean that in arms reduction agreements both sides are going to have to look closely to make sure that the outcome is properly balanced.

Talbott: Overall, I think, it is fair and accurate to say that a state of rough equivalence or parity exists. Within that parity there are dissymmetries, disparities, some of which are profoundly worrisome to Americans.

Lomeyko: As regards military, economic, strategic and other factors parity does not exist between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. One can argue oneself hoarse over specific questions, but on the global plane that parity is undubitable because neither of the two countries can win a war, neither can gain superiority without detriment to itself. But maintaining the present level of military-strategic parity is dangerous and costly. Therefore, we propose stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament, ruling out the development of new types of mass destruction weapons, including "star wars" weapons.

NEW TIMES: In this connection what is your view on the concept of "first nuclear strike?"

Matlock: Well, we feel that the Soviet Union at present has a distinct advantage in weaponry which could be used for a disarming first strike. So, we would hope that a way can be found as we negotiate a strategic arms agreement to get a better balance at lower levels. We are obviously willing to reduce some of our systems that may be greater in number than Soviet systems. We know that we have to trade off without asking something for nothing. But this is clearly one area in which we would like to see more reductions, because we feel it is important to reduce the possibility of a first strike and the anxiety from that. Also, we feel that inasmuch as we have no first-strike strategy at all, we think it would be rational to try to eliminate the type of weaponry that can be used for a disarming first strike on both sides, so that regardless of other circumstances neither side need feel that it can be hit by a disarming first strike.

Lomeyko: What about the development of space strike weapons within the framework of SDI? What about the directive Defence Guidance for 1984-1988 which says that "The American nuclear forces must prevail," that "the preferred attack technique would be 'decapitation' strike to destroy Soviet command, control, communications, and intelligence systems." Frankly speaking, all this worries Soviet people. We also remember that four American presidents--Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower (in Korea), Richard Nixon (in Vietnam), and Jimmy Carter (in the Persian Gulf) threatened to use the nuclear weapon, not to speak of the initial test the U.S. carried out over Japanese cities.

The concept of the "nuclear first strike" is amoral and absurd. Amoral, because it expresses the spirit, the philosophy and practice of deterrence which terrorizes mankind. Absurd, because in the nuclear overkill age it spells assured death. Who is the first to die is irrelevant. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union, unilaterally understood the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Talbott: It is almost impossible for me to conceive a leadership in either country that would plan to launch a preventive attack against the other. I hope that the arms control process would be more successful in the future than it has been today in inducing an evolution in the arsenals of both sides away from weapons that can be perceived by the adversary as potential first-strike weapons. That's the first problem. The other is the problem of the political shadow that nuclear weapons cast. One thing that can be said about nuclear weapons is that they exist only to be controlled, only to be negotiated over. But that is a slight exaggeration. Nuclear weapons also carry with them a certain symbolic political importance, and if one side is perceived by its adversary or by the rest of the world to have a considerable advantage in an important category this becomes a political advantage unacceptable to the other side.

NEW TIMES: The U.S.S.R. announced and is abiding by a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, the proposal for stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament is on the table in Geneva. If these opportunities are missed now, what will things be like in the year 2000?

Matlock: I'm not the one that feels that the door's closed for ever to possibilities, so I think that we'll have to keep working on these large problems and trying to find a solution. However, I would say that in my view the strategic situation in terms of keeping the nuclear peace is very stable today. I do not see any threat of war to the United States and the Soviet Union. There are many tensions, but no real threat of war. I think things are more stable in this respect than they were 15 or 20 years ago and we can see that in the sense that in the 1980s we have not had extreme crises like the Cuban missile crisis in the early 1960s. And although many people feel that tension is higher I do not think that is true in terms of the sort of tensions that could lead to a conflict. So I am confident that both sides are going to continue to avoid conflict with each other, as both of our leaders have stressed, regardless of what happens. But that does not mean that we should not keep trying to get the right sort of arms reduction agreements.

Talbott: It's a loaded question.

NEW TIMES: Turn it around any way you please.

Talbott: My own analysis is that like it or not, good or bad, just as the Soviet-American relationship is central to all international relations so the strategic nuclear arms control process which includes the issue of strategic defence is central to the issue of arms control. It is very difficult for me to conceive a meaningful progress in any other area of arms control, be it medium-range systems, conventional systems, multilateral force negotiations in Europe, chemical and biological weapons, or moratorium on testing nuclear weapons, unless there is, first, significant progress in what is now called the nuclear and space talks, that is, the Geneva negotiations.

The reason for that is both political and technical. The political reason is that, I think, it is generally acknowledged that those are the most important talks, and therefore set the tone, establish the climate for the others. The technical reason is that there are linkages between all these different forms of weapons--linkages between offence and defence, linkages between strategic systems and medium-range systems, the linkages between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons and so on. And so it's like a game of dominoes and you can't knock the last domino down until you've knocked the first one down, and the first one is the nuclear and space talks.

NEW TIMES: That, strictly speaking, is what was confirmed in Reykjavik. The inflexible stand taken by the U.S. on SDI torpedoed agreements that could have opened for mankind the door to a nuclear-free world.

Lomeyko: The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, as a prelude to our stage-by-stage plan to free the planet of nuclear weapons, is a sample of the new political thinking. Given reciprocity, it offers the world an epochal chance to meet the year 2000 not in the armoured garb of Mars, but in the flowing robes of Mercury. If this chance is missed, humanity will drive itself deeper and deeper into the labyrinth of new types of armaments. The world community so far clearly lacks the will and boldness of imagination to combat the monsters of the military-industrial complex. But the process of rethinking has begun, and it is irreversible, because the young generation, prompted by instinct and reason, is bent on mastering the art of survival.

NEW TIMES: In conclusion, let us look back at the beginning of this eventful year, to the days when the 27th CPSU Congress was in session in Moscow. "It is not at all easy in the current circumstances to predict the future of the relations between the socialist and capitalist countries, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.," the congress noted. "The decisive factors here will be the correlation of forces on the world scene, the growth and activity of the peace potential.... Much will depend, too, on the degree of realism that Western ruling circles will display in assessing the situation.... The course of history, of social progress, requires ever more insistently that there should be constructive and creative interaction between states and peoples on the scale of the entire world.

Let us hope that the bridge of cooperation and mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will be built from the American side as well.

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PM270857 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

["Conference of Central Committee Secretaries of the Socialist Countries' Fraternal Parties"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] A conference of Central Committee secretaries for international and ideological questions of the socialist countries' fraternal parties was held in Warsaw 22-23 January 1987. Participating in it were: From the BCP--Milko Balev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee; Yordan Yotov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee; Dimitur Stanishev, secretary of the BCP Central Committee; and Stoyan Mikhaylov, secretary of the BCP Central Committee; from the MSZMP--Janos Berecz, secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee, and Matyas Szuros, secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee; from the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV]--Tran Xuan Bach, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPV Central Committee, and Dao Duy Tung, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPV Central Committee; from the SED--Kurt Hager, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, and Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee; from the Communist Party of Cuba--Carlos Aldana Escalante, member of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee Secretariat; from the Lao People's Revolutionary Party--Somlat Chanthamath, secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Propaganda Committee; from the MPRP--Tserendashiyn Namsray, member of the Politburo and secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, and Tserenpilyn Balhaajab, secretary of the MPRP Central Committee; from the PZPR--Jan Glowczyk, member of the Politburo and secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, and Henryk Bednarski, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee; from the RCP--Petru Enache, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and secretary of the RCP Central Committee, and Ion Stoian, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and secretary of the RCP Central Committee; from the CPSU--A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and V.A. Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; from the CPCZ--Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, and Jan Fojtik, candidate member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee.

During the discussion of foreign policy questions it was stated that the efforts which the socialist states made during International Peace Year -- efforts aimed at struggling against the nuclear threat and creating an all-embracing system of international security -- are having a beneficial effect on changing the political climate in the world and the mood of the international public.

The 15 January 1986 statement of M.S. Gorbavhev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century made a major contribution to the struggle against the threat of war.

The fraternal parties' representatives emphasized the special significance of the Soviet Union's proposals at Reykjavik. This attests to the strength of the new political thinking. It has enabled millions of people to be convinced of the possibility of a rapid and significant reduction in nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet nuclear disarmament program, the Budapest program for reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, and the socialist countries' other constructive initiatives demonstrate a truly innovative approach to cardinal problems of world politics and socialism's lofty responsibility for the fate of mankind. Various political parties, broad public movements, and religious organizations have stepped up their efforts in the struggle for disarmament, security, cooperation, and peace.

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